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EXPUNGEMENT OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
J.J. Prescott and Sonja B. Starr∗ 
 Laws permitting the expungement of criminal convictions are a key component of modern 
criminal justice reform efforts and have been the subject of a recent upsurge in legislative 
activity.  This debate has been almost entirely devoid of evidence about the laws’ effects, in part 
because the necessary data (such as sealed records themselves) have been unavailable.  We were 
able to obtain access to de-identified data that overcome that problem, and we use it to carry 
out a comprehensive statewide study of expungement recipients and comparable nonrecipients 
in Michigan.  We offer three key sets of empirical findings.  First, among those legally eligible 
for expungement, just 6.5% obtain it within five years of eligibility.  Drawing on patterns in 
our data as well as interviews with expungement lawyers, we point to reasons for this serious 
“uptake gap.”  Second, those who do obtain expungement have extremely low subsequent crime 
rates, comparing favorably to the general population — a finding that defuses a common public-
safety objection to expungement laws.  Third, those who obtain expungement experience a 
sharp upturn in their wage and employment trajectories; on average, within one year, wages go 
up by over 22% versus the pre-expungement trajectory, an effect mostly driven by unemployed 
people finding jobs and minimally employed people finding steadier or higher-paying work. 
INTRODUCTION 
oday, somewhere between 19 and 24 million Americans have felony 
conviction records,1 and an unknown — but presumably much 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Henry King Ransom Professor of Law and Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, respectively, 
and Co-Directors of the Empirical Legal Studies Center, University of Michigan Law School.  The 
authors gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support of the National Science Foundation 
(Award No. SES 1023737) and the assistance of several Michigan state agencies in obtaining data: 
the State Police; the Workforce Development Agency; the Unemployment Insurance Agency; the 
Department of Technology, Management and Budget; and the State Court Administrative Office.  
We are also grateful to Miriam Aukerman, Jeff Morenoff, and David Harding for early advising, to 
conference and workshop participants at the NBER Summer Institute, Harvard Law School, the 
University of Michigan, the Center for American Progress, and the Michigan District Judges  
Association for helpful feedback, to colleagues at Michigan and elsewhere for fruitful discussions, 
and to all the experts whose interviews and emails are cited herein for sharing their insights.  We 
are indebted to Margaret Love and David Schlussel for their advice and support on this project, 
and we thank the many research assistants who contributed during the project’s ten-year history, 
including Patrick Balke, Grady Bridges, Gabriella D’Agostini, David Do, Haley Dutch, Jonathan 
Edelman, Nathaniel Givens, Seth Kingery, Rami Krispin, Elena Malik, German Marquez Alcala, 
Charlotte McEwen, Chris Pryby, Chelsea Rinnig, Zehra Siddiqui, and especially Simmon Kim for 
his extensive efforts. 
 1 See The Economic Impacts of the 2020 Census and Business Uses of Federal Data: Hear-
ing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 116th Cong. 12 (2019) (statement of Nicholas Eberstadt, Henry 
Wendt Chair in Political Economy, American Enterprise Institute); Sarah K.S. Shannon et al., 
The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with Felony Records in the United 
States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806 (2017).  When arrests are added, 75 million 
Americans — a third of adults — have criminal records.  See FBI, NOVEMBER 2018 NEXT 
T
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larger — number have misdemeanor conviction records.2  In recent 
years, policymakers, civil rights advocates, and scholars have paid in-
creasing attention to the substantial barriers to employment,3 housing,4 
and social integration5 that these records can pose, not to mention the 
hundreds of collateral legal consequences that typically flow from crim-
inal convictions, such as restrictions on public-benefits eligibility and 
occupational licensing.6  Taken together, these hurdles have been de-
scribed as amounting to a “new civil death,”7 and on a collective scale, 
this phenomenon magnifies racial disparities in employment and other 
outcomes due to disparities in the distribution of criminal records.  For 
all these reasons, a core part of this century’s emergent criminal justice 
reform movement has been a search for effective policy levers to miti-
gate the reentry barriers faced by people with criminal records.  This 
effort is picking up steam in virtually every corner of the country, with two-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
GENERATION IDENTIFICATION (NGI) SYSTEM FACT SHEET 1 (2018), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/ngi-monthly-fact-sheet/view [https://perma.cc/5KQJ-UBL5]. 
 2 No studies currently document the total number of Americans with misdemeanor convictions.  
However, statistics collected between 2008 and 2016 indicate that misdemeanors routinely make up 
over 70% of a state’s criminal caseload.  Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misde-
meanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 746 n.81 (2018). 
 3 See, e.g., NAN ASTONE, MICHAEL KATZ & JULIA GELATT, URBAN INST., INNOVATIONS 
IN NYC HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES POLICY: YOUNG MEN’S INITIATIVE 6 (2014), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/32651/413057-Innovations-in-NYC-Health-
and-Human-Services-Policy-Young-s-Men-s-Initiative.PDF [https://perma.cc/V954-Y23W]; Fact 
Sheet: President Obama Announces New Actions to Promote Rehabilitation and Reintegration for 
the Formerly-Incarcerated, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/02/fact-sheet-president-obama- 
announces-new-actions-promote-rehabilitation [https://perma.cc/F89L-69K4]. 
 4 See, e.g., ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, HAMILTON PROJECT, PUTTING TIME LIMITS ON 
THE PUNITIVENESS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (2016), https://www. 
hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/reducing_punitiveness_piehl_policymemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
XQ5P-DWKF]; MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY 
LAW, WHEN DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL 
RECORDS BARRIERS TO FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 1 (2015), https://www. 
povertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV7K-GSEV]. 
 5 See, e.g., Amy L. Solomon, In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, NIJ 
J., June 2012, at 42, 44, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238488.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T6Y-TK9F]; 
Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to State Attorneys Gen. (Apr. 18, 2011) (available 
at https://web.archive.org/web/20120227180437/http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ 
documents/0000/1088/Reentry_Council_AG_Letter.pdf). 
 6 See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE §§ 1:12, 2:8, 2:75, 6:16 (2018); see also Gabriel J. 
Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1789, 1811–14 (2012); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. 
REV. 1055, 1089–94 (2015).  See generally National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Con-
viction, CSG JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org [https://perma.cc/N79E-5PFN] [herein-
after CSG Inventory]. 
 7 Chin, supra note 6, at 1790; see also JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 
4 (2015) (observing that criminal records are “for life” and “there is no statute of limitations”). 
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thirds of U.S. states adopting one or more such policies in 2018,8 and forty-
three states, the federal government, and the District of Columbia passing 
an “extraordinary 153 laws” aimed at this problem in 2019.9 
Perhaps the policy levers with the greatest theoretical potential to 
improve reentry outcomes are laws that allow criminal conviction rec-
ords to be wholly expunged or, at least, sealed from public view.  We 
will refer to such laws collectively as “expungement laws,” and this pro-
cess as “expungement,” although such shorthand elides some differ-
ences.10  Expungement offers the possibility of sweeping aside a wide 
range of legal and socioeconomic consequences at once; these laws typ-
ically authorize individuals to apply for jobs, housing, schools, and ben-
efits as though their convictions did not exist. 
Today, a substantial majority of U.S. states provide some form of 
expungement procedure for otherwise-valid adult convictions.11  Many 
states have recently adopted, or are presently considering, new expunge-
ment laws or expansions to existing ones.12  For example, New Mexico, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 A major report by the Collateral Consequences Resource Center documents the “extraordi-
nary number of laws passed [by thirty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands] in 2018 aimed at reducing barriers to successful reintegration for individuals with a crimi-
nal record,” calling it the “most productive legislative year since a wave of ‘fair chance’ reforms 
began in 2013.”  Press Release, Collateral Consequences Resource Center, New Report on 2018 Fair 
Chance and Expungement Reforms (Updated) (Jan. 10, 2019), https://ccresourcecenter. 
org/2019/01/10/press-release-new-report-on-2018-fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms/#more-18004 
[https://perma.cc/4AGU-6CH5]; see also  MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE AND 
EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018, at 2–3 (2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9QA5-9PMM]. 
 9 MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., 
PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2019, at 1–2 (2020), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Pathways-to-Reintegration_Criminal- 
Record-Reforms-in-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/35MG-734Y]. 
 10 The details vary by jurisdiction, and many advocates use various terms such as “expungement,” 
“sealing,” and “set-aside” interchangeably.  Typically, a true “expungement” legally eliminates the record 
from the state’s perspective.  “Sealing” maintains the record for some limited state purposes (for exam-
ple, law enforcement investigations of future crimes) but insulates it from public view.  
 11 Two useful online resources contain periodically updated collections of these laws; at our last 
check, we found slightly different information at the two sites, but both include close to forty states 
with some form of expungement law for valid, nonpardoned, and nonvacated adult criminal con-
victions.  See 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief, COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR., https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/50-state-
comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside [https://perma.cc/JA4B-2HUD] [hereinafter 
CCRC State Survey]; States, CLEAN SLATE CLEARINGHOUSE, https://cleanslateclearinghouse. 
org/compare-states [https://perma.cc/94VU-UPRD]. 
 12 For example, in 2018 alone, twenty states passed twenty-nine bills expanding expungement 
eligibility.  LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 8, at 2.  In 2019, there was still further activity, with “31 
states and D.C. enact[ing] no fewer than 67 bills creating, expanding, or streamlining record relief,” and 
twenty states “authoriz[ing] diversion programs that produce non-conviction dispositions newly eligible 
for record-clearing under existing law.”  LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 9, at 10.  Fifteen of these 
states took “incremental” steps, and five made more dramatic eligibility-enhancing changes.  Id. at 
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for the first time, passed a law in 2019 to make a petition-based expunge-
ment process available,13 and it is not alone.14  In 2018, Pennsylvania be-
came the first state to adopt a sweeping program of automatic expunge-
ment of adult criminal convictions — specifically, nonviolent 
misdemeanors after ten crime-free years.15  In 2019, Utah, New Jersey, 
and California also enacted automatic expungement laws,16 which are 
more ambitious in some ways.  For example, Utah has only a five-year 
waiting period in some instances,17 and California’s recent legislation 
has even shorter waiting periods (none in some cases) and encompasses 
minor felonies as well as misdemeanors, although the law only operates 
prospectively.18  The New Jersey law extends automatic expungement 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
10–17.  We note that many of the new or amended laws have features that roughly parallel the 
Michigan law we study, and therefore, our work can be useful in predicting the likely consequences 
of these reforms. 
 13 Danny W. Jarrett et al., New Mexico Adopts Ban-the-Box, Expungement Laws, 
JACKSONLEWIS (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/new-mexico-adopts-
ban-box-expungement-laws [https://perma.cc/96SE-ABY9].  The expungement law went into effect 
on January 1, 2020.  Id. 
 14 See LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 9, at 14 (“New Mexico, North Dakota, Delaware, West 
Virginia, and Colorado made particularly dramatic changes to their petition-based systems to ex-
tend eligibility for relief to a range of non-conviction and conviction records.  None of the first four 
states had previously authorized relief for felony-level offenses, and Colorado had authorized seal-
ing only for drug convictions.  The comprehensive schemes enacted by North Dakota and New 
Mexico are noteworthy as the first laws in those states to authorize sealing of adult criminal records.  
Both states extend relief to most felonies, but they also require the applicant to pay a filing fee and 
make the case for relief at a court hearing.  (North Dakota courts may dispense with the hearing if 
the prosecutor agrees.)”). 
 15 Faith Karimi, Pennsylvania Is Sealing 30 Million Criminal Records as Part of Clean Slate 
Law, CNN (June 28, 2019, 4:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/28/us/pennsylvania-clean-slate-
law-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/5XVN-RFFE].  Felonies, as well as violent and certain other 
serious misdemeanors, are ineligible for automatic expungement.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.3(a), 
(b) (2019).  But such offenses are still potentially eligible for expungement by petition.  Id. § 9122.3(c). 
 16 Jessica Miller, Utah Lawmakers Pass the “Clean Slate” Bill to Automatically Clear the Criminal 
Records of People Who Earn an Expungement, SALT LAKE TRIB., (Mar. 16, 2019) 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/03/14/utah-lawmakers-pass-clean [https://perma.cc/HVV7-VFE6]; 
Press Release, State of N.J., Governor Murphy Signs Major Criminal Justice Reform Legislation  (Dec. 
18, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/562019/approved/20191218a.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/V5YE-RK8F]; CCRC Staff, California Becomes Third State to Adopt “Clean Slate” Record 
Relief, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (Oct. 10, 2019), http://ccresourcecenter. 
org/2019/10/10/california-becomes-third-state-to-adopt-clean-slate-record-relief 
[https://perma.cc/8U5C-XSRJ]. 
 17 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102(5)(a)(iii)(A) (LexisNexis 2020).  The waiting periods are six 
years for more serious misdemeanors and seven years for certain drug crimes.  Id. §§ 77-40-
102(5)(a)(iii)(B)–(C). 
 18 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425(a)(2)(E) (West 2020) (stating that automatic relief is available 
only for convictions “on or after January 1, 2021,” and only for misdemeanors, infractions, and 
offenses resulting in a sentence of probation).  For all crimes resulting in probation sentences (even 
felonies), relief is automatic after completing probation, with no further waiting period.  Id. 
§ 1203.425(a)(2)(E)(i).  Automatic expungement is also available for all misdemeanors, even those 
resulting in jail time; in that case the waiting period is one year.  Id. § 1203.425(a)(2)(E)(ii). 
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to some felonies as well as misdemeanors, without limits as to the num-
ber of convictions expunged, after a ten-year period with no subsequent 
convictions.19  Other states may soon follow suit.20  More typically, ex-
pungement laws require individuals to go through a judicial process to 
apply for relief, usually giving judges the discretion to deny the petition.  
Many states have stringent eligibility requirements as to crime type or 
severity or the number of convictions on the individual’s record, and 
many have waiting periods.21 
Despite the considerable legislative ferment and the excitement that 
surrounds these “Clean Slate” initiatives in the civil rights and criminal 
justice reform worlds, what has been missing from the debate is hard 
evidence about the effects and true potential of conviction expungement 
laws.  Empirical studies in this area have been difficult to carry out.  
Expunged criminal records are, obviously, not typically available to 
study — and other relevant outcome data, such as wage information or 
employment status, are also protected by privacy laws.  While there are 
many persuasive theoretical reasons to believe that expungement laws 
will have large and important effects across many domains,22 the dearth 
of empirical evidence is a significant hindrance to reform and experi-
mentation.  It leaves policymakers almost entirely in the dark. 
In this Article, we present the results of an unprecedented statewide 
study that overcomes existing limitations on research on expungement and 
seeks to fill various policy-relevant gaps in our empirical knowledge.  Pur-
suant to a data-sharing agreement with the State of Michigan, we were 
able to obtain complete, de-identified criminal records from the  
Michigan State Police (MSP) on all individuals who had received convic-
tion expungements (known as “set-asides” in Michigan) as of March 2014, 
as well as full criminal history records for much larger comparison groups 
of individuals with convictions that were not expunged.  In addition, the 
state matched these criminal histories with detailed wage and employment 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Criminal History Record Information — Expungement, 2019 N.J. Sess. Laws Serv. 11–12 
(West) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52–5.3).  In the immediate term, this relief is petition 
based, but a task force has been directed to develop an automated process.  Id. at 12–14 (to be 
codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52–5.4). 
 20 See, e.g., Expungement Bill Package Passes House with Overwhelming Bi-partisan Support, MICH. 
HOUSE DEMOCRATS (Nov. 22, 2019), https://housedems.com/article/expungement-bill- 
package-passes-house-overwhelming-bi-partisan-support [https://perma.cc/2PWU-2ZVL]; Kelan Lyons, 
Winfield to Swap Out Lamont’s Clean Slate Bill with a Broader Measure, CT MIRROR (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://ctmirror.org/2020/02/26/winfield-to-swap-out-lamonts-clean-slate-bill-for-a-broader-measure 
[https://perma.cc/2AX2-BMWZ]. 
 21 See sources cited supra note 11; see also infra section I.B, pp. 2472–76 (describing this legal 
landscape in more detail). 
 22 See, e.g., Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Ex-
pungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2824–26 (2018); Amy Myrick, Facing Your Criminal Rec-
ord: Expungement and the Collateral Problem of Wrongfully Represented Self, 47 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 73, 74 (2013). 
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data for the same individuals from the state’s unemployment insurance 
program, sharing these data with us as well.  
Michigan is an ideal setting in which to study expungement laws: it 
is a large, diverse state with criminal justice challenges typical of the 
United States today.  Moreover, the version of Michigan’s expungement 
law we study has many of the common features of a petition-based  
record-clearing law, and it applies to a diverse set of records (e.g., vio-
lent/nonviolent, misdemeanor/felony), carries a fairly short waiting pe-
riod, has relatively straightforward eligibility rules, and went untouched 
for more than two decades, allowing us to study results over time. 
We use our unique data to investigate a number of interrelated em-
pirical questions, which can be grouped into three main areas of inquiry.  
First, we examine the critical question of the “uptake rate”: the rate at 
which those who are legally eligible for expungements actually receive 
them.23  We find that Michigan’s expungement uptake rate is discour-
agingly low; our best estimate is that only 6.5% of all eligible individuals 
receive an expungement within five years of the date at which they first 
qualify for one.24  To better understand the uptake process, we examine 
the characteristics of expungement recipients and their offenses and as-
sess whether some characteristics are predictive of uptake by eligible 
individuals.  We then use these data, plus interviews with Michigan ex-
pungement lawyers and advocates for people with criminal records, to 
inform a discussion of why people might not apply for expungements 
despite their potential benefits. 
Second, we investigate expungement recipients’ subsequent criminal 
offending.25  We find very low rates of recidivism: just 7.1% of all expunge-
ment recipients are rearrested within five years of receiving their expunge-
ment (and only 2.6% are rearrested for violent offenses), while reconvic-
tion rates are even lower: 4.2% for any crime and only 0.6% for a violent 
crime.  Indeed, expungement recipients’ recidivism rates compare favor-
ably with those of the Michigan population as a whole.26  We do not 
claim that these low rates are necessarily because of expungements, al-
though there are several channels by which expungement receipt could 
potentially contribute to lower recidivism risk.  Another likely explana-
tion is that people who have limited criminal records and have gone at 
least five years since their last conviction are simply very low risk to 
begin with.  This finding is consistent with the broader empirical liter-
ature on patterns of desistance from crime.  Whatever the cause, the low 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 23 See infra Part II, pp. 2486–2510. 
 24 Although our data do not identify unsuccessful applicants, it is clear from follow-up inquiries with 
the Michigan State Police that the low uptake rate can be primarily attributed to individuals’ failure to 
apply, rather than to denials of applications by judges.  See infra section II.C.6, pp. 2506–210. 
 25 See infra Part III, pp. 2510–23. 
 26 See infra p. 2514. 
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recidivism rates we observe help to defuse an otherwise potentially con-
vincing policy argument against expungement laws: that the public (in-
cluding employers and landlords) has a safety interest in knowing about 
the prior records of those with whom they interact. 
Third, we examine the employment consequences of criminal record 
expungement.27  After accounting for an individual’s prior employment 
and wage history, as well as broader changes in the economy, we find 
that expungement recipients experience considerable gains shortly after 
receipt.  Within one year, on average, an individual’s odds of being em-
ployed (earning any wages at all) increase by a factor of 1.13; their odds 
of earning at least $100/week (a slightly more demanding employment 
measure) increase by a factor of 1.23; and their reported quarterly wages 
increase by a factor of 1.23 (and are sustained in subsequent years).  
These results suggest that those with expunged records gain access to 
more and better-paying jobs.  To be sure, one has to be cautious about 
drawing causal inferences here; it is very possible that some of the gains 
come about because people choose to seek expungement at a time that 
they are especially motivated to seek improvements in their economic 
situation.  Nonetheless, our data and other supporting evidence give us 
some confidence that at least a large fraction of the improvement that 
we observe stems from the clean record itself. 
We provide background on expungement laws, existing relevant em-
pirical research, and our research setting (including our data and their 
limitations) in Part I.  We then present the three major components of 
our work — our analyses of expungement uptake, the recidivism rates 
among expungement recipients, and the relationship between expunge-
ment and subsequent employment outcomes — in Parts II, III, and IV, 
respectively.  In Part V, we respond to two potential objections to ex-
pungement, which might, if accurate, influence the policy takeaways of 
our empirical results.  In the Conclusion, we address policy implications 
and consider future research possibilities.   
Our findings tell a good news/bad news story: when expungement is 
not automatic (and takes time, effort, and even money to apply), only a 
very small share of the people eligible for relief actually apply for and 
receive an expungement — but those who do experience clear improve-
ments in economic outcomes and pose little public-safety risk.  Taken 
together, these conclusions have a clear policy upshot: they support the 
expansion of expungement availability, an easing of the procedural hur-
dles associated with seeking expungement, and, in particular, the emerg-
ing movement to make expungement occur automatically after a period 
of time, rather than after an application process. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See infra Part IV, pp. 2523–43. 
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I.  EXPUNGEMENT POLICIES AND RELATED RESEARCH 
Several large bodies of scholarly research, as well as active policy 
debates and commentary, inform and motivate our study.  In section I.A, 
we describe the many hurdles people with public criminal records face; 
paring back these hurdles is the core policy motivation for expungement 
laws and efforts to expand them.  In section I.B, we add some further 
detail to the Introduction’s description of the current legal and policy 
landscape surrounding expungement.  In section I.C, we discuss the very 
limited empirical research that exists on expungement and identify the 
key unanswered empirical questions that we seek to address.  In section 
I.D, we turn to our specific empirical setting, describing Michigan’s ex-
pungement law and the data that we use in our study. 
A.  The Economic and Legal Aftermath of a Criminal Conviction 
The consequences of criminal convictions do not end when people 
convicted of crimes complete their formal sentences.  For many individ-
uals, punishments such as probation, fines, and even incarceration may 
be dwarfed in importance by what comes next: exclusion from employ-
ment, obstacles to social integration, and a vast array of collateral legal 
consequences that often last a lifetime.28  A growing body of academic 
research documents the scope, ubiquity, and size of these hurdles.29 
First, people with criminal records face serious employment barri-
ers — indeed, these barriers may exceed those facing any other disad-
vantaged group.30  While many aspects of these individuals’ back-
grounds, as well as the interruptions to work and education experienced 
by those who are incarcerated, may put them at greater risk of unem-
ployment than the general population,31 the criminal record itself also 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence — Understanding Collateral Consequences, NIJ 
J., Sept. 2013, at 25, 25 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/241927.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2FM-
8GF3]; CSG Inventory, supra note 6;  see also LOVE ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 1:11–1:12, 2:44. 
 29 See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY (2010), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_ 
assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7XB-MCEN]; Anastasia Christman & 
Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, Research Supports Fair Chance Policies, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT 
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.nelp.org/publication/research-supports-fair-chance-policies [https:// 
perma.cc/V7GG-YQNT]. 
 30 See Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Ra-
cial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 471 (2006); Devah Pager, The Mark of a 
Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 960 (2003). 
 31 DEBBIE MUKAMAL, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FROM HARD TIME TO FULL TIME: 
STRATEGIES TO HELP MOVE EX-OFFENDERS FROM WELFARE TO WORK, Part III.B (2001), 
https://hirenetwork.org/sites/default/files/From%20Hard%20Time%20to%20Full%20Time.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XM8-H8KT]; AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO 
WORK: THE EMPLOYMENT DIMENSIONS OF PRISONER REENTRY 8–11 (2004), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/58126/411097-From-Prison-to-Work.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/6W2R-CFQS]; JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: 
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seems to directly harm employment prospects.32  Many employers report 
that they take steps to avoid hiring individuals with records.33  Their 
motivations for doing so vary.  A report prepared for the Department of 
Labor has found that many employers are driven by “bias and stigma.”34  
Some believe that individuals with records cannot be trusted.35  Others 
fear a negligent-hiring lawsuit if an employee hired with a criminal rec-
ord commits a crime while on the job.36 
Experimental results confirm employers’ reluctance to hire individ-
uals with records.  Devah Pager had matched pairs of testers, differing 
only in criminal history, apply for a range of employment positions.37  
She found that applicants without records received more than twice as 
many callbacks.38  More recently, Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr sent 
around 15,000 fictitious job applications paired by race to entry-level 
jobs mainly in the restaurant and retail industries.39  They found that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 31–33 (2001), http://re-
search.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2Z6-RYGR]. 
 32 CHERRIE BUCKNOR & ALAN BARBER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE 
PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC COSTS OF BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMER 
PRISONERS AND PEOPLE CONVICTED OF FELONIES 10–13 (2016), http://cepr.net/images/ 
stories/reports/employment-prisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf?v=5 [https://perma.cc/M58K-E5FE]; 
SCOTT H. DECKER ET AL., CRIMINAL STIGMA, RACE, GENDER, AND EMPLOYMENT: AN 
EXPANDED ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPRISONMENT FOR EMPLOYMENT 
56 (2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/244756.pdf [https://perma.cc/M82H-3DHQ]. 
In a small study of expungement seekers in Chicago, “participants reported attempts to use face-to-
face contact with potential employers and landlords to convince them that, despite their criminal 
records, they were trustworthy and dependable.  However, participants with both extensive and 
minor criminal record histories indicated that these attempts were ineffective.”  Simone Ispa-Landa 
& Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal Record: Stigma Reports Among 
Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387, 401 (2016) (internal citations omitted). 
 33 MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2011), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YS6-F2SR]; Holzer et al., 
supra note 30, at 455; Sarah Esther Lageson et al., Legal Ambiguity in Managerial Assessments of 
Criminal Records, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 191 (2015). 
 34 MUKAMAL, supra note 31, at III.B. 
 35 See Harry J. Holzer, Collateral Costs: Effects of Incarceration on Employment and Earnings 
Among Young Workers, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE 
PRISON BOOM 239, 248 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009). 
 36 LOVE ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 6:18–6:29; see also MUKAMAL, supra note 31, at IV.A.2; SOC’Y 
FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. & CHARLES KOCH INST., WORKERS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 5 
(2018), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/pages/second-
chances.aspx [https://perma.cc/JDQ8-T9ME]; Holzer, supra note 35, at 243. 
 37 Pager, supra note 30, at 946–48. 
 38 See id. at 958 fig.6. 
 39 Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A 
Field Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191, 192, 198 (2018) [hereinafter Agan & Starr, Ban the Box]; 
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment, 107 AM. 
ECON. REV. 560, 560–61 (2017). 
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when employers asked about criminal history, the applicants without rec-
ords received 63% more callbacks, even though the records in question 
were relatively minor.40  Many employers, influenced by the national “Ban 
the Box” movement and resulting law changes, have removed questions 
about criminal history from initial job applications — but these employers 
typically still conduct background checks before finalizing a hire.41  A sur-
vey in 2012 reported that 87% of randomly sampled employers performed 
criminal background checks on at least some employees; 69% performed 
background checks on all employees.42  This represented an expansion 
from an earlier era, driven by the availability of easier and less costly 
internet-based searches.43  Almost all states place court records on the 
internet,44 and private companies, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, also 
market criminal history databases.45 
In addition to these employment consequences, criminal convictions 
bring with them a wide range of other “collateral” legal consequences — 
that is, consequences that are not part of the sentence but a function of 
a wide array of civil laws.  Licensing restrictions categorically exclude 
previously convicted individuals from hundreds of professions.46  These 
individuals are often prohibited from receiving various social services, 
including welfare and health benefits, public housing, and food 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 Agan & Starr, Ban the Box, supra note 39, at 195, 200. 
 41 See id. at 193 n.3.  The slogan refers to the fact that such questions are often set apart in a 
box on the application form. 
 42 See SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SHRM SURVEY FINDINGS: BACKGROUND 
CHECKING — THE USE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS IN HIRING DECISIONS (2012), 
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Pages/ 
criminalbackgroundcheck.aspx [https://perma.cc/3EQU-KBQL]. 
 43 See JACOBS, supra note 7, at 5; LOVE ET AL., supra note 6, § 5:2; Jeffrey Selbin et al.,  
Unmarked? Criminal Record Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 9 (2018). 
 44 See Privacy/Public Access to Court Records: State Links, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., 
https://www.ncsc.org/topics/access-and-fairness/privacy-public-access-to-court-records/state-links 
[https://perma.cc/V2HP-3J6M]. 
 45 See Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1191, 1198–99 (2006). 
 46 See CHIDI UMEZ & REBECCA PIRIUS, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
BARRIERS TO WORK: IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT IN LICENSED OCCUPATIONS FOR 
INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 3 (2018), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/ 
Labor/Licensing/criminalRecords_v06_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GKS-GJUF]; Alec C. Ewald, 
Collateral Consequences and the Perils of Categorical Ambiguity, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT/LAW 
AS REGULATION 77, 87–88 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2011); Policy Changes Needed to Unlock  
Employment and Entrepreneurial Opportunity for 100 Million Americans with Criminal Records, 
Kauffman Research Shows, BUSINESSWIRE (Nov. 29, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/ 
news/home/20161129005528/en/Policy-Needed-Unlock-Employment-Entrepreneurial-Opportunity-
100 [https://perma.cc/UA6K-VEEG]; Shoshana Weissmann & Nila Bala, Opinion, Criminal Justice, 
Occupational Licensing Reforms Can Go Hand in Hand, THE HILL (Apr. 15, 2018, 4:30 PM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/383262-criminal-justice-occupational-licensing-reforms-can-
go-hand-in-hand [https://perma.cc/R7SU-ZMWZ]. 
  
2020] EXPUNGEMENT OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 2471 
stamps.47  Whole families can be evicted from public housing on the 
basis of one member’s convictions.48  Exclusion from housing renders 
individuals with records homeless at high rates — for instance, in 1997, 
the California Department of Corrections estimated that 10% of its pa-
rolees were homeless.49  The specifics of these exclusions vary from state 
to state, although some are encouraged or required by federal law.50  
They also vary based on crime type.51 
Because so many Americans have conviction records, these conse-
quences have a large aggregate impact.  Repercussions include spillover 
effects on family members never convicted of any crime; the Center for 
American Progress estimates that almost half of U.S. children have a 
parent with some form of criminal record (including arrests).52  In addi-
tion, because criminal records are not equally distributed across the popu-
lation,53 the effects of these collateral consequences are disproportionately 
concentrated by race, gender, and poverty status, especially affecting black 
men.54  This concentration of criminal records may therefore be a signifi-
cant contributor to racial disparities in employment and other socioeco-
nomic outcomes. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 19, introductory cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 
2004); PAUL SAMUELS & DEBBIE MUKAMAL, LEGAL ACTION CTR., AFTER PRISON: 
ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY 12–13, 16 (2004), http://www.november.org/resources/LACReportCard. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/FGV5-39ZZ]; Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social 
Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS 
IMPRISONMENT 15, 23–25 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002); Geiger, supra note 45, 
at 1204–06. 
 48 Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Crim-
inal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 299 (2011). 
 49 CAL. STATE DEP’T OF CORR., PREVENTING PAROLEE FAILURE PROGRAM: AN 
EVALUATION 2 (1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/180542NCJRS.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JX2E-V3BZ]. 
 50 See MUKAMAL, supra note 31, at III.A.1; Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and 
Housing — Denial of Benefits to Drug Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT, supra note 47, at 
37, 41–42; Geiger, supra note 45, at 1204. 
 51 See SAMUELS & MUKAMAL, supra note 47, at 16. 
 52 Rebecca Vallas et al., Removing Barriers to Opportunity for Parents with Criminal Records 
and Their Children, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 10, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2015/12/10/126902/removing-barriers-to-opportunity-
for-parents-with-criminal-records-and-their-children [https://perma.cc/KU9B-YUH7]. 
 53 See E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2016, at 10 (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/68J8-QFQT] (showing imprison-
ment rates in 2016 at 1609, 857, and 274 per 100,000 U.S. residents for black, Hispanic, and white 
adults, respectively); Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence 
by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 476 (2014) (finding about half of black men have 
been arrested by age twenty-three compared to 38% of white men). 
 54 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 29, at 27; Andi Mullin, Banning the Box in  
Minnesota — and Across the United States!, COMMUNITY CATALYST (Dec. 2, 2013), 
https://www.communitycatalyst.org/blog/banning-the-box-in-minnesota-and-across-the-united-
states [https://perma.cc/69C6-TBU2]. 
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B.  Sealing of Criminal Records: The Legal and Policy Landscape 
More than two-thirds of states have adopted statutes that permit 
adult criminal convictions to be sealed, set aside, or expunged.55  These 
laws generally require state agencies to ignore the affected individual’s 
criminal record for most purposes other than law enforcement, thereby 
lifting any statutory barriers to public employment, licensing, and ben-
efits.  The laws also give an individual expungement recipient the legal 
right to respond “no” when an employer or landlord asks if the applicant 
has a criminal record.56  In most states (including Michigan), sealed con-
victions remain available for law enforcement purposes, and for sen-
tencing in the event of a subsequent crime.57 
The specific eligibility requirements for criminal record expunge-
ment vary widely across jurisdictions.  For example, some states’ laws 
exclude certain classes of crimes, such as violent felonies.58  Waiting pe-
riods also vary: In some states, at least for some categories of crime, 
individuals can apply for expungement immediately after completing 
their sentence (although evidence of rehabilitation must generally be 
shown, which can be harder if little time has passed).59  Other states, by 
contrast, have minimum waiting periods ranging from one to twenty 
years.60  In some states (including Michigan), it is illegal for an employer 
to discriminate on the basis of an expunged conviction if the employer 
becomes aware of it.61  The Collateral Consequences Resource Center 
and the Clean Slate Clearinghouse provide comprehensive state-by-state 
information on expungement laws.62 
Beyond adult conviction records, most states have other expunge-
ment policies covering at least some other types of criminal records, such 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 55 See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, supra note 32, at 392. 
 56 Adult Criminal Record FAQs, PAPILLON FOUND., http://www.papillonfoundation.org/ 
information/expungement-faqs#Adult_Criminal_Record [https://perma.cc/SA3T-GWF6]. 
 57 See, e.g., MICH. COURTS, NONPUBLIC AND LIMITED-ACCESS COURT RECORDS (2020), 
https://courts.michigan.gov/administration/scao/resources/documents/standards/cf_chart.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/9SVE-MJR5] (cataloging different kinds of court records and the access restrictions imposed 
on those records “by statute, court order, or court rule,” id. at i, as of January 2020). 
 58 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 18(A)(11) (2020). 
 59 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a 
(West 2020). 
 60 See CCRC State Survey, supra note 11. 
 61 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a)(1) (West 2020) (prohibiting employment discrimination); 
see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12952 (West 2020) (prohibiting disclosure in its new enactment).  In 
Michigan, to use or divulge information about an expunged conviction is a misdemeanor.  MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.623(5) (West 2020) (“Except as provided in subsection (2), a person, other 
than the applicant . . . , who knows or should have known that a conviction was set aside under 
this section and who divulges, uses, or publishes information concerning a conviction set aside un-
der this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days 
or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.”). 
 62 See sources cited supra note 11. 
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as juvenile records, nonconviction records, or convictions that have been 
overturned or are subject to successful collateral attack.63  Many also 
have deferred-adjudication programs available for certain defendants 
(for example, first-time drug crime defendants or youthful defendants), 
in which no conviction is ever entered if the defendant completes certain 
requirements.64  These laws raise related empirical and policy questions, 
and discussions about them might well be able to draw on our findings.  
But we focus here on state laws that expunge otherwise-valid adult con-
victions that have become final; these policies have been expanding in 
scope in recent years and are the subject of active political debates in 
many states.  Although supported by the American Bar Association,65 
and by advocacy groups such as the National Employment Law Project, 
the Center for American Progress, and Community Legal Services,66 
they have also met with considerable political opposition, principally 
from employers, who want access to information that they consider rel-
evant to hiring decisions.67 
The most recent wave of efforts to expand and improve expungement 
laws — often referred to by advocates as the “Clean Slate” movement — 
has focused to a large degree on the potential for automatic expungement 
of certain criminal records after a certain period of time.68  The ground-
breaking success in this area was the adoption of Pennsylvania’s Clean 
Slate Act, which extends court-ordered criminal record sealing to encom-
pass a broader set of offenses and creates an automatic computerized pro-
cess for sealing certain eligible convictions: minor nonviolent misdemean-
ors after ten years without a subsequent conviction.69  The Clean Slate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 See id. 
 64 See id. (describing deferred-adjudication programs). 
 65 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 19-2.5  (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 2004); AM. 
BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 109B, at 1 (2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/ 
2019-midyear/2019-midyear-109b.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJ5R-2ZV8]. 
 66 See Press Release, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Removing Barriers to Economic Opportunity for 
Americans with Criminal Records Is Focus of New Multistate Initiative by CAP, NELP, and CLS 
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2017/09/12/437592/release-removing-
barriers-economic-opportunity-americans-criminal-records-focus-new-multistate-initiative-cap-nelp-
cls [https://perma.cc/E73W-W8BK]. 
 67 See, e.g., Alison Knezevich, New State Laws to Help Marylanders Clear Arrest Records, BALT. 
SUN (Sept. 26, 2015, 11:02 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bs-md-expungement-
changes-20150926-story.html [https://perma.cc/R3X3-4YFD]; Nancy Reardon, Activists Want Law 
to Seal Criminal Records Sooner, PATRIOT LEDGER (July 28, 2009, 9:11 PM), https://www. 
patriotledger.com/x836550449/Activists-want-law-to-seal-criminal-records-sooner 
[https://perma.cc/B5R6-W3MN]. 
 68 See CLEAN SLATE, https://cleanslateinitiative.org [https://perma.cc/S3FF-JPGA]. 
 69 See Act of June 28, 2018, No. 402, 2018 Pa. Laws No. 56; Press Release, Governor Tom Wolf 
of Pa., Governor Wolf: “My Clean Slate” Program Introduced to Help Navigate New Law (Jan. 2, 
2019), https://www.governor.pa.gov/governor-wolf-my-clean-slate-program-introduced-to-help-
navigate-new-law [https://perma.cc/ENF7-UDRE]; Frequently Asked Questions About Clean Slate, 
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Bill received nearly unanimous legislative endorsement and was sup-
ported by an overwhelming majority of Pennsylvania residents.70   
Pennsylvania’s club became larger in 2019, when Utah, New Jersey, 
and California enacted automatic expungement laws,71 and similar reform 
efforts are now underway in several other states,72 including Michigan.73  
These newer laws have all been broader than Pennsylvania’s pioneering 
statute along some dimensions.  Of these laws, California’s is the most 
ambitious, although (unlike the others) it does not apply retrospec-
tively.74  The California law applies to all misdemeanors and to some 
felonies resulting in probation,75 and it imposes no lengthy waiting pe-
riod — indeed, none beyond sentence completion in some cases.76  Utah’s 
law, like Pennsylvania’s, is limited to nonviolent misdemeanors, but its 
waiting periods for most crimes are only five to seven years depending 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVS. PHILA. (June 26, 2018), https://clsphila.org/learn-about-issues/ 
frequently-asked-questions-about-clean-slate [https://perma.cc/3PY5-U3CM]. 
 70 See J.D. Prose, Pennsylvania Becomes First State with “Clean Slate” Law for Nonviolent 
Criminal Records, THE TIMES (June 28, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.timesonline.com/ 
news/20180628/pennsylvania-becomes-first-state-with-clean-slate-law-for-nonviolent-criminal-rec-
ords [https://perma.cc/2EVM-B5RE]. 
 71 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425(a)(2)(E) (West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-5.4 (West 
2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 72 See, e.g., David Brand, A Criminal Justice Reform Would Give Thousands a Clean Slate — If 
Only They Would Apply, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (Nov. 25, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/ 
articles/2019/11/25/a-criminal-justice-reform-would-give-thousands-a-clean-slate-if-only-they-
would-apply [https://perma.cc/34H3-NDKR]; Gemma Gaudette, Bipartisan Proposal Would Give 
Some Former Idaho Inmates a “Clean Slate,” BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/bipartisan-proposal-would-give-some-former-idaho- 
inmates-clean-slate#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/L6E3-8WXZ]; Asti Jackson & Phil Kent, A Criminal 
Record Should Not Be a Lifetime Sentence; That’s Why We Need the Clean Slate Law, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Mar. 15, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-op-jackson-kent-
clean-slate-0315-20200315-7bohb5by5nfmpkrbh6fngml4fy-story.html [https://perma.cc/9WZY-
Z3GH].  There is also activity at the federal level.  Nila Bala & Rebecca Vallas, Opinion, State 
Momentum in Criminal Record Sealing Fuels Federal Clean Slate Bill, THE HILL (Mar. 2, 2020, 
2:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/485477-state-momentum-in-criminal-record-
sealing-fuels-federal-clean-slate-bill [https://perma.cc/W5MN-T2GB]; Press Release, Ctr. for Am. 
Progress, supra note 66. 
 73 See, e.g., Riley Beggin, Michigan Eyes Reform to Costly, Confusing System of Expunging Crimi-
nal Records, BRIDGE MAG. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/ 
michigan-eyes-reform-costly-confusing-system-expunging-criminal-records [https://perma.cc/4D83-
CZXU]; Miriam Francisco, New Bill Would Automate Process of Criminal Record Expungement 
for Certain Convictions, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Sept. 20, 2019, 3:24 PM), https://www.me-
trotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2019/09/20/new-bill-would-automate-process-of-criminal-record-
expungement-for-certain-convictions [https://perma.cc/AC4M-DTGF]. 
 74 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425(a)(2)(E) (noting that the automatic conviction relief only ap-
plies to “conviction[s] [that] occurred on or after January 1, 2021”). 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. (indicating that otherwise-qualifying individuals who receive probation become eligible 
for such relief immediately after successfully completing probation while those with misdemeanor 
or infraction convictions become eligible immediately after completing their sentence, so long as a 
year has elapsed since the conviction’s date of judgment). 
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on the crime class.77  New Jersey’s automatic expungement law has a 
ten-year waiting period, but it allows some more serious crimes to be 
automatically expunged; it delegates to a task force the development of 
the process.78  In addition, proposed federal legislation would require 
automatic expungement one year after completing a sentence for mari-
juana offenses and certain other minor drug offenses.79 
Many states and local jurisdictions have also adopted other laws de-
signed to reduce barriers to employment of people with criminal records.  
The most important category (along with expungement laws) are Ban-
the-Box laws and policies, which typically bar employers from asking 
about records on initial job application forms and in initial interviews.80  
Thirty-five states (and the District of Columbia) and over 150 cities and 
counties have passed Ban-the-Box laws governing public employers, 
and a further thirteen states and eighteen cities and counties now extend 
them to private employers.81  In terms of the number of people affected, 
Ban-the-Box laws are far more sweeping than typical expungement laws 
because they apply to all criminal records and contain no eligibility re-
quirements.  However, expungement, for those who do obtain it, offers 
potentially far more significant relief from the consequences of criminal 
convictions, cutting across different domains of life and, in effect, legally 
erasing the conviction in question.  In contrast, Ban-the-Box laws pri-
marily affect employer practices, and only change the timing of employ-
ers’ receipt of record-related information; they can still refuse to hire an 
applicant after completing a background check.82  Still, Clean Slate ad-
vocates typically see the two types of reforms as complementary, and 
many advocacy organizations have pushed for both.83 
Some states have also adopted laws that substantially restrict employ-
ers’ use of criminal record information — for example, requiring that they 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 77 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(2–3) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-5.4 (West 2020). 
 79 Clean Slate Act of 2019, H.R. 2348, 116th Cong. 
 80 See LINDA EVANS, ALL OF US OR NONE, BAN THE BOX IN EMPLOYMENT: A 
GRASSROOTS HISTORY 8 (2016), http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/10/BTB-Employment-History-Report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6P9Z-AP38].  The Ban-the-
Box campaign was initiated in 2004 by All of Us or None, a national civil rights movement, to 
eliminate the box on employment forms (as well as other applications) that asks whether an appli-
cant has ever been convicted of a felony.  See id. at 10. 
 81 BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX 1 (2019), 
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-
July-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/33QT-FEZK].  
 82 See Agan & Starr, Ban the Box, supra note 39, at 193. 
 83 See, e.g., Angela Hanks, Ban the Box and Beyond, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 27, 2017, 
9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/07/27/436756/ban-box-
beyond [https://perma.cc/5T7V-58NU]. 
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only rely on information that is job relevant.84  These laws essentially rep-
licate guidance long given by the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), which holds that overly sweeping bans on employ-
ees with records can amount to disparate impact racial or national origin 
discrimination.85  Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to enforce 
these restrictions.86  Many employers throughout the country continue 
to implement blanket exclusions of individuals with records, notwith-
standing EEOC’s guidance87 — which, in any event, the Fifth Circuit 
recently ruled is not enforceable.88  These practices, and the difficulty of 
eliminating them through other legal mechanisms, are among the moti-
vations for expungement laws. 
C.  Research Questions and Existing Empirical  
Research on Expungement 
There has been very little empirical research on any of the many 
questions surrounding expungement laws, despite the clear importance 
of these inquiries to policymakers and the lives of millions of Americans.  
In truth, most of these questions really cannot be answered effectively 
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 84 See AVERY, supra note 81, at 1–2. 
 85 See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT 
DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/UK3G-DAAH]. 
 86 See Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination 
Against Ex-offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 80 (2015) (“[T]he EEOC has yet to prevail in 
court . . . .”); see also Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2265, 
2303 (2018); Geiger, supra note 45, at 1203 (indicating that at least early versions of state laws were 
“severely underutilized”); id. at 1199 (“[R]egulations [may be] especially difficult to enforce since, in 
order for an applicant to know that a rejection was based on the use of prohibited criminal history 
information, either the applicant would have to sue and obtain subpoena power to see the job 
application information or the employer would have to freely admit the illegal basis for rejecting 
the applicant.”).  
 87 See RODRIGUEZ & EMSELLEM, supra note 33, at 3; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND 
THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 134 (2019), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-
Consequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX86-2BMM] (“Employment is difficult to access for those 
individuals with a criminal conviction as many employers choose to use a blanket ban on hiring 
any person with a prior criminal conviction regardless of the offense committed by the person.”); 
Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for  
Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. & SOC’Y 18, 
26 (2005); Mark Jones et al., Challenges Facing Released Prisoners and People with Criminal Rec-
ords: A Focus Group Approach, 2 CORRECTIONS: POL’Y PRAC. & RES. 91, 97–98 (2017); see also 
MUKAMAL, supra note 31, at III.B.  
 88 See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2019); CCRC Staff, Appeals Court Invalidates 
EEOC Criminal Record Guidance, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (Aug. 7, 2019), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2019/08/07/appeals-court-invalidates-eeoc-criminal-record-guidance 
[https://perma.cc/9PT6-245J]; Alonzo Martinez, Fifth Circuit to EEOC — Don’t Mess with Texas, 
FORBES (Aug. 13, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alonzomartinez/2019//13/fifth-circuit-
to-eeoc-dont-mess-with-texas/#4e17c8f6c897 [https://perma.cc/5GMY-Z9Y7].  
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absent comprehensive access to individual-level data on people whose 
records have been expunged, and because those records are generally 
unavailable, research has been stymied.  Fortunately, by taking ad-
vantage of our unusual data access, we are able to examine several key 
questions that have long remained unanswered. 
First, there is essentially no research on the question of “uptake” in 
the context of the expungement of convictions.  The basic question re-
lates to the uptake rate: When people are legally eligible for expunge-
ment, how often do they actually apply for and receive it?  Beyond this 
question, we also seek to provide a richer picture of who receives re-
lief — what kinds of convictions they have, what types of sentences they 
served, their demographics — and how their profiles compare to those 
of the broader pool of eligible persons, that is, what factors predict ac-
tual receipt.  Answering these questions can help us better understand 
the problem of “uptake gaps” and can also inform the discussion of ex-
pungement’s effects.  Given that the group that actually receives relief is 
a highly selected one, in order to speculate as to the potential results of 
extending expungement laws to a broader and possibly dissimilar popula-
tion, we need to understand that selection process. 
Again, no published study addresses these questions with respect to 
expungement laws.89  However, in certain other post–conviction relief 
contexts, there have been a few attempts to explore issues related to 
uptake.  The most comprehensive such effort is Colleen Chien’s research 
estimating the uptake rates for several programs: President Obama’s 
clemency initiative allowing certain federal inmates to apply for sen-
tence commutation; California’s Proposition 47, which allows some fel-
ony convictions to be reduced to misdemeanors; and California’s  
Proposition 64, which legalized marijuana and provides various forms 
of relief for those previously convicted on marijuana charges.90  She 
finds uptake rates of about 3%, 9%, and 3%, respectively (within a rel-
atively short time period, especially for the newer Proposition 64).91  
Chien also analyzes a sample of background-check data concerning  
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 89 Very recently, Colleen Chien et al. released a short summary of preliminary findings from 
their study of expungement uptake in Washington State.  Colleen V. Chien et al., The Washington 
State Second Chance Expungement Gap 1 (Feb. 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3529777 [https://perma.cc/7AX6-PBE7].  The study 
uses a random sample of cases to estimate how many cases are eligible for expungement in  
Washington; comparison to reported statistics on the total number of expungements actually 
granted implies that only about 3% of eligible individuals obtain expungement.  See id. at 2, 5. 
 90 Colleen V. Chien, The Second Chance Gap, 119 MICH. L. REV. 12 (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript 
at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265335 [https://perma.cc/R8SH-HY5T]. 
 91 Id. (manuscript at 17–23).  The study does not use individual-level data to identify eligible 
cases and track their outcomes.  Instead, it compares publicly reported figures on the estimated 
numbers of people eligible for relief and on the number of applications.  See id. 
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“gig” jobseekers and finds evidence that many reports contain noncon-
viction records (for example, arrests not leading to convictions), at least 
some of which should be clearable under state law.92  Research by Chris-
topher Uggen and coauthors also uncovers large uptake gaps in voting 
rights–restoration procedures for people disenfranchised due to felony 
convictions.93  Although none of these estimates focuses on the expunge-
ment of criminal convictions, they all suggest a general problem: when 
criminal justice relief mechanisms require individuals to go through ap-
plication procedures, many people who might benefit from them will 
not do so. 
Second, we investigate subsequent recidivism outcomes for expunge-
ment recipients.  We explore this particular outcome in order to address 
the concern, often raised by opponents of record-sealing, that the public 
has a safety interest in being able to identify people with records.94  We are 
unaware of any other empirical research on this question — a question we 
are able to investigate because we have recipients’ full criminal records, 
including post-expungement convictions.95  Evidence on the recidivism 
question is critical to addressing objections from those who fear endorsing 
expungement policies because of the possibility that these policies could 
hide or increase recidivism risk. 
Third, we examine the employment consequences of expungement.  
Although potential employment benefits are core to the policy case for 
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 92 See id. (manuscript at 25–35).  The rates at which such nonconviction records appeared varied 
substantially by state.  See id. at 32 n.130.  Note that because cleared records do not appear in back-
ground check data, Chien’s approach does not identify the number or share of eligible people who 
do clear nonconviction records; rather, it simply shows that there are many who have not done so.  
To estimate uptake rates for expungement among those eligible requires access to cleared records, 
which researchers typically have not had.  For background on nonconviction criminal records, their 
use, and their regulation, see generally COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., MODEL LAW 
ON NON-CONVICTION RECORDS at v–vii (2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/model-law-on-non-con-
viction-records-3 [https://perma.cc/PY5W-BYSY]. 
 93 CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: 
STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 13 (2016), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E9GB-Y2NG]. 
 94 See T. Markus Funk, The Dangers of Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66 TENN. L. REV. 287, 298–99 
(1998); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section 
of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1726 (2003); Michael D. Mayfield,  
Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH 
L. REV. 1057, 1065–66, 1069–70. 
 95 Some theoretical and qualitative work has explored a few potential mechanisms by which 
expungement policies could reduce recidivism.  See, e.g., Ericka B. Adams et al., Erasing the Mark 
of a Criminal Past: Ex-offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance, 19 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 23, 45–47 (2017) (finding, based on interviews with forty people, that ex-
pungement encourages attitudinal shifts that could potentially be associated with reduced recidi-
vism); Murat C. Mungan, Reducing Crime Through Expungements, 137 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
398, 399 (2017) (arguing that offering expungements but making them costly could allow govern-
ments to “separate generally-law-abiding-citizens” from career criminals, thereby reducing crime). 
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expungement laws, they have proven especially difficult to study be-
cause both expunged criminal records and wage and employment rec-
ords are typically confidential.  The above-cited research showing that 
criminal records impair employment opportunities provides a strong in-
tuitive reason to believe that expunging those records should have the 
opposite effect.  However, for several reasons, this intuition could prove 
to be incorrect, and the magnitude of any effect is unknown.  First, 
many commentators have expressed concern that expungement may fail 
to hide criminal history information from inquisitive employers — for 
example, if news stories, mug shots, or other information about past of-
fenses can be easily found with a Google search or other digital means,96 
or if private criminal records databases do not effectively delete ex-
punged records.97  Second, the waiting periods built into expungement 
laws may undermine any potential benefits because these restrictions 
mean that expungement cannot help during the critical period immedi-
ately after a conviction or during reentry.98  Third, people with records 
often also tend to face many other employment disadvantages besides 
the record itself, potentially limiting the benefits of expungement.99 
To date, the most on-point research is a recent study by Jeffrey 
Selbin, Justin McCrary, and Joshua Epstein, which tracks labor market 
outcomes for 235 clients of a law clinic who pursued either expungement 
or another form of relief (which allowed the reduction of felonies to mis-
demeanors).100  The authors find suggestive evidence of employment 
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 96 See Victoria Cumbow, Everything Posted Online Is There Forever, Even After It’s Been  
Deleted, AL.COM (last updated Jan. 14, 2019), http://blog.al.com/breaking/2011/03/everything 
_posted_online_is_th.html [https://perma.cc/6MHW-XTL5]; see also Sarah Esther Lageson, There’s No 
Such Thing as Expunging a Criminal Record Anymore, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2019, 2:44 PM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/criminal-record-expungement-internet-due-process.html [https:// 
perma.cc/H3EW-J396]; Experts: Deleted Online Information Never Actually Goes Away, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 21, 2015, 11:26 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/blue-sky/chi-deleted-online-
information-never-goes-away-20150821-story.html [https://perma.cc/5A8N-GCBH]. 
 97 See Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First 
Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 123–24 (2010); Alessandro Corda & Sarah E. Lageson, Disordered 
Punishment: Workaround Technologies of Criminal Records Disclosure and the Rise of a New Penal 
Entrepreneurialism, 60 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 245, 247, 260–61 (2020); Marc A. Franklin & Diane 
Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 745–48 (1981); Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77 MD. L. REV. 337, 
355–57 (2018); Love, supra note 94, at 1719, 1725–26; Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap 
Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 341–46; Mayfield, supra note 94, at 1068–69; 
Sharon M. Dietrich, Ants Under the Refrigerator?, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 26, 26, 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Ants-under-the-Refrigerator-published.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZQH-BVBN]. 
 98 See JACOBS, supra note 7, at 131; Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 97, at 739; Selbin et al., 
supra note 43, at 52. 
 99 See sources cited supra note 31. 
 100 See Selbin et al., supra note 43, at 33, 38, 40.  
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gains.101  As they acknowledge, however, their small sample size does 
not “allow for precise estimation,”102 and the study does not present sta-
tistical estimates with standard errors (which permit readers to evaluate 
the degree of imprecision).  In addition, their sample is not necessarily 
representative of those who obtain expungement,103 and their data do 
not allow them to answer the additional questions we discuss above re-
garding uptake and recidivism outcomes.  So while their study provides 
a welcome start, its objectives were relatively modest.  In contrast, we 
analyze a large, statewide sample that includes all expungement recipi-
ents as well as a large comparison group of individuals eligible for ex-
pungement, and we are able to use these data to address a variety of 
interrelated questions with statistical power. 
D.  Our Empirical Setting and Data 
We conduct our research in Michigan.  Michigan is a large, demo-
graphically diverse state; studying its population, therefore, is likely to 
yield empirical findings that are broadly generalizable to the rest of the 
United States.  For example, Michigan’s 14.1% poverty rate is roughly 
comparable with the 13.1% national poverty rate;104 its $56,697 median 
household income is also close to the U.S. median household income of 
$61,937.105  Michigan has roughly the same percentage of people who 
identify as African American (13.8%) and white (78.3%)106 as the coun-
try overall, although it has significantly smaller Hispanic and Asian 
populations.107  Michigan’s criminal justice system is also reflective of 
national trends.  Michigan’s property crime rates are now slightly lower 
than the national average, but, for most of the study period, they hewed 
closely to national crime rates; Michigan’s violent crime rates are a bit 
higher than average.108  Similarly, Michigan’s state prison population 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 101 Id. at 50–51. 
 102 Id. at 49. 
 103 See id. at 45–46, 59. 
 104 Compare Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?q= 
Michigan [hereinafter Michigan Census Data] [https://perma.cc/XRH2-2853], with United States, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?q=United%20States [hereinafter  
National Census Data] [https://perma.cc/89M4-TSZ5]. 
 105 Compare Michigan Census Data, supra note 104, with National Census Data, supra note 104. 
 106 ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.cen-
sus.gov/cedsci/table?q=percent%20african%20american%20michi-
gan&g=0400000US26&hidePreview=false&tid=ACSDP1Y2018.DP05&t=Black%20or%20African
%20American&cid=DP05_0001E&vintage=2018 [https://perma.cc/5487-HNPS]. 
 107 Compare id. (only 5.2% of the population identifying as Hispanic or Latino in Michigan), and 
id. (only 3.3% identifying as Asian), with National Census Data, supra note 104 (18.3% of the na-
tional population identifying as Hispanic or Latino and 5.6% of the national population identifying 
as Asian). 
 108 See Crime Data Explorer: Michigan, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://crime-data-
explorer.fr.cloud.gov/explorer/state/michigan/crime [https://perma.cc/M8MA-WJUV]. 
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increased at roughly the same rate as the overall state prison population 
in the nation through the mid-2000s.109  Today, Michigan’s incarceration 
rate of 641 per 100,000 people is the 29th highest in the country, only 
slightly lower than the national rate of 698 per 100,000.110 
In Michigan, expungement of criminal convictions is provided for by 
a longstanding statute, M.C.L. 780.621.  The law actually labels this 
process a criminal record “set aside,” rather than using the more recog-
nizable term “expungement.”  And indeed, as in most states, the  
Michigan process does not entail a complete expungement of the record 
(which is retained by the police for limited purposes mainly related to 
criminal justice), but rather a sealing and an elimination of many of the 
record’s legal consequences.  However, to maintain consistency with the 
terminology we adopt elsewhere in this Article, we will continue to use 
the term “expungement” as a convenient and familiar shorthand. 
M.C.L. 780.621 has been on the books since the 1960s,111 although 
expungements were very rare before a significant statutory change that 
took effect in 1983.112  It has undergone some recent amendments, 
mostly expansions in its eligibility provisions.113  Because of the time 
range of our data, the most relevant version of the law is the one that 
was in effect (with no material changes) from 1983 until mid-2011.  Our 
empirical analyses focus on people eligible under that law’s require-
ments, and on expungements granted before the law changed in 2011.  
The fact that Michigan has had an expungement law for decades distin-
guishes it from the majority of other states,114 and it makes the state a 
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 109 Compare Michigan Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/ 
profiles/MI.html [https://perma.cc/TE7G-2AMD], with State Prison Incarceration Rate, 1978-2012, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/US_state_incrates_1978-
2012.html [https://perma.cc/2JL3-5SUM] (calculating the rate of increase as the slope of a line fitted 
to the annual data).   
 110 Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, States of Incarceration: The Global Context 2018, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/2018.html [https://perma.cc/ 
U8DU-DABN]. 
 111 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621 (2019); see also A Brief History of Expungement in Michigan, 
SAFE & JUST MICH. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.safeandjustmi.org/2018/08/22/a-brief-history-of- 
expungement-in-michigan [https://perma.cc/NP4V-96KR] [hereinafter A Brief History]. 
 112 Only a handful of earlier expungements appear in our comprehensive dataset.  For a related 
discussion, see A Brief History, supra note 111.  Advocating for amendments, one judge wrote in 
1981 that the available procedures at the time were “segmented and confusing.”  William S. Easton, 
Commentary, Expunging Criminal Records: A Judge’s Perspective, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 1391, 1392 
(1981).  Prior to the statute’s amendment, the limited availability of expungement in Michigan was 
driven by the difficulties of accessing arrest records, see id. at 1394, and the narrowness of the 
procedures available to seek expungement, see People v. Upshaw, 283 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1979).  The statute was amended in 1982.  See 1982 Mich. Pub. Acts 1887.   
 113 See A Brief History, supra note 111. 
 114 See generally Love, supra note 94, at 1717–26 (surveying the expansion and contraction of 
expungement laws and policies in the United States); CCRC State Survey, supra note 11.  
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particularly useful subject for empirical study; Michigan’s long experi-
ence with record clearing can inform other states that have recently 
adopted or are considering adopting similar policies.  Cumulatively, tens 
of thousands of people have received expungements under Michigan’s 
law, and many received them long enough ago to allow us to observe 
their post-expungement outcomes for a substantial period of time. 
Michigan’s expungement law imposes a five-year waiting period,115 
which is in the middle of the range of the waiting periods that other 
states’ statutes apply.116  In the pre-2011 version, the five-year clock 
began running at sentencing, unless the defendant served a term of in-
carceration after sentencing, in which case it ran from release.117  Any 
reconviction during this five-year period disqualified the individual 
from an expungement.118  Essentially, then, the law required five “clean” 
years, excluding time behind bars.  The statute covered (and still covers) 
almost all types of crimes, including most violent felonies.119  The prin-
cipal exceptions are traffic offenses, sex offenses that are subject to reg-
istration requirements, and the most serious class of felonies: those car-
rying potential life-imprisonment terms.120  The wide range of crimes 
otherwise covered is another advantage of Michigan’s law for research 
purposes; it allows us to compare uptake rates and outcomes across 
many important offense types and grades. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 115 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(5) (2019) (“An application [for expungement] shall only be filed 
5 or more years after whichever of the following events occurs last: [listing imposition of sentence, 
completion of probation, discharge from parole, or completion of a term of imprisonment].”); see 
also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(3) (2011) (“An application shall not be filed until at least 5 years 
following imposition of the sentence for the conviction that the applicant seeks to set aside or 5 
years following completion of any term of imprisonment for that conviction, whichever occurs 
later.”). 
 116 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-38-9-2(c) (2019) (five-year waiting period); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
6614 (2019) (three to five years); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 977(A)(2), 978(A)(2) (2019) 
(five-year waiting period for most misdemeanors and ten-year waiting period for felonies); MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-110(c) (West 2019) (ten to fifteen years); MINN. STAT. 
§ 609A.02(3)(a)(2)–(5) (2019) (one to five years, based on offense severity); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 610.140(5)(1) (2019) (three years for misdemeanors; seven for felonies); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 179.245(1) (2019) (effective July 1, 2020) (one to ten years, based on offense severity); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 160.59(5) (McKinney 2019) (ten years); see also MARGARET LOVE, JOSH GAINES & 
JENNY OSBORNE, FORGIVING AND FORGETTING IN AMERICAN JUSTICE: A 50-STATE 
GUIDE TO EXPUNGEMENT AND RESTORATION OF RIGHTS 84–112 (2018), http:// 
ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Forgiving-Forgetting-CCRC-Aug-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SQ57-YQKN]; CCRC State Survey, supra note 11. 
 117 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(3) (2011). 
 118 Id. § 780.621(4)(c). 
 119 Id. § 780.621(1) (“[A] person who is convicted of not more than 1 offense may file an  
application . . . .”). 
 120 Id. § 780.621(2) (“A person shall not apply to have set aside, and a judge shall not set aside, a 
conviction for a felony for which the maximum punishment is life imprisonment or an attempt to 
commit a felony for which the maximum punishment is life imprisonment, a conviction for a vio-
lation or attempted violation of section 520c, 520d, or 520g of the Michigan penal code, . . . or a 
conviction for a traffic offense.”). 
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However, Michigan does impose stringent limitations on expunge-
ment eligibility based on the length of the individual’s record — that is, 
the number of convictions (nonconviction records like arrests are not 
relevant to eligibility).121  While this has now been loosened slightly, in 
the pre-2011 version, expungements were strictly limited to people with 
exactly one conviction on a single charge.122  Prior convictions, subse-
quent convictions, and simultaneous convictions — even multiple 
charges stemming from the same incident — were all disqualifying.  On 
a policy level, this has incongruous results; for example, a person with a 
single very serious felony may be eligible for an expungement, while a 
person with two simultaneous misdemeanor counts arising from one in-
cident is not.  However, the simple, bright-line nature of these eligibility 
requirements offers advantages from a research perspective;123 for ex-
ample, it makes it easier to code expungement eligibility and other var-
iables related to the nature of the criminal record. 
For those meeting the eligibility requirements in Michigan, expunge-
ments are not automatic.  Rather, the law requires the expungement 
seeker to go through an elaborate application process, which we describe 
in detail in section II.C.  The court is not required to grant the requested 
expungement — it “may” grant the request if doing so is warranted by 
the applicant’s subsequent behavior and “consistent with the public wel-
fare.”124  Still, grant rates are fairly high.  Although our data do not 
identify unsuccessful applications, the Michigan State Police (MSP), 
which processes applications and also implements the expungements 
once they are granted, shared figures for 2016 and 2017 that indicate 
that approximately 75% of applications are successful.125 
To carry out our study, we entered into a data-sharing agreement with 
multiple Michigan state agencies, which worked with us to develop a 
merged and de-identified dataset.  MSP provided comprehensive  
Michigan criminal histories (RAP sheets) on almost every expunged crim-
inal conviction in Michigan history through March 2014,126 amounting to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 121 Id. § 780.621(1) (“Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who is convicted of not more 
than 1 offense may file an application with the convicting court for the entry of an order setting 
aside the conviction.”); see also People v. Blachura, 440 N.W.2d 1, 1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (person 
convicted of five counts of perjury ineligible since each count deemed a separate conviction). 
 122 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(4)(c). 
 123 See Charles Tremper et al., Measuring Law for Evaluation Research, 34 EVALUATION REV. 
242, 252–54 (2010). 
 124 MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 780.621(9).  Note that the text quoted has not changed.  See 1982 
Mich. Pub. Acts 1889. 
 125 Email from Ted Kilvington, Court Reporting Coordinator, Mich. State Police, to Simmon 
Kim, Research Assoc., Univ. of Mich. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr. (Feb. 22, 2019, 10:47 AM) (on 
file with authors).  Although the figures MSP provided cover more recent years than do the data 
we use in our study, discussions with MSP and with expungement lawyers do not give us any reason 
to believe there have been substantial changes in grant rates in the intervening years. 
 126 A small share of the most recent records was inadvertently dropped, as we discuss below. 
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nearly 30,000 cases, plus a larger group of other criminal records meet-
ing requirements that we discuss below.  These were linked to wage and 
employment information for the same individuals from the state Unem-
ployment Insurance Agency and Workforce Development Agency.  
Matching was based on Social Security numbers, so those without such 
numbers are excluded from our analysis of wage data.127  In addition to 
the records for individuals who actually receive expungements, we ob-
tained records for a large group of people who were, at the time of their 
convictions, potentially legally eligible for expungements in the future, 
if they subsequently succeeded in meeting the five-clean-years require-
ment.  This group consists of individuals with a first criminal offense 
(occurring between 1999 and 2008) that was on a list of legally eligible 
offense codes, which we developed using the expungement statute and 
provided to the MSP for a data query.128 
Our data have other limitations.  For our criminal record and em-
ployment outcome data, we lack information on out-of-state convictions 
(affecting our coding of expungement eligibility and recidivism out-
comes) and out-of-state income (affecting our wage and employment 
analysis).  Our wage and employment information comes from the state 
unemployment insurance system, which covers wage and salary employ-
ees quite comprehensively but misses the self-employed and individuals 
employed “under the table.”129 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 127 Michigan’s Department of Technology, Management and Budget carried out the matching 
process, and then the department de-identified all records before it turned them over to us.  In the 
initial stages of our work on this project, in order to shape our records requests for MSP, we also 
received and analyzed court records from Michigan’s Judicial Data Warehouse.  However, because 
of the incompleteness of these records, we did not include them in the ultimate data analysis. 
 128 Because MSP asked us to keep our request reasonable in size, we excluded from this list 
certain common petty misdemeanors — such as dog-leash law and hunting and fishing violations — 
which are almost never expunged, even though they are legally eligible.  We identified these as 
among Michigan’s most common first offenses based on a preliminary analysis of court data from 
the Judicial Data Warehouse, but these offenses are essentially not found at all in the complete 
dataset on all expungements, perhaps suggesting that people do not bother to expunge records so 
minor that they may impose no serious burdens.  Some cases were also inadvertently excluded 
because MSP formatted offense codes in inconsistent ways that did not match our list; these exclu-
sions seem substantively random.  We also excluded minor-in-possession cases, which in Michigan were 
(until the offense was decriminalized in 2016) often subject to a separate diversion process for youthful 
individuals.  We discuss the implication of these exclusions below, infra pp. 2492–93. 
 129 This means that our measured employment and wage levels will be biased downward relative 
to total employment and wages.  Although this is true to some degree both before and after ex-
pungement, it is possible that it is more true before expungement, if people with records are more 
likely to seek under-the-table work.  If so, we could overstate true wage gains.  On the other hand, 
there are reasons to focus on employment in the formal sector (as employment studies typically do).  
There are distinct advantages to having formal labor market opportunities (for example, termina-
tion notice and other mandatory benefits).  See Minhaj Mahmud et al., What Aspects of Formality 
Do Workers Value? 3 (World Bank Grp., Knowledge and Strategy Team, Dev. Econ., Working Paper 
No. 9108, 2020), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/428331578944574540/ 
pdf/What-Aspects-of-Formality-Do-Workers-Value-Evidence-from-a-Choice-Experiment-in- 
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Our most serious data challenge involves missing records.  The 
state’s process for matching and de-identifying our criminal history and 
employment outcomes data inadvertently dropped certain observa-
tions.130  Fortunately, we were able to restore virtually all of the dropped 
records that concern expungement recipients because we had already 
received a complete version of that part of the dataset slightly earlier.131  
These drops only minimally affect our uptake analysis and should not 
affect our employment analysis at all.  However, the problem did lead us 
to focus our primary recidivism outcome analysis on expungement recip-
ients alone, because the drops affect the accuracy of our recidivism 
measures for nonrecipients.132  Another data challenge relates to certain 
missing dates in the criminal records data, a problem that requires us to 
impute eligibility dates.133  We believe this adds fairly minimal measure-
ment error.  The imputation should not be far off, and should be correct  
on average, so our resulting uptake estimates should not be biased, even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Bangladesh.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM65-FDGY].  Indeed, to the extent that people do move from 
under-the-table work to formal employment after receiving an expungement, it is presumably be-
cause the formal-sector option is more appealing.  We discuss these issues as they pertain to our 
analyses below. 
 130 Data patterns make clear that their procedure successfully identified duplicate records pro-
duced by overlapping data pulls by MSP but then mistakenly deleted both copies. 
 131 We were unable to restore some records for individuals who had not received expungements, 
however.  By the time we diagnosed the problem, our data-sharing agreement and grant period had 
expired, and the state authorities informed us that they could not reconstruct the original dataset 
for us or repeat the process.  Through information from MSP, we were able to identify the number 
of lost records (about 9% of the nonrecipients in the original data pull). 
 132 The dropped nonrecipient cases were individuals with at least two convictions, so omitting 
them would have distorted our analysis.  We requested data on people with certain kinds of first 
convictions or second convictions within a ten-year period; people with first and second convictions 
meeting these criteria were included as duplicates and then doubly dropped.  The other set of du-
plicates dropped was the set of expungement recipients who also met the eligibility criteria for the 
comparison group, but this was the set that we were able to restore. 
 133 When MSP effectuates an expungement, they change the disposition field in the record to 
denote an expungement, but their data entry system does not have a separate field for the expunge-
ment date.  Instead, MSP’s practice in most years was to change a field called “judgment date” to 
the expungement date.  This practice caused the information originally stored in the judgment date 
field to be lost — specifically, the conviction date, which is what we use in most cases to calculate 
the start date for the five-year expungement eligibility clock.  Expungement eligibility in nonincar-
ceration cases runs from sentencing, which is usually a few weeks after the case disposition, Email 
from Jonathan Sacks, Appellate Def., State Appellate Defs.’ Office, to Sonja Starr, Professor of 
Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Feb. 22, 2019, 11:02 AM) (on file with authors); Email from Kim 
Thomas, Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., to J.J. Prescott, Professor of Law, 
Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Feb. 17, 2019, 9:19 PM) (on file with authors), and has no recorded date 
in the data.  MSP informed us, however, that when they make their official determinations of ex-
pungement eligibility, they rely on the conviction date as a proxy for sentencing, so we do the same 
here.  See Email from Nick Romanov, IT Specialist, Mich. State Police, to J.J. Prescott, Professor 
of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Nov. 7, 2018, 11:38 AM) (on file with authors).  Because some of 
our analyses (especially of uptake rates) require us to know both the expungement eligibility date 
and the expungement grant date, we had to impute the lost conviction date based on the incident, 
arrest, and charge dates. 
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if we might get the date of eligibility wrong by a month or two for some 
individual observations. 
In a small subset of expungement cases, MSP changed the disposi-
tion code but did not change the judgment date field to the expungement 
date, leaving no record of when the expungement occurred.  These cases 
are identifiable because the judgment date is too close to other key dates 
in the case (for example, the arrest date) to be a plausible expungement 
date given the required five-year waiting period.  We eliminate these 
cases from the recidivism and employment analyses, which require ex-
pungement dates; the lag time from other events in the case to expunge-
ment receipt is far too unpredictable to be imputed without introducing 
significant measurement error.  However, in our analyses of expunge-
ment uptake rates within certain periods of time, we cannot ignore these 
cases or we would understate uptake, so instead we make assumptions 
about their temporal distribution to estimate bounds on uptake rates.  
Fortunately, the practical importance of this problem is small; there is 
good reason to believe that most of these unknown-date expungements 
occurred after June 2011, when we see a sudden drop in the number of 
known-date expungements to virtually zero, reflecting a change in 
MSP’s data-recording practice.134  This date happens to coincide with 
the substantive changes in the expungement law that (as we note above) 
took place in 2011,135 and the focus of our work is on expungements 
taking place before that date anyway. 
II.  THE UPTAKE GAP: WHO SEEKS AND  
RECEIVES EXPUNGEMENTS? 
 Challenges surrounding uptake may be the most underappreciated 
problem concerning expungement policies — and indeed, similar prob-
lems appear in many access-to-justice contexts.136  Uptake challenges 
potentially arise whenever the government imposes significant bur-
dens — such as fees or onerous administrative requirements — on the 
exercise of a right or opportunity, or whenever it is difficult for potential 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 134 MSP confirmed that expungement dates are not recorded in their current data and that the 
number of expungements granted has only increased since 2011.  See Email from Ted Kilvington, 
supra note 125 (stating that 2594 expungements were processed in 2017).  Assuming expungement 
frequency at least did not drop, we believe at least half the unknown-date expungements in the 
earliest version of our complete expungement dataset (which ended in December 2012) must have 
occurred between June 2011 and December 2012, which leaves at most 3000 occurring before then 
(about 13% of the number of known-date expungements).  
 135 See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text. 
 136 See, e.g., J.J. Prescott, Assessing Access-to-Justice Outreach Strategies, 174 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 34, 36 (2018) (“Individuals often fail to take full ad-
vantage of beneficial government programs and policies.  This take-up problem has been studied 
in numerous contexts . . . .”). 
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beneficiaries to learn about those rights or opportunities.137  And a right 
or opportunity that is too difficult for most people to exercise is effec-
tively empty.  Accordingly, in this Part, we address several questions 
surrounding expungement uptake (here defined as the successful receipt 
of an expungement by someone who is eligible to receive one), which 
have never previously been examined empirically.138 
 In section A, we estimate the overall five-year expungement uptake 
rate among those who are eligible for such relief.  In section B, we turn 
to the question of who successfully obtains expungements, presenting 
descriptive statistics on recipients and regression analyses to assess 
which individual and case characteristics predict expungement receipt.  
We use these analyses in section C, along with qualitative insights pro-
vided by our interviews with expungement experts, to inform a discus-
sion of uptake hurdles and their implications. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 137 For a useful discussion of the “uptake” problem for social-benefit programs — referred to as the 
“take-up” problem in many disciplines — see generally Janet Currie, The Take-Up of Social Benefits, in 
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 80 (Alan J. Auerbach et al. eds., 2006). 
 138 Research on uptake is common in many contexts outside of the criminal justice domain, where 
policy designers are very conscious of the issue.  See generally, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand 
Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an 
IRS Field Experiment, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 3489 (2015) (tax benefits); Adam S. Booij et al., The 
Role of Information in the Take-Up of Student Loans, 31 ECON. EDUC. REV. 33 (2012) (education); 
Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Comparison Friction: Experimental Evidence from Medicare Drug Plans, 
127 Q.J. ECON. 199 (2012) (health); Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: 
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149 (2001) (saving incen-
tives); Giovanni Mastrobuoni, The Role of Information for Retirement Behavior: Evidence Based 
on the Stepwise Introduction of the Social Security Statement, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 913 (2011) (Social 
Security); Xiaopeng Pang et al., Does Women’s Knowledge of Voting Rights Affect Their Voting 
Behaviour in Village Elections? Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in China, 213 
CHINA Q. 39 (2013) (voting rights); Dan Archer et al., Reducing Vulnerability to Human Trafficking: 
An Experimental Intervention Using Anti-trafficking Campaigns to Change Knowledge, Attitudes, 
Beliefs, and Practices in Nepal (U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Research and Innovation Grants  
Working Papers Series, 2016) (legal access and compliance).  This literature provides insight into 
the general barriers to uptake.  For example, Janet Currie identifies the costs of learning about and 
making use of government programs, noting that these costs may be relatively high for individuals 
who need programs the most.  Currie, supra note 137, at 83.  Saurabh Bhargava and Dayanand 
Manoli emphasize the costs studied by behavioral economics, including psychological frictions due 
to cognitive, motivational, and emotional constraints.  Bhargava & Manoli, supra, at 3489–90.  Peo-
ple may be confused about a program or policy, see, e.g., Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J.  
Zeckhauser, Schmeduling 6–9 (2004) (unpublished working paper), https://scholar.harvard. 
edu/files/jeffreyliebman/files/Schmeduling_WorkingPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EFP-VRCB], may 
be unaware that a particular program exists, see Currie, supra note 137, at 110–11, or may suffer 
from other psychological biases or tendencies (such as procrastination, inattention, or distaste for 
time-consuming processes) that inhibit their pursuit of a program’s benefits, see  
Marianne Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics and Marketing in Aid of Decision Making Among 
the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 8, 10 (2006); Madrian & Shea, supra, at 1150.  Other 
explanations include hyperbolic time discounting and stigma costs. 
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A.  Estimating Uptake Rates 
The first step in estimating expungement uptake rates is identifying 
which cases are legally eligible for relief.  In our context, the relevant 
eligible pool is defined first by the parameters of the records query that 
we asked MSP to implement, as detailed in section I.D, and second by 
some further sample refinements that we carry out thereafter.  These 
sample parameters are: (1) The individual has a first criminal conviction 
on a single criminal count.139  (2) The crime of conviction matches an 
offense code on a list of offenses eligible for expungement (known as a 
“set-aside” in Michigan).140  (3) Sentencing for the eligible count took 
place between January 1999 and May 2001.141  (4) The individual is not 
subsequently convicted for any crime within five years of sentencing.142  
(5) The individual was not sentenced to incarceration on the eligible 
offense.143  And (6) the individual has no out-of-state driver’s license 
listed anywhere in their MSP arrest record.144 
The five-year uptake rate is the percentage of this eligible group that 
receives an expungement within five years of the eligibility date (that is, 
within ten years of sentencing).  We make two further assumptions in 
order to calculate this uptake rate, which relate to the data problems we 
identify above in section I.D.  First, we assume the distribution of  
unknown-date expungements in our sample, in terms of the time elapsed 
since the case’s disposition, is roughly similar to the distribution of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 139 This was a pre-2011 eligibility requirement.  See supra notes 119, 122 and accompanying text.  
As we describe below, we are able to screen only for prior offenses that took place in Michigan. 
 140 We are confident that our offense list only contains offenses that are in fact legally eligible for 
expungement.  However, as we explain in section I.D and discuss below, our list is not inclusive of 
all eligible offenses. 
 141 Thus, expungement eligibility kicks in between January 2004 and May 2006 in our uptake 
sample.  Our sample contains the most recent set of cases for which we can still track outcomes for 
five years after eligibility accrues.  The main estimates we give are five-year uptake rates, and we 
treat May 2011 as the end of our tracking period because two important changes occurred in June 
2011: the eligibility rules changed (making more people eligible but also rendering some formerly 
eligible persons ineligible), and MSP ceased to record expungement dates.  For cases receiving ex-
pungements, because of MSP’s data recording practices, we impute the sentencing date. 
 142 This is also a legal requirement, and again we implement this filter based on Michigan data 
alone.  See supra p. 2482.  Our eligible pool consists of people who became eligible after five years, 
and we estimate expungement receipt rates within the next five years.  Some members of this sample 
could have lost eligibility at some point during the second five-year period due to a subsequent 
conviction, although as we will see in the recidivism analysis in Part III, this happens rarely. 
 143 We focus on nonincarceration cases (which, as we will see below, constitute the large majority 
of all expungement cases) because we have a more accurate measure of the start date of the eligi-
bility clock, which runs from sentencing.  In incarceration cases, the eligibility start date is based 
on release from incarceration, and because our data tell us only the sentence and not the actual 
release date, we cannot account for possible early release or credit for time served pretrial. 
 144 In our data, driver’s license numbers have been removed, but for most observations we know 
whether the individual had a driver’s license and, if so, the state that issued that license.  We exclude 
individuals with out-of-state driver’s licenses to reduce the likelihood of miscoding eligibility on 
account of unobservable out-of-state convictions, but we retain those observations of individuals 
who had no driver’s license identified in our data.  This restriction eliminates about 4% of our 
sample. 
  
2020] EXPUNGEMENT OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 2489 
known-date expungements.  We show below that our empirical conclu-
sions are robust to — that is, unaffected by — alternative assumptions 
about the unknown-date distribution.  Second, we assume that the miss-
ing nonexpunged records would not have met the criteria for inclusion 
in this sample, and thus we do not adjust our estimate to account for 
them.  We believe this latter assumption is largely correct; dropped cases 
all had at least two convictions within the years covered by the pool of 
eligible cases given to us by MSP (1999–2008), few of which would meet 
the five-year nonrecidivism criterion.  To the extent this assumption is 
mistaken, we understate the number of eligible cases and thus overesti-
mate the uptake rate (but likely not by much). 
 In Table 1, we present our main uptake estimate, which is discour-
agingly low.  Of eligible individuals, only 6.5% receive expungements 
within five years of becoming eligible.  The remaining 93.5% includes 
people who do not apply for expungements and those who have their 
applications denied by a judge.  However, as we note above, we learned 
from MSP that in 2016 and 2017 combined, 74% of the expungement 
applications MSP received were ultimately granted by courts.  If we 
assume that all of these applicants were legally eligible and that the 
same ratio applies during the relevant time period for our estimate 
(2004–11), 6.5% of those eligible for expungement receive one within 
five years, another 2.3% have their applications denied, and 91.2% do 
not apply during the first five years of eligibility.  This extrapolation may 
actually overstate the share of eligible people who apply for expungement, 
because some denials are based on ineligibility.145 
 In section C, we discuss reasons for this poor uptake.  But, first, how 
confident can we be in our principal estimate?  In particular, given that 
our sample is both overinclusive and underinclusive in some ways, is 
our main uptake estimate for this sample a good proxy for expungement 
uptake for the full eligible population during these years?146  To inform 
this question, the remaining rows of Table 1 present estimates based on 
alternative assumptions and sample definitions.  Given that we find very 
low uptake, we use the term “conservative” below to refer to assump-
tions that likely lead to an overestimation of uptake.  
  First, in Rows 2 and 3 of Table 1, we alter our timing assumption 
for the unknown-date expungements.  Ninety such cases appear in this 
sample.  Our initial assumption that their timing distribution mirrors 
that of known-date expungements is conservative; there is a strong rea-
son to believe that these expungements occur disproportionately after 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 145 Telephone Interview with Tracey Brame, Associate Dean, Cooley Law Sch. (Mar. 11, 2019) (on 
file with authors). 
 146 In a similar study on uptake rates in the context of food stamp programs, the authors note 
that “program takeup rates estimated from social science data sets with limited asset measures can 
easily be mismeasured, and are likely to be too low.”  Beth Osborne Daponte et al., Why Do Low-
Income Households Not Use Food Stamps? Evidence from an Experiment, 34 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 612, 622 (1999); see also id. at 622–24.  
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May 2011 (and therefore after the five-year period), when MSP stopped 
changing the disposition dates in their records.  We estimate bounds on 
the possible scope of any error from this assumption.  If we assume that 
none of the unknown-date expungements occurred within five years of 
eligibility, or, instead, we apply the most conservative assumption (that 
they all occurred within five years), the resulting uptake estimates range 
from only 5.7% to 6.7%.  Because our original approach is conservative, 
we assume that the correct uptake rate (if all other assumptions are 
valid, that is) lies somewhere between 5.7% and 6.5%. 
 In Row 4, we add to the sample all cases involving incarceration of 
up to one year, testing the effect of our exclusion of these observations.  
We assume that these individuals served their full term of incarceration, 
commencing on the date of sentencing.  This assumption is also con-
servative because it ignores credit for time served and possible early 
release; it thus errs on the late side in estimating the release date and 
may include slightly more than five years of eligible time in the “five-
year uptake” estimate.  After adding these cases to the sample, the up-
take rate drops to 5.4%, indicating that people who have been sentenced 
to incarceration receive expungements at lower rates than other eligible 
people.  Thus, focusing on nonincarceration cases has the effect of in-
creasing our main uptake estimate.  We do not include a five-year esti-
mate for those serving longer incarceration terms because we do not 
have a sufficient follow-up period for most of these cases.  However, 
given the evidence that those who were incarcerated for relatively short 
terms have a lower uptake rate, it seems likely that including individuals 
with longer incarceration terms would only lower the rate further. 
 There are a few uncertainties about our uptake estimates that we 
cannot address directly with our data.  In particular, we have no records 
Specification
Five-Year
Uptake
Sample Size
(n)
1. Main 6.55% 9103
2. Expungement Date Unknown: Lower Bound 5.73% 9103
3. Expungement Date Unknown: Upper Bound 6.72% 9103
4. Including Incarcerated (≤ 1 year) 5.44% 14,223
TABLE 1. UPTAKE RATES
Receipt of Expungement Within Five Years of Eligibility
Notes: The uptake sample (n=9103) consists of all individuals who have a first conviction on a single
criminal count in Michigan for an expungement-eligible crime with a sentencing date between
January 1999 and May 2001, and who were not incarcerated, were not reconvicted for any crime
within five years of sentencing, and did not have an out-of-state driver’s license. The sample for Row
4 (n=14,223) adds individuals who were incarcerated for their expungement-eligible offense for up to
one year and were released by May 2001.
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of out-of-state or federal convictions, and so our “eligible” pool probably 
includes some people who are not in fact eligible due to such convictions.  
Our exclusion of people with out-of-state licenses mitigates this problem 
but does not eliminate it, as people can move or commit crimes across 
borders.  Including ineligible cases in the eligible pool will produce an 
underestimate of the uptake rate.   
However, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that this prob-
lem is minor.  The Census Bureau estimates that about 1.8% of lower-
income Midwestern households (the best available proxy for our sample) 
move across state lines each year.147  When we apply this rate of attrition 
to our sample and extrapolate from the within-Michigan reconviction 
patterns in our data, we deduce that we might fail to observe disquali-
fying reconvictions within five years for about 1% of the purportedly 
eligible population.148  We have a similar problem with potentially dis-
qualifying prior adult convictions for people who might have previously 
lived elsewhere; this problem might be twice as large or so as that of 
subsequent convictions, given the age distribution of our sample.  It is 
also possible for Michigan residents to commit crimes in other states, 
although the great majority of crimes are committed very close to home; 
we estimate that we might miss prior or subsequent cross-border con-
victions for perhaps another 7% or 8% of the sample.149  All in all, miss-
ing out-of-state convictions likely cause us to overstate the size of the 
eligible group by no more than 10% to 12%, and therefore to understate 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 147 See Geographical Mobility: 2017 to 2018 tbl.9, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2018), 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/tables/geographic-mobility/2018/cps-2018/tab09. 
xls [https://perma.cc/69NN-JP39].  1.8% is based on households with incomes at $34,999 per year 
or below.  Id.  If we use individual-level Census data instead, the interstate mobility estimate is 
even lower — closer to 1.5%.  See id. 
 148 To make this calculation, we assume that, per the state issuing their driver’s licenses, our 
sample members were Michigan residents at the time of their convictions.  The mobility estimate 
implies that 7.3% of our sample would have moved away from Michigan after five years; for that 
subgroup, we would miss on average the last 2.5 years of their criminal history.  In our sample, 
those who are not reconvicted within 2.5 years have a reconviction rate of 13% over the next 2.5 
years; 13% times 7.3% is about 1%. 
 149 A large body of research finds that the average distance from an individual’s home to the 
location of their crime is around one or two miles.  See Michael Townsley & Aiden Sidebottom, All 
Offenders Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal than Others: Variation in Journeys to Crime  
Between Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 897, 899–900 (2010) (reviewing literature).  One piece of 
evidence that most crimes are committed in-state comes from our own data: among arrestees with 
driver’s licenses, 96% are from Michigan.  If we make the conservative assumption that all of the 
balance are out-of-state residents (not just people with old licenses from a state of previous resi-
dence) and we assume conversely that about 96% of the recidivism committed by Michigan resi-
dents is in-state (not a necessary inference but a plausible approximation), it would imply that we 
overlook reconvictions before five years in about 2.7% of our sample.  We could also miss prior 
convictions over a somewhat longer period (eleven years on average in our sample), some of which 
would presumably have involved the same individuals. 
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the uptake rate by less than one percentage point.  Meanwhile, the fed-
eral conviction problem is likely small enough to be ignored because 
federal convictions are extremely rare relative to state convictions.150 
In addition, our eligible pool of people with records is defined by the 
parameters of the data query that MSP conducted on our behalf, which, 
as we discuss in section I.D, is itself limited by the list of statutory of-
fense codes of the eligible crimes that we provided.151  This source of 
error likely cuts in the opposite direction, causing us to overestimate 
uptake, because the largest category of legally eligible offenses that we 
exclude from the list are petty offenses that we know are very common 
first offenses in Michigan but are almost never expunged.152  If we were 
to include them, the uptake rate we estimate would be lower.  Although 
we inadvertently omit some additional observations due to irregular for-
matting of statutory codes, these exclusions are very likely effectively 
random — that is, there is no reason to expect that the observations 
with irregular formatting have either higher or lower uptake rates com-
pared to the rates of those we include in the sample. 
Overall, we are confident that our main five-year uptake estimate of 
6.5% is quite accurate for our sample, and it is in the ballpark of the 
correct figure for the true population of eligible individuals in Michigan 
during the years in question (2004–11); our best guess is that the true 
uptake rate is probably lower.  While the lack of data from out-of-state 
and federal courts may bias our estimate downward, these biases cannot 
be very large.  Meanwhile, the assumptions we make about the missing 
cases and the unknown expungement dates are designed to bias our up-
take estimate upward, and our constraints on the statutory code and the 
exclusion of cases with incarceration terms almost surely do so as well.  In 
any event, the substantive story on uptake from our data is clear: very  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 150 The federal district courts in Michigan sentenced 1233 people for felonies or nonpetty misde-
meanors in 2017.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET FISCAL 
YEAR 2017: STATE OF MICHIGAN 4 tbl.2, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
research-and-publications/federal-sentencingstatistics/state-district-circuit/2017/mi17.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/PB74-PYQW].  By comparison, in 2017, caseload figures suggest that the Michigan state 
courts entered roughly 340,000 criminal convictions of any sort.  See MICH. COURTS, 2017 COURT 
CASELOAD REPORT 11, https://courts.michigan.gov/education/stats/Caseload/2017/Statewide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3EXJ-9YLF].  This figure is based on adding felony and misdemeanor (including 
traffic) guilty pleas and trial verdicts in circuit and district courts, under the rough estimate that 
80% of trial verdicts are convictions.  The Michigan Department of Corrections reported approxi-
mately 47,000 people convicted of felonies entering corrections in 2016.  See Kahryn Riley, Coping 
with the Growing Number of Felons in Michigan, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y (Aug. 27, 
2018), https://www.mackinac.org/coping-with-the-growing-number-of-felons-in-michigan 
[https://perma.cc/C5UR-T7UV].  Although these numbers are not precisely comparable, the differ-
ence in scale is obvious and suggests that only a very small percentage of the single-Michigan-
conviction individuals in our sample are likely to have a federal record, making a negligible differ-
ence in our uptake estimates. 
 151 See supra note 128. 
 152 See id. 
  
2020] EXPUNGEMENT OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 2493 
few of those who are legally eligible for expungements receive them 
within five years of becoming eligible.  Indeed, even if the true five-year 
rate were 10% — substantially higher than any version of our esti-
mate — it would still be strikingly low. 
What about after five years?  Unfortunately, we cannot directly esti-
mate a longer-term uptake rate because of the time range of our data on 
the eligible-group sample.  However, we do have data on the full uni-
verse of expungement recipients in Michigan up through 2011.  Among 
nonincarceration cases in this more inclusive sample, at the time of ex-
pungement receipt, 44% have an elapsed time since eligibility of more 
than five years.153  Assuming the same pattern holds for the cases in our 
eligible sample, extrapolating from our main uptake estimate would pre-
dict a lifetime uptake rate of 11.6% for those not sentenced to incarcer-
ation.154  Even this rate means that 88% of those eligible will never 
secure relief — and those who receive expungements after many years 
still forfeit many years of potential benefits. 
B.  Who Receives Expungements? 
Only a small minority of people with records in Michigan are eligible 
for expungements,155 and only a small minority of this eligible popula-
tion in fact receives them.  What distinguishes eligible individuals who 
receive an expungement from those who do not?  To develop insight into 
possible reasons for the low uptake rate we identify and to develop hy-
potheses about policies that might increase it, we assess the characteris-
tics of the individuals who do receive expungements and their cases, and 
we investigate which of those characteristics are usefully predictive of 
an eligible person receiving an expungement. 
 In Table 2, we provide descriptive statistics of the relevant popula-
tions for this exercise.  The statistics in Column 1 refer to the complete 
population of all Michigan expungement recipients with known dates 
prior to June 2011 (when the law changed).  Columns 2 and 3 report 
summary statistics for the main sample we use in our uptake-rate anal-
ysis on display in Table 1.  Column 2 covers individuals within that 
sample who did receive expungements within five years of becoming 
eligible, and Column 3 covers the entire uptake sample (most of whom 
did not receive expungements).  Columns 2 and 3 can be usefully com-
pared to one another to shed light on how expungement recipients differ 
from the broader eligible group.  We note that some of the figures for  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 153 See infra fig. 1 and accompanying text. 
 154 That is, we simply assume that the 6.5% share of the uptake sample who receive expunge-
ments within five years constitute 56% of those who will eventually receive expungements in their 
lifetimes: 0.065/0.56=0.116. 
 155 Establishing the number of people with criminal records is notoriously difficult.  Expungement 
advocates consistently emphasized to us in interviews that very few people are actually eligible, which 
is intuitive, given the strict limitations in terms of numbers of convictions (especially during the pre-
2011 period).  See infra notes 204–212 and accompanying text for further analysis. 
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 (1) (2) (3)
Expungement 
Recipients
(complete 
population)
Expungement 
Recipients 
(uptake sample 
only)
Eligible for 
Expungement 
(uptake sample 
only)
Individual Characteristics
Race
Black 30.4% 39.8% 30.9%
White 65.6% 54.4% 67.0%
Other 4.0% 5.7% 2.1%
Mean Age at Conviction (years) 26.50 29.64 30.43
Male 60.9% 54.2% 64.9%
Employed (at eligibility) 66.0% 67.0% 64.6%
Employed (before expungement) 60.6% 53.8%
Quarterly Wages (at eligibility) $4,968 $5,013 $6,387
Quarterly Wages (before expungement) $5,160 $3,463
Case Characteristics
Felony 44.2% 48.9% 30.1%
Crime Type
Violent 14.9% 28.0% 26.2%
Drug 13.5% 14.0% 27.0%
Property/Economic 53.2% 39.8% 31.6%
Other 18.4% 18.2% 15.2%
Incarcerated 28.6%
Incarcerated ( > 1 year) 1.9%
Median Elapsed Time (years) 9.6
Number of Observations 22,004 522 9103
TABLE 2. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
EXPUNGEMENT RECIPIENTS
Notes: Column (1) includes the complete population of Michigan known-date expungement recipients through
May 2011.  Column (2) comprises all individuals in the uptake sample who received an expungement.  The uptake 
sample (n=9103) in Column (3) consists of all individuals who have a first conviction on a single criminal count in
Michigan for an expungement-eligible crime with a sentencing date between January 1999 and May 2001, and
who were not incarcerated, were not reconvicted for any crime within five years of sentencing, and did not have
an out-of-state driver’s license. The phrases “at eligibility” and “before expungement” refer to the quarter in
which an individual first becomes eligible for expungement and the quarter before expungement, respectively.
“Median Elapsed Time” is the number of years between sentencing and expungement receipt.
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expungement recipients look a little bit different in Columns 1 and 2; 
this may arise from the various constraints on the Column 2 sample.  
 While expungement recipients have diverse personal and case char-
acteristics, some patterns stand out in the data.  Relative to the criminal 
convictions of the entire eligible pool (as shown in Column 3), convic-
tions that are actually expunged (as shown in Column 2) are much more 
likely to be felonies; they are more likely to be property offenses, less 
likely to be drug crimes, and roughly equally likely to be violent offenses.  
Although expungements are not limited to minor crimes under the law 
we study, most expungement recipients were not sentenced to incarcer-
ation for their expunged offense.  In fact, among all expungement recipi-
ents historically, only 28.6% were incarcerated for any time at all, and only 
1.9% were incarcerated for more than one year.156  Finally, compared to all 
eligible individuals, expungement recipients are less likely to be male and 
more likely to be black.    
 
FIGURE 1.  TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN SENTENCING  
AND EXPUNGEMENT                   
Notes: The bars show the percentage of recipients who received their expunge-
ment before the end of the year(s) indicated and who did not receive it in an 
earlier period.  The sample consists of the complete population of Michigan 
known-date expungement recipients through May 2011 (n=22,004). 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 Because our main uptake sample is defined to exclude those who were incarcerated, we do 
not provide comparison figures in Columns 2 and 3.   
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 We report employment measures for both the quarter that the recip-
ient became eligible for the expungement and the quarter before actually 
receiving it, which may offer suggestive evidence about whether em-
ployment changes influence the timing of expungement applications.157  
Here, we discern notable differences between the uptake sample and the 
full sample of expungement recipients: in the former, employment rates 
and wages are far lower just before expungement than they were at the 
time of eligibility, whereas in the full sample employment is modestly 
lower and average wages are actually higher.  This difference may re-
flect the fact that the uptake sample is narrowly defined temporally, and 
the five-year observation period for the uptake outcome (ending between 
2009 and 2011 for all members of the sample) includes a major economic 
crash;158 for this reason, these numbers may not actually suggest any 
broader relationship between employment setbacks and expungement 
timing.  We explore that potential relationship in Part IV. 
 As Column 1 in Table 2 shows, at the time of expungement receipt, 
the median time elapsed since sentencing is 9.6 years.159  In Figure 1, 
we show more detail on the distribution of elapsed time, focusing on 
those not sentenced to incarceration, all of whom would have become 
eligible after five years had transpired.  Figure 1 makes clear that there 
is wide variation in the time lag between eligibility and expungement 
receipt.  On the one hand, the single year with by far the most expunge-
ments granted is the first year after the five-year waiting period expires 
(that is, the sixth year since sentencing — labeled “Year 6”), roughly a 
quarter of the total.  This flurry of expungement activity suggests a pent-
up demand effect: some expungement recipients likely anticipate becom-
ing eligible ahead of time and apply more or less as soon as they can.160  
The monthly rate, not shown in the graph, peaks at four months after 
the date of eligibility; this too is consistent with the pent-up demand 
theory, since expungements typically take a few months to process.161 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 157 We discuss our wage data in more detail infra Part IV, pp. 2523–43. 
 158 See generally Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES (June 6, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/chart-book-the-legacy-of-the-
great-recession [https://perma.cc/9K74-N79U] (reviewing the economic consequences of the reces-
sion of 2007–09). 
 159 We do not show this figure in Column 2 because that sample is already constrained to include 
only those receiving expungements within five years of becoming eligible. 
 160 Cf. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives to  
Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 754–59 (1995) (analyzing the potential ben-
efits of same-sex marriage legalization using a model assuming pent-up demand). 
 161 See Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, Attorney, Mich. Legal Help (Feb. 14, 2019) 
(estimating that four to six months is typical for one large Michigan county); Telephone Interview 
with Chioke Mose-Telesford, Deputy Dir. of Workforce Dev. for the City of Detroit (Feb. 27, 2019) 
(explaining that Detroit’s legal assistance program has recently reduced its wait time to two months 
through concerted efforts to accelerate the process but that previously 160 to 190 days would have 
been typical).  MSP advised us that typically about six to ten weeks elapse after MSP runs the 
criminal background check and returns a report deeming the individual eligible before the expunge-
ment is granted by the judge.  Email from Ted Kilvington, supra note 125. 
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The annual rate declines continuously thereafter (the last two bars in 
the graph are taller only because they represent periods of five or more 
years).  Still, more than 44% of expungements take place after more than 
five years of eligibility (year 11 or beyond), and almost 25% occur after 
more than ten years of eligibility (year 16 or beyond).  
 
FIGURE 2.  UPTAKE RATE BY COUNTY (MICHIGAN) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Notes: The bars indicate the percentage of expungement recipients by county.  The sample 
consists of all individuals who have a first conviction on a single criminal count in  
Michigan for an expungement-eligible crime with a sentencing date between January 1999 
and May 2001, and who were not incarcerated, were not reconvicted for any crime within 
five years of sentencing, and did not have an out-of-state driver’s license (n=9103). 
 
 In Figure 2, we present uptake rates by county for the six most pop-
ulous counties in Michigan (in descending order of population from the 
left), and for Michigan’s other seventy-seven counties combined.  The 
figure reveals considerable local variation.  Michigan’s largest counties 
are primarily urban and suburban; five of the six (all but Kent) are in 
Southeastern Michigan, within an hour of Detroit.  Nevertheless,  
Oakland County’s rate is more than triple that of Genesee County, 
which it borders.  All of the larger counties have higher uptake rates 
than the rest of the state combined.  However, by 2014, courts in every 
county in Michigan had granted at least one expungement, and at least 
ten had been granted in seventy-seven out of eighty-three counties (with 
the remaining six all being among Michigan’s least populous).  
Many of the individual and case characteristics listed in Table 2 are 
correlated with one another, and with the county as well, which makes  
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Wayne Oakland Macomb Kent Genesee Washtenaw Other
0%
2
4
6
8  
10
12
14
Wayne Oakland Macomb Kent Genesee Washtenaw Other 
  
2498 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:2460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.663*** 0.654*** 0.671*** 0.693*** 0.692***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.058) (0.051) (0.052)
Black 0.989 0.825 0.846⁺ 0.936 0.948
(0.109) (0.098) (0.086) (0.079) (0.083)
Age at Conviction (years) 0.988** 0.986** 0.986*** 0.988*** 0.990**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Felony 2.552*** 2.129*** 2.211*** 2.262*** 2.446***
(0.284) (0.262) (0.227) (0.194) (0.219)
Offense Type
Violent Offense 0.464*** 0.545*** 0.525*** 0.554*** 0.571***
(0.068) (0.085) (0.070) (0.064) (0.069)
Drug Offense 1.243 1.487** 1.306* 1.400** 1.468***
(0.170) (0.221) (0.171) (0.150) (0.164)
Public Order/Other Offense 1.272* 1.297⁺ 1.331* 1.387*** 1.449***
(0.153) (0.175) (0.150) (0.128) (0.140)
Incarcerated (≤ 1 year) 0.553*** 0.676*** 0.672***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Wages (last quarter) 1.004
(0.007)
Employed (last quarter) 1.768***
(0.158)
Lost Wages (last quarter) 2.268***
(0.196)
Baseline Odds 0.077*** 0.187*** 0.120* 0.006*** 0.011***
(0.013) (0.048) (0.127) (0.006) (0.011)
Controls
Conviction Year Effects X X X X X
County Effects X X X X
Elapsed Time (years) X X
Number of Observations 9080 8406 13,465 515,964 474,670
TABLE 3. DETERMINANTS OF EXPUNGEMENT RECEIPT
Notes: The results of these logistic regressions are reported as odds ratios. The outcome variable is an indicator
for expungement receipt. Columns (1) to (3) analyze expungement receipt within the first five years of eligibility.
Columns (1) and (2) consider individuals in our uptake sample; Column (3) adds individuals incarcerated for up
to one year. Columns (4) and (5) analyze expungement receipt in a given quarter using a panel-regression
framework; observations are person-quarters and standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the
person level. ⁺, *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively. The base
category for the offense type is property/economic crime.
Receipt:
Within Five Years of Eligibility
Receipt:
Current Quarter
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inference from this table fraught.  It could be, for instance, that the 
higher uptake rate for black individuals can be entirely explained by 
county-to-county variation; indeed, uptake rates are generally lower in 
more rural, predominantly white Michigan counties.  For this reason, in 
Table 3, we turn to regression analysis to test which individual and case 
characteristics remain predictive of expungement uptake when we hold 
other characteristics constant.  We use logistic regression, a common ap-
proach for analyzing binary outcomes like expungement receipt.162  We 
present our results as odds ratios, which represent a multiplier of the 
odds of the expungement occurring.  An odds ratio greater than one 
means that the variable is associated with increased odds of expunge-
ment receipt when other variables are fixed.163  In Columns 1 through 3 
of Table 3, we study the determinants of whether an individual receives 
an expungement within five years of becoming eligible — the same out-
come we report in Table 1.164  We estimate the following equation: logit 𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝐴𝑔𝑒               + 𝛽 𝐹𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦  +  𝛾 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 + 𝛿 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜖 . 
The outcome variable 𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 is an indicator for whether the 
individual receives an expungement within five years of eligibility.  𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 
and 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 depict the individual’s reported gender and race; all nonblack 
races are combined into one base category, which is 94% white.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝐴𝑔𝑒 is the individual’s age in years at the time of the expungement-
eligible conviction.  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 represents the year of that conviction.  𝐹𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 is an indicator for whether the crime of conviction is a felony, 
and 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 is a set of indicators for the type of crime: drug-related, 
violent, and other, with property/economic crimes as the omitted refer-
ence category.  Column 1 presents our baseline results.  In Column 2 
(and subsequent columns), we also control for county effects.  In Column 
3, we include individuals incarcerated for their crime for up to one year 
and add an indicator for whether the individual was incarcerated.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 However, linear (ordinary least squares) regression analysis produces substantively indistin-
guishable results when compared to the marginal effects from the logistic regressions. 
 163 Odds have a technical definition, and while they are not the same as probability, higher odds 
do mean a higher probability.  When probabilities are quite low (as they are here), the odds ratio is 
a good rough approximation of the probability ratio.  The odds that an event X (for example, an 
expungement) occurs are equal to the probability that X occurs divided by the probability that X 
does not occur.  An odds ratio refers to the multiplier of these odds that applies with a one-unit 
change in some explanatory variable.  
 164 For Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, the sample is the same one we use for the main uptake 
estimate in Table 1 (with constraints described in section II.A), and for Column 3, we add cases 
with incarceration up to one year (the same sample we use in Table 1, Row 4).  Our results are 
robust to estimating Columns 1 through 3 on the same sample (in two different ways).  The findings 
in Column 4 are also unaffected by limiting the analysis to Column 5’s smaller sample.  These 
results are available upon request. 
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 The regression results in Column 1 show that, other things equal, 
uptake rates are much higher among women and among people who 
were relatively young at the time of their conviction.  The impression 
given in Table 2 of a higher uptake rate for black individuals completely 
disappears in these regressions, implying that this racial difference is ac-
tually explained by other correlated characteristics.  As for crime attri-
butes, the regressions all confirm that people with felony convictions 
have, other things equal, more than twice the odds of receiving expunge-
ments.  By contrast, people who have been incarcerated  (even for short 
periods) and people convicted of violent crimes have only about half the 
odds of expungement receipt as otherwise similar individuals do; this pat-
tern is not apparent in the summary statistics in Table 2.  A possible 
theory for these results is that felony convictions make individuals much 
more likely to apply (because felonies can trigger a wider range of col-
lateral consequences), but judges are less likely to grant expungements 
in cases involving more serious or violent convictions.165  Taken to-
gether, the pattern indicates that the people most likely to receive ex-
pungements are those with relatively minor felony convictions (espe-
cially women) — namely, felonies not resulting in jail time. 
 The regression results we present in Columns 4 and 5 also analyze 
expungement receipt, but they replace the five-year uptake indicator 
with a different outcome variable: whether an expungement is received 
in any particular quarter.  These analyses help us to understand the in-
fluences on expungement probability that vary over time — and in par-
ticular, to ask whether an individual’s immediate employment history 
(such as a recent job loss) drives the decision to apply for an expunge-
ment.  The dataset we use in these regressions has a panel structure, 
meaning it contains separate observations for each quarter for each in-
dividual.  The sample covers most of the people we include in the Col-
umn 3 analysis, depending on whether we have linked wage data for 
them.  The regression we estimate takes the following form: logit 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝐴𝑔𝑒      + 𝛽 𝐹𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦  +  𝛽 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛾 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒  
            + 𝛿 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜇 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 + 𝜃𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑄𝑡𝑟  
        + 𝜋𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑄𝑡𝑟 +  𝜌𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 + 𝜖 . 
 The specifications underlying Columns 4 and 5 are similar to the 
ones in the previous columns but also include variables that change over 
time for a given individual.  Column 4 includes whether an individual 
was employed in the previous quarter (that is, whether any wages are 
reported, which we discuss in greater detail in Part IV) and their re-
ported wages in the previous quarter, as well as the number of years 
that have elapsed since the expungement-eligible conviction.  We focus 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 165 See infra p. 2507. 
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on the role of the previous quarter in part because there is likely to be 
at least a one-quarter lag between expungement application and receipt, 
and we are interested in understanding the motivation for the applica-
tion.  In addition, lagging this variable avoids the problem of reverse 
causation: employment status and wages in the quarter of expungement 
receipt could be affected by the expungement itself. 
In Column 5, we focus on whether the individual recently experi-
enced an employment setback, which we proxy for with an indicator for 
whether the individual’s wages had, in the quarter preceding the receipt 
of the expungement, dropped by at least 20% compared to a year earlier 
(denominated “Lost Wages” in Table 3).  Our framework allows us to 
assess the effects of wage loss on expungement receipt in a way that is 
not confounded by the recession’s timing.  The whole sample is affected 
by the same economic trends, and the controls for year of conviction and 
years since conviction (which together produce the calendar year) also 
absorb those effects.  The regression thus allows us to investigate whether, 
among individuals subjected to the same broader economic conditions, 
personal employment setbacks affect expungement probability. 
We find, on the one hand, that being employed is a very strong pos-
itive predictor of expungement receipt in a particular quarter, increasing 
the odds by a factor of 1.77 (Column 4).  On the other hand, a recent 
wage loss is an even stronger predictor, increasing the odds of expunge-
ment receipt by a factor of 2.27 (Column 5).  Although these results are 
in tension with each other, they each have plausible explanations: em-
ployed people may generally be more likely to have the resources, infor-
mation, and money to pursue an expungement; but people who have 
experienced a recent employment setback may have more motivation to 
pursue a new job.  These results also help to inform our interpretation 
of the wage and employment effects of expungement that we estimate 
below; we refer back to these uptake findings in Part IV. 
C.  What Explains the Uptake Gap? 
Given the many life disadvantages that come with a criminal record, 
one might expect that most people who have records would jump at the 
chance to leave their record behind.  Yet strikingly few do so.  Why?  
Our quantitative data shed some light on this question but cannot really 
answer it.  To complement our data analysis, we sought out the insights 
of experienced Michigan expungement lawyers and other advocates for 
people with records, many of whom are actively involved with outreach 
efforts (such as “expungement fairs”) that aim to encourage and facilitate 
expungement applications.166  We asked them for their perceptions of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 166 See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Legal Aid Lawyer (Feb. 22, 2019); Telephone In-
terview with Miriam Aukerman, Senior Staff Attorney, ACLU of Mich. (Feb. 16, 2019); Telephone 
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the underlying mechanisms of limited uptake.  Our discussions consist-
ently pointed to a set of likely explanations. 
 1.  Lack of Information. — Every advocate we spoke to mentioned 
this concern, and many thought it was the single most important uptake 
barrier.  Most people with records, even if they are eligible, lack the 
information they need to pursue an expungement.  As Tracey Brame, 
who runs a law clinic that handles expungement cases, explained: “A lot 
of people have absolutely no idea that they can do this.”167  Many do 
not know that the expungement law exists at all.  Others may have a 
vague idea that expungement is possible, but they do not know that they 
are eligible or they are unfamiliar with what they need to do to pursue 
one (or how to find out).  Expungement law is complicated and not easy 
for a layperson to grasp.168  Many people do not understand their own 
criminal records — for example, they may not know that their decision 
to plead guilty to a traffic offense produced a criminal conviction.  Sev-
eral advocates recounted running expungement fairs in which, even 
though promotional materials identify the key eligibility requirements, 
a substantial majority of those who turn up learn sometime after they 
arrive that they are ineligible and walk out exasperated.  It is certainly 
plausible that there are just as many people who are eligible who assume 
they are not.  After all, the great majority of people with records are 
ineligible for expungement, and in communities where many people 
have records, to the extent that people know about expungement at all, 
frustration with its stringent restrictions is common.169  The shared im-
pression that “nobody is eligible” may be entrenched, including among 
those who are actually eligible. 
 2.  Administrative Hassle and Time Constraints. — Obtaining an 
expungement requires a nontrivial amount of organization, effort, and 
time.  The process is drawn out and requires patience and ongoing re-
solve.  A would-be applicant, after overcoming the basic informational 
hurdles we describe above, must track down the official application 
form, which is available on the website of the State Court  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Interview with Tracey Brame, supra note 145; Email from Josh Hoe, Co-Chair, Policy and Educ. 
Comm., Nation Outside, to Sonja Starr, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Feb. 13, 2019, 
12:25 PM) (on file with authors); Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161; Tele-
phone Interview with Chioke Mose-Telesford, supra note 161; Email from John Shea, Private Prac-
titioner, to Sonja Starr, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Feb. 15, 2019, 1:33 PM) (on file 
with authors); Email from Kim Thomas, supra note 133. 
 167 Telephone Interview with Tracey Brame, supra note 145. 
 168 This is particularly so given that the target population includes many people with significant 
socioeconomic challenges, including limited literacy.  Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, 
supra note 161. 
 169 See Email from Josh Hoe, supra note 166; Telephone Interview with Chioke Mose-Telesford, 
supra note 161. 
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Administrative Office.170  Occupying two-thirds of the second page of 
that form, in fairly small font, is the following set of instructions: 
1. Determine whether you are eligible to apply to have your conviction set 
aside according to MCL 780.621.  You must complete a separate application 
for each conviction if you are applying to have more than one conviction 
set aside [as is allowed under the current statute]. 
2. Find out the exact date of conviction and the charge from the court.  Get 
a certified copy of the adjudication and attach it to your application. 
3. Swear to the truth of the statements in this application and then sign it 
in the presence of the court clerk or a notary public. 
4. Make four copies of all attachments and this application.  Take all copies 
to the court clerk. 
5. Depending on local practice, the clerk of the court may set a hearing date 
at the time of filing.  If a hearing date is set at the time of filing, the clerk 
of the court will complete the Notice of Hearing. 
6. Go to the local law enforcement agency for a fingerprint card and get 
fingerprinted on the applicant card (RI-8) . . . . 
7. Make out a money order or check to the State of Michigan for the appli-
cation. . . . 
8. Mail a copy of the application packet, application fee, and the fingerprint 
card to the Michigan State Police . . . . 
9. Mail a copy of the application packet to the Attorney General of the State 
of Michigan . . . . 
10. Mail a copy of the application packet to the correct prosecuting official 
where the conviction occurred (county, city, or township) . . . . 
11. On both copies of the application, fill in the Proof of Service on the back 
of the form.  After you fill out and sign the Proof of Service, mail or take 
one of the remaining application packets with the completed Proof of  
Service to the court.  Keep the other copy for your records . . . .171 
It is easy to see how this list would be daunting and confusing to 
potential applicants (and these steps do not end the process; a court 
hearing follows, usually many weeks later).172  Advocates confirm that 
this is so; everyone we interviewed independently mentioned the admin-
istrative burdens facing applicants.  As many elaborated, people with 
records are usually struggling with a variety of life challenges.  Taking 
time away from work and childcare responsibilities to go to a police 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 170 See MICH. COURTS, MC 227: APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE CONVICTION, 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Administration/SCAO/Forms/courtforms/mc227.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EYV6-YJVF]. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See id.; Common Questions About Setting Aside Adult Convictions (Expungements), MICH. 
LEGAL HELP, https://michiganlegalhelp.org/self-help-tools/crime-traffic-and-id/common- 
questions-about-setting-aside-adult-convictions-expungements [https://perma.cc/HYR8-9SB6] 
(stating that it can take about six months or more for a conviction to be expunged). 
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station to be fingerprinted, to make several trips to a courthouse, to find 
a notary, and to mail all these materials to the right addresses may be 
simply impossible, or at least difficult enough to be strongly discourag-
ing.173  This is especially so when prospective applicants do not live near 
the court that convicted them, where their expungements must be pro-
cessed and the hearing must take place.  And, finally, one experienced 
expungement lawyer at a public interest organization pointed out that 
many of her clients are already overwhelmed with paperwork, such as 
the forms associated with receiving public benefits.174 
 3.  Fees and Costs. — Every expert we interviewed emphasized the 
barriers erected by fees and other associated costs.  The $50 expunge-
ment application fee cannot be waived, and it is not the only expense.175  
Michael Kiehne of Michigan Legal Help and Michigan Works estimated 
that the total cost amounts to close to $100, including fingerprinting 
($10–$20 at most local police stations), notary fees (up to $10), obtaining 
a certified record of a conviction ($10–$12 if it is only one page), and 
photocopies.176  This does not include the costs of transportation and 
possible loss of wages for time taken off work; Chioke Mose-Telesford 
of Detroit’s Project Clean Slate emphasized that especially in a city with 
poor public transit and low car ownership, the absence of transportation 
options is a serious hurdle.177  For applicants living in poverty, these accu-
mulated expenses are a serious financial impediment — consistent with 
our finding that the unemployed are less likely to apply.  In principle, one 
could see the cost as an investment in future earnings; in Part IV, we 
document average expected gains that would very quickly cover the 
cost.  But those without cash on hand may not have the liquidity or 
ability to make such an investment or may be reluctant to do so when 
the long-term benefits are speculative. 
 4.  Distrust and Fear of the Criminal Justice System. — For many 
potential expungement applicants, their prior experience with the crim-
inal justice system may well have been among the worst experiences of 
their lives.  According to several advocates, this often amplifies the 
daunting nature of the expungement process; individuals with records, 
at least five years removed from an earlier criminal justice ordeal, may 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 173 This is consistent with the larger access-to-justice literature.  The use of procedures that re-
quire travel to courthouses, for instance, can dramatically reduce participation.  See Maximilian A. 
Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, 
and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 217–35 (2016); Prescott, supra note 136, at 38. 
 174 Telephone Interview with Anonymous Legal Aid Lawyer, supra note 166. 
 175 See MICH. COURTS, supra note 170 (calling the $50 fee a “required fee”); I Need a Fee Waiver 
for Court, MICH. LEGAL HELP, https://michiganlegalhelp.org/self-help-tools/going-court/i-need-
fee-waiver-court [https://perma.cc/PCC3-FBK5] (not listing an expungement application fee as a 
court fee that may be waived).   
 176 Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161. 
 177 Telephone Interview with Chioke Mose-Telesford, supra note 161. 
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be strongly averse to returning to court or to a police station for any 
reason.178  This may be especially so if they expect the prosecutor or a 
crime victim to come to court to contest an expungement petition, which 
the law allows (and which sometimes happens).179  In addition to fear 
of the process itself, potential applicants may be pessimistic about the 
likely outcome, even though most expungement applications are in fact 
granted.  As Kiehne explained: 
Expungements are discretionary, and when you let people know that, they 
tend to be pessimistic.  We always try to tell people that many judges are 
excited to grant these . . . .  [But some] fear that it won’t work [for] them — 
an issue based on their past experience with the courts. . . . [S]o it is hard to 
get this information through.180 
A potential applicant who fears that any request for an expungement 
will be denied may be particularly reluctant to undertake the effort, cost, 
and stress of pursuing record-clearing opportunities.181 
 5.  Lack of Access to Counsel. — Some of the obstacles above could be 
overcome or rendered less discouraging with legal assistance.  Although 
expungement applications can be filed pro se, the process is far less diffi-
cult to navigate for an experienced attorney.182  Yet, too often, none are 
available.  Criminal defense lawyers are typically long since out of touch 
with their former clients by the time they become eligible for expunge-
ment, and most of the time defense lawyers do not advise their clients 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 178 See Email from Josh Hoe, supra note 166 (“Many formerly incarcerated and impacted people 
have very little faith in judges, so there is also a suspicion of wasting their time going through the 
process.”); Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161.  Alternatively, this fear and 
apprehension may take the form of a stigma “friction.”  Bhargava & Manoli, supra note 138, at 
3490, 3505, 3512; see also DAVID RIBAR, IZA WORLD OF LABOR, HOW TO IMPROVE 
PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 6 (2014), https://wol.iza.org/uploads/ 
articles/104/pdfs/how-to-improve-participation-in-social-assistance-programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8APE-76MQ]; Jana Friedrichsen & Renke Schmacker, Fear of Stigmatization Prevents Individuals 
from Claiming Benefits, 9 DIW WEEKLY REPORT 215, 219 (2019); Robert Moffitt, An Economic 
Model of Welfare Stigma, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1023, 1024–27 (1983); David C. Ribar & Lauren A. 
Haldeman, Changes in Meal Participation, Attendance, and Test Scores Associated with the Avail-
ability of Universal Free School Breakfasts, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 354, 381 (2013). 
 179 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(11) (2019) (“[A]n opportunity shall be given to the attorney 
general and to the prosecuting attorney to contest the [expungement] application . . . [and] [t]he 
victim has the right to appear at any proceeding under this act concerning that conviction and to 
make a written or oral statement.”). 
 180 Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161. 
 181 A small survey of recipients of record clearance in California described respondents’ past 
encounters with the court system as “consistently fraught with fear and shame.”  Adams et al., supra 
note 95, at 42.  Notably, when respondents did go through with clearing their record, their experi-
ences were ultimately far more positive.  See id. (noting that, given their past bad experiences, 
respondents were often surprised by the respect they received from judges and district attorneys 
during the clearance process).  
 182 See, e.g., Margaret (Peggy) Stevenson, Expungement: A Gateway to Work, CLEARINGHOUSE 
COMMUNITY, Mar. 2015, at 1, 1–2 (“Clearing a record without an attorney is frequently difficult.  
The absence of sufficient free legal help and the inability to pay for private attorneys mean that 
many low-income people unnecessarily carry the burden of an expungeable conviction for years.”). 
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about the possible prospect of an expungement five years in advance, 
either.  Paid attorneys are out of reach for most people with records.183  
And legal aid or pro bono attorneys with time on their hands are too 
rare.  Although there have been some recent improvements on this front 
(which we discuss below), one legal aid lawyer with extensive expunge-
ment experience explained to us that many legal aid organizations are 
simply overwhelmed with the many other needs they are asked to serve, 
which makes it “hard to ask them to take on a whole new area.”184 
 6.  Insufficient Motivation to Pursue Expungement. — Notwith-
standing the various hardships that tend to be associated with having 
a criminal record, not everybody with a record is affected by it in the 
same way.  Virtually everyone with a criminal record would presumably 
prefer not to have it, but not everybody necessarily experiences the re-
cord as a burden sufficient to motivate them to take on the investment 
of time, money, and energy that an expungement demands.  This may 
be especially true for people with minor convictions — a theory sup-
ported by our finding that those with misdemeanors are less than half 
as likely to obtain expungements as those with felonies are.  It seems 
implausible that judges would on average be less willing to grant ex-
pungements for misdemeanors, so the only credible explanation is that 
people with misdemeanors are less likely to apply.  This is intuitively 
sensible.  While misdemeanor records can certainly have nontrivial conse-
quences,185 many collateral legal consequences apply only to felonies,186 
and some employment applications ask about only felony records.187  It is 
not surprising that those with felony records appear to be particularly 
motivated to pursue expungement relief.  In addition, motivation may 
affect the timing of expungements; as Tracey Brame explained: “A lot of 
people don’t prioritize it until [the conviction] is a problem,” such as 
when they are trying to pursue an occupational license.188 
* * * 
Our exchanges with practitioners and policymakers, who were con-
templating record clearing specifically when sharing their views with us,  
produce a set of concrete reasons for low uptake.  But record-clearing 
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 183 See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt that Can Never Be Repaid: A Report Card on the 
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2006, at 16, 22 (“[I]t is generally more 
expensive for a criminal offender to hire a lawyer to go to court to seek expungement, than it is to 
file an application for pardon . . . .”). 
 184 Telephone Interview with Anonymous Legal Aid Lawyer, supra note 166. 
 185 See, e.g., Charlie Gerstein & J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 268, 276, 278 (2015); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without  
Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351, 369–73 (2013). 
 186 See UMEZ & PIRIUS, supra note 46, at 3. 
 187 See Agan & Starr, Ban the Box, supra note 39, at 193 n.2 (“Job application questions about 
records are overwhelmingly limited to convictions (not arrests), and usually to felonies.”).  
 188 Telephone Interview with Tracey Brame, supra note 145. 
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policies — including the common requirement that eligible individuals 
file a petition — are embedded in a larger criminal justice context, one 
rife with access-to-justice and punishment disparities along economic 
and racial dimensions.189  To those familiar with that context, the uptake 
gap, while stark, may actually be unsurprising.  The gap aligns with 
Sarah Brayne’s finding that people involved in the criminal justice sys-
tem are more likely to engage in “system avoidance” by self-selecting 
away from institutions that keep formal records or carry the mantle of 
government because they fear the prospect of adverse state surveil-
lance.190  The burdens of seemingly unrelated policies, therefore, may 
help us understand the failure of uptake with respect to expungement.  
Nevertheless, addressing the immediate barriers to uptake we de-
scribe above is critical, and various organizations have taken important 
steps to improve matters.  Over the past fifteen years, as the challenges 
facing people with records have drawn more attention nationally and in 
Michigan,191 significant efforts in Michigan to increase support for peo-
ple seeking expungement have sprouted.  The City of Detroit, for exam-
ple, recently adopted an initiative called Project Clean Slate to support 
expungement activity,192 and Michigan Works, a statewide workforce 
development program, has become increasingly involved in the issue.193  
Michigan Legal Help, a nonprofit that provides do-it-yourself tools to 
pro se litigants, has developed an online tool that allows applicants to 
assess their eligibility and to fill out the application form, although they 
must still go through the various steps to file it.194 
Many of these organizations have sponsored expungement fairs, 
which have become perhaps the central outreach tool in this space.195  
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 189 See DAVID J. HARDING ET AL., ON THE OUTSIDE: PRISONER REENTRY AND 
REINTEGRATION 4–5 (2019) (acknowledging “a broader cultural, political, and institutional shift 
toward order, control, and the use of punishment to solve social problems, particularly those asso-
ciated with poverty or ethnoracial minorities”). 
 190 Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and  
Institutional Attachment, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 367, 385 (2014). 
 191 We discuss recent expansions in expungement law above, supra notes 12–21 and accompany-
ing text.  While the past couple of years have been particularly active, the trend of expansion actu-
ally goes back further.  See Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent 
Developments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 369–73 (2016) (dis-
cussing reforms between 2009 and 2015). 
 192 See Project Clean Slate, CITY OF DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov/departments/law- 
department/project-clean-slate [https://perma.cc/ZJQ2-E4LY]. 
 193 See Have You Been Convicted of a Crime?, MICH. WORKS! SE., https://www.mwse.org/ 
expungement [https://perma.cc/U4B7-SJCW]; Telephone Interview with Chioke Mose-Telesford, 
supra note 161. 
 194 See Do-It-Yourself Expungement (Adult Conviction), MICH. LEGAL HELP, https:// 
michiganlegalhelp.org/self-help-tools/crime-traffic-and-id/do-it-yourself-expungement-adult-conviction 
[https://perma.cc/5X47-88VN]; Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161. 
 195 See Michigan Works! Southeast Expungement Fair, MICH. LEGAL HELP, https:// 
michiganlegalhelp.org/node/11324 [https://perma.cc/CUR6-MEQ5]; Project Clean Slate Fair This 
  
2508 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 133:2460 
Expungement fairs are designed at a minimum to provide information, 
and many also provide concrete assistance: applicants have been encour-
aged to fill out applications on site, and some fairs have had sheriffs 
present to do the fingerprinting, as well as notaries.196  Depending on 
the sponsoring organization’s funding, these fairs have sometimes been 
able to defray the costs for applicants — for example, by offering fin-
gerprinting for free or paying for the certified record of conviction.197  
Expungement fairs in Detroit have reportedly been quite large, some 
perhaps close to a thousand participants, although most attendees have 
proven to be ineligible.198  Fairs elsewhere in the state have generally 
not had anywhere close to this kind of attendance.199 
Miriam Aukerman, who worked on expungement cases at Western 
Michigan Legal Aid until 2010, told us: 
When I started doing this work back in 2003 or 2004, nobody was doing it.  
People didn’t think it was important.  When I left in 2010, it was a thing.  
Legal services offices had started doing it; there were self-help packets avail-
able . . . .  Expungement fairs were starting to happen.  Advocacy organi-
zations started spreading the word.200 
Aukerman’s recollection is borne out by data.  In 2010, the last full year 
for which we have complete data, the number of known-date expunge-
ments granted in Michigan was 2044, which is 67% higher than the 
number in 2004 (1224).  MSP reported to us that 2594 expungements 
were granted in 2017; this number (although down slightly from 2016)  
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Saturday to Provide Free Criminal Record Expungement for Detroiters, CITY OF DETROIT, https:// 
detroitmi.gov/news/project-clean-slate-fair-saturday-provide-free-criminal-record-expungement- 
detroiters [https://perma.cc/P97U-43YU]; Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161; 
Telephone Interview with Chioke Mose-Telesford, supra note 161. 
 196 See, e.g., Hunter McLaren, Expungement Fair Gives Jackson Residents Second Chance at 
Finding Work, Housing, MLIVE (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/jackson/2019/08/ 
expungement-fair-gives-jackson-residents-second-chance-at-finding-work-housing.html [https:// 
perma.cc/LR6G-SFR5] (describing the provision of reduced fees and a local police officer to facili-
tate the expungement application process). 
 197 See id. 
 198 See Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161 (indicating that some Detroit 
fairs have had approximately 1000 attendees); Attorneys Participate in “Know Your Rights”  
Program, Expungement Fair, LEGALNEWS.COM (Feb. 10, 2020), http://legalnews.com/ 
detroit/1484605 [https://perma.cc/725R-DJQB]; Corey Williams, Detroit Jobseekers Look to Have 
Nonviolent Records Expunged, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 4, 2016; see also Project Clean Slate 
Fair This Saturday to Provide Free Criminal Record Expungement for Detroiters, supra note 195 
(noting that only 200 Detroit residents had records expunged that year).  
 199 See, e.g., Gabriella Galloway, Some with Criminal Records Get a Possible Second Chance, 9 & 10 
NEWS (July 29, 2019), https://www.9and10news.com/2019/07/29/some-with-criminal-records-get-a-
possible-second-chance [https://perma.cc/UC8M-DYA3]; McLaren, supra note 196.  But see, e.g., 
Jacqueline Francis, Criminal Expungement Fair Draws Hundreds, WOODTV.COM (Oct. 2, 2019, 11:12 
PM), https://www.woodtv.com/news/grand-rapids/criminal-expungement-fair-draws-hundreds [https: 
//perma.cc/VP6M-XRBJ] (describing a fairly large Grand Rapids fair with 435 attendees). 
 200 Telephone Interview with Miriam Aukerman, supra note 166. 
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represents another 27% growth since 2010.201  These changes suggest 
that efforts to help people surmount the various barriers to access ex-
pungement opportunities can successfully encourage applications. 
That said, one should not be too sanguine; even if uptake doubled 
from what we measure (for five-year periods ending between 2009 and 
2011), it would still be only 13%.  Expungement lawyers articulated to 
us the frustration that many of their clients feel with the process, even 
with legal help.202  Rather than expect a massive influx of aid to help 
people navigate the process, we should recognize that substantially clos-
ing the uptake gap will require legal changes to simplify that process.  
We return to this point in the Conclusion. 
Finally, it bears noting that, although our interviews focused mainly 
on the problem of low uptake among eligible individuals, every advocate 
we spoke to also stressed the stringency of the eligibility requirements, 
which in each of their views exclude a great many worthy candidates.203  
Reforms in 2011 and 2015 slightly softened the requirements regarding 
the allowable number of convictions,204 but they are still strict and in 
many ways quite arbitrary.  Today, in Michigan, anyone with two felony 
convictions is still excluded, even if they are low-level felonies and even 
if they are two counts arising from the same incident.205  Inexplicably, 
people with three misdemeanors cannot seek expungements at all, even 
though people with one felony plus two misdemeanors can seek to ex-
punge the felony.206  Traffic misdemeanors cannot be expunged them-
selves but nevertheless count toward the limit and thus may disqualify an 
individual from expunging another conviction.207  These offenses are very 
common in Michigan, accounting for more than half of all misdemeanor 
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 201 Email from Ted Kilvington, supra note 125. 
 202 See Telephone Interview with Miriam Aukerman, supra note 166; Email from Josh Hoe, supra 
note 166. 
 203 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Anonymous Legal Aid Lawyer, supra note 166; Telephone 
Interview with Miriam Aukerman, supra note 166 (“90% of the people would walk out [of an ex-
pungement fair] and be angry after you explained that you could only have one conviction [to be 
eligible]. . . .  It could be that the people who are most impacted by criminal records are those who 
are not eligible.”); Email from Josh Hoe, supra note 166 (“A large number of folks are made ineligible 
for expungement by either carve-outs in the legislation or by the fact that it only applies to people 
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 204 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(4) (2020) (effective Jan. 12, 2015) (expanding eligibility for 
expungement to victims of human trafficking); id. § 780.621(1)(c) (2020) (effective June 23, 2011) 
(expanding eligibility for expungement of an offense to individuals who have two other “minor 
offense[s]”). 
 205 See id. § 780.621(1)(a) (2020) (effective Jan. 12, 2015) (stating that individuals are only eligible 
for an expungement if they “[have been] convicted of not more than [one] felony offense”). 
 206 See id. § 780.621(1)(a)–(b).  This seems like a clear drafting error, but it is apparently enforced.  
Telephone Interview with Michael Kiehne, supra note 161. 
 207 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(3)(d) (2020) (stating that expungements shall not be 
granted for traffic offenses). 
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convictions.208  Petty misdemeanors, including violations of hunting and 
fishing laws and dog-leash laws, likewise count toward the limit.209  In 
addition, the waiting period now runs five years from the completion of 
all components of the sentence, which means that people with lengthy 
probation or parole terms might actually have to wait out eight or ten 
recidivism-free years in the community, not just five years as was re-
quired under Michigan’s old law.210 
All of these restrictions mean that the low uptake rate we estimate 
is even starker when viewed in context: it is a very small fraction of a 
very small fraction.  For the past decade about 2000 expungements per 
year have been granted in Michigan.  Meanwhile, each year the Michigan 
state courts add about 300,000 new criminal convictions.211  On balance, 
the population of people living with criminal records is continuing to 
grow quickly; the existing expungement regime is like a bucket remov-
ing water from an ever-rising ocean.212 
III.  RECIDIVISM OUTCOMES 
Petition-based expungement is not very common — but what happens 
when it does occur?  Are there significant public-safety costs to granting 
record-clearing relief?  For example, does expungement increase the risk 
of recidivism or conceal other substantial dangers from the public?  Pub-
lic-safety concerns underlie the most common objections to expunge-
ment laws, the idea being that the public — especially people with par-
ticular interests at stake, such as employers and landlords — have a 
right to know when people have criminal records because of their 
heightened risk of committing future crimes.213  Here, our data paint a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 208 See MICH. COURTS, supra note 150.  An experienced Michigan expungement attorney told 
us that it is common for her clients to believe they are eligible for an expungement because they do 
not understand that a prior traffic offense happened to be a misdemeanor and because it does not 
come up in ICHAT, the free background check tool that some use to check their eligibility (though 
it does ultimately appear in the official background check to determine actual eligibility).  Telephone 
Interview with Anonymous Legal Aid Lawyer, supra note 166. 
 209 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(16)(f) (2020) (stating the definition of a misdemeanor for 
purposes of the statute); cf., e.g., id. § 324.43560 (providing that a person who violates the hunting 
and fishing licensing rules “is guilty of a misdemeanor”). 
 210 See id. § 780.621(5)(a)–(d) (effective Jan. 12, 2015). 
 211 See supra note 150. 
 212 See Riley, supra note 150 (estimating that tens of thousands of Michigan residents receive 
first-time felony convictions each year). 
 213 See Murray, supra note 191, at 375 (describing the counterargument to expungement that 
“federal crimes are serious, and actors within the community should be able to obtain information 
about ex-offenders that might be relevant to an important decision, especially related to hiring”); 
see also, e.g., Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 449, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (memorializing 
the judge’s belief that “employers are generally entitled to know about the past convictions of job 
applicants,” id. at 449, and indicating that, in part for that reason, expungements may be granted 
only when “extraordinary circumstances are present,” id. at 455); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 1 (2006), 
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sunnier picture.  In section A, we estimate recidivism rates for expunge-
ment recipients, finding that reoffending is strikingly rare.  In section B, 
we consider the interpretation and policy implications of our findings.  
In this discussion, we rely mainly on other criminological research for 
guidance; as we explain below, the nature of the law and our data make 
it difficult to directly assess the causal effect of receiving an expunge-
ment on criminal behavior. 
A.  Recidivism Among Expungement Recipients 
 In Table 4, we report two-year and five-year rearrest and reconvic-
tion rates for expungement recipients, starting from the date of receipt 
of the expungement.214  We analyze the criminal histories of the full 
universe of individuals receiving expungements up through the begin-
ning of December 2010.215  Most of the data concerns we raise with 
regard to the “eligible” sample of individuals with records that we ana-
lyze in Part II do not arise here.216  Our only significant data limitation  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BY8-WT8M] 
(stating that employers want access to criminal records so they can “protect employees, customers, 
vulnerable persons, and business assets” and avoid negligent hiring suits). 
 214 Recidivism rates are a complicated concept, see generally MICHAEL D. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 
(1984), and one of the important questions in constructing estimates is the length of time over which 
to consider an individual “at risk” of reoffending.  At least within the domain of government statis-
tics, there is no real consensus on the appropriate at-risk period.  See Bill Montgomery, We Have 
No Standard for Measuring Recidivism, THE HILL (Nov. 15, 2017, 3:00 PM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/360520-we-have-no-standard-for-measuring-recidivism 
[https://perma.cc/C56V-8RN7].  The two-year rates that we report are more typical of the recidivism 
literature, but the time period varies.  See, e.g., Seena Fazel & Achim Wolf, A Systematic Review of 
Criminal Recidivism Rates Worldwide: Current Difficulties and Recommendations for Best Prac-
tice, 10 PLOS ONE 3–4, 5 tbl.3 (2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/ 
file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0130390&type=printable [https://perma.cc/NJ77-2LQM].  Three-year 
follow-up periods are also common, but selection of the length of time for evaluating recidivism is 
often driven by data availability.  See MARIEL ALPER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2018 
UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD (2005–2014) 14 (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/18upr9yfup0514.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT9K-MAQ9].  Longer 
time spans are generally more beneficial for studying patterns of recidivism and their attributes.  
See id.  We are readily able to offer a longer-term measure, too, because our data cover a more 
extensive span than many other researchers have been able to observe.  We opt to include both two- 
and five-year measures to provide both points of comparison. 
 215 We rely for this analysis on an MSP criminal history dataset that ends on December 6, 2012.  
To allow a sufficient follow-up period, our analysis sample accordingly includes nearly all individ-
uals receiving expungements in Michigan with known dates up through December 6, 2010 (for the 
two-year rates), and December 6, 2007 (for the five-year rates).  The only individuals we drop are 
232 people identified in the data as having out-of-state driver’s licenses, to reduce any bias that 
might result from unobserved out-of-state recidivism.  The resulting numbers of observations for 
our analysis are 20,955 for the two-year sample and 15,256 for the five-year sample. 
 216 The rates we report are not really “estimates” for these populations; there is no sampling error 
in the results that we report for pre-2011 Michigan expungement recipients. We need not worry 
about the representativeness of the sample in thinking about how expungement recipients fared in 
Michigan during our study period. However, our calculations are “estimates” if we think of past 
expungement recipients as a “sample” that is representative of future expungement recipients (or, 
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potentially, expungement recipients from other jurisdictions) about whom we wish to make predic-
tions.  Accordingly, we include standard errors in Table 4, in parentheses; these show that our 
estimates (if understood as such) are in any event quite precise. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Two-Year
Arrest
Rate
Two-Year
Conviction
Rate
Five-Year
Arrest
Rate
Five-Year
Conviction 
Rate
A. Full Sample
1. Overall Rearrest/Reconviction Rates 3.4% 1.8% 7.1% 4.2%
(0.13%) (0.09%) (0.21%) (0.16%)
2. Violent Rearrest/Reconviction Rates 1.0% 0.2% 2.6% 0.6%
(0.07%) (0.03%) (0.13%) (0.06%)
3. Felony Rearrest/Reconviction Rates 1.2% 0.3% 2.7% 1.0%
(0.07%) (0.04%) (0.13%) (0.08%)
Number of Observations 20,955 20,955 15,256 15,256
B. Subsamples
1. Expungement After < 6 Years 3.8% 2.1% 8.1% 4.9%
(0.30%) (0.23%) (0.49%) (0.39%)
2. Expungement in Years 11 and 12 2.8% 1.6% 6.3% 3.6%
(0.50%) (0.37%) (0.86%) (0.66%)
3. Expunged Offense: Felony 4.0% 1.9% 8.1% 4.6%
(0.20%) (0.14%) (0.33%) (0.26%)
4. Expunged Offense: Misdemeanor 3.1% 1.8% 6.4% 3.8%
(0.17%) (0.13%) (0.28%) (0.22%)
5. Expunged Offense: Incarcerated 3.2% 1.7% 6.7% 3.9%
(0.23%) (0.17%) (0.38%) (0.29%)
6. Expunged Offense: Not Incarcerated 3.5% 1.8% 7.2% 4.3%
(0.15%) (0.11%) (0.25%) (0.19%)
7. Expunged Offense: Violent 4.4% 2.2% 8.4% 4.4%
(0.37%) (0.27%) (0.62%) (0.46%)
8. Expunged Offense: Violent 1.6% 0.3% 4.0% 0.8%
  (violent rearrest/reconviction only) (0.23%) (0.10%) (0.44%) (0.20%)
TABLE 4. REARREST AND RECONVICTION RATES
FOR EXPUNGEMENT RECIPIENTS
Notes: Rearrest and reconviction data come from Michigan State Police criminal history files. The full sample consists of
all individuals with no record of an out-of-state driver’s license who receive a known-date expungement in Michigan
through December 6, 2010, for two-year rates and through December 6, 2007, for five-year rates. In Panel B, all rearrest
and reconviction rates are “overall” rates — that is, they count any new criminal arrest or conviction — except for Row 8,
which shows only the rearrest and reconviction rates for violent offenses. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Subsample sizes are available from the authors upon request.
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is our inability to observe out-of-state and federal arrests and convic-
tions,217 which may mean that we slightly underestimate true recidivism 
rates. We do not believe this omission has a large effect, however, for 
reasons we already discuss in detail in Part II: federal arrests and con-
victions are rare, and interstate moves and interstate travel to commit 
crimes are not common either.218 
 In Row 1 of Table 4, Panel A, we report the overall two-year and 
five-year rearrest and reconviction rates, while in the remaining rows 
we give specific rates for certain types of crime that may be of particular 
public and policy concern: violent offenses and felony offenses.219  All of 
these rates show a consistent pattern: recidivism among expungement 
recipients is low.220  Overall, 3.4% are rearrested and 1.8% are recon-
victed for crimes within two years; 7.1% are rearrested and 4.2% are 
reconvicted within five years.  The numbers are even lower when we 
focus specifically on the types of crimes that worry people most.  For 
example, within five years, only 2.6% of expungement recipients are 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 217 See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text.  
 218 Applying the assumptions we use in Part II that 1.8% of individuals move per year and 4% 
of crime is committed across state borders, we expect we might be missing about 5–6% of the re-
arrests and reconvictions for our two-year outcome period and perhaps 7–8% in the five-year period 
(when people have had more time to move).  See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text.  
Given the very low recidivism rates we report in Table 4, the effect of this problem is negligible in 
percentage-point terms.  Another useful source is a 2005 study from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
which finds nontrivial rates of out-of-state recidivism over the course of five years (whether due to 
cross-border crime or individuals changing their state of residence).  See MATTHEW R. DUROSE 
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: 
PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 7 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/J2BP-WTKN].  But still, even that out-of-state recidivism rate (10.9%) is only 
about one-seventh of the overall recidivism rate (75.4%) observed over the same period.  Id. at 7–
8.  If we were to apply that same ratio here, our estimated recidivism rates would understate the 
true rate by much less than a percentage point.  Moreover, Michigan residents almost surely engage 
in fewer cross-border crimes than residents in many states, simply because Michigan is surrounded 
on most sides by water and has no interstate metropolitan areas. 
 219 Felonies are identified as such in the MSP records we use in our analysis; we classify an 
offense as violent if it involves the use or threat of force according to its statutory definition.  Stat-
utorily, a felony in Michigan is defined as an offense for which a person convicted of the charge 
may be punished by death or imprisonment.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.7 (2020).  Violent 
offenses are a subset of both felonies and misdemeanors. 
 220 Recidivism risk varies by type of initial crime, age, poverty, and many other factors, but in 
general, recidivism rates below 10% are relatively low.  For example, in a recent multistate study 
of prisoners released in 2005, over 60% are rearrested within two years, and 77% are rearrested 
within five years.  See ALPER ET AL., supra note 214, at 11 tbl.7.  Limiting this to in-state arrests 
(to more closely match our data), these numbers are 54.4% and 66.1%, respectively.  See id. at 4 
tbl.2.  Recidivism rates for individuals on probation are also much higher.  See PATRICK A 
LANGAN & MARK A. CUNNIFF, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF FELONS ON 
PROBATION, 1986–89, at 5–6 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rfp8689.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7BAU-4J4F]; see also Dana Goldstein, The Misleading Math of “Recidivism,” 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 4, 2014, 11:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/04/ 
the-misleading-math-of-recidivism [https://perma.cc/UAS7-BS2Q]. 
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rearrested and 0.6% are reconvicted for violent crimes; 2.7% are rearrested 
and 1% are reconvicted for felonies. 
 We emphasize that these rates are much lower than those found in 
most studies of criminal recidivism.221  Indeed, our statistics suggest that 
expungement recipients pose a lower crime risk than the general popu-
lation of Michigan as a whole.  Although no general-population data are 
available that directly parallel the figures in Table 4, the state does re-
port annual arrest figures.  For comparison purposes, in the two-year 
period from 2009–10, Michigan police made about 6.6 arrests per 100 
adults in the population.222  In contrast, using cases from approximately 
the same time period, we calculate only 4.7 arrests per 100 expungement 
recipients within two years of their having received an expungement.223  
This comparison is particularly striking given that expungement recipi-
ents (like people with criminal records generally) tend to have other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 221 See, e.g., Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the 
Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 
357, 370 (2010); Ilyana Kuziemko, How Should Inmates Be Released from Prison? An Assessment 
of Parole Versus Fixed-Sentence Regimes, 128 Q.J. ECON. 371, 385–86 (2013); Cody Tuttle,  
Snapping Back: Food Stamps Ban and Criminal Recidivism, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 301, 
315–16 (2019).  For sources specific to Michigan, see, for example, David J. Harding et al., Short- 
and Long-Term Effects of Imprisonment on Future Felony Convictions and Prison Admissions, 114 
PNAS, 11,103, 11,106–07 (2017); Chris Gautz, Michigan Recidivism Rate Falls to Its Lowest 
Level at 28.1 Percent, MICHIGAN.GOV (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.michigan.gov/som/0,4669,7-
192-26847-459956--,00.html [https://perma.cc/M9GJ-WKHH]. 
 222 Arrest figures are summed across “total arrests” for persons eighteen and up in MICH. STATE 
POLICE, 2009 STATE ARREST TOTALS (2010), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
msp/2009Annual_StatewideArrests_332334_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAA9-D5XV], and MICH. 
STATE POLICE, 2010 STATEWIDE ARREST TOTALS (2011), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/ 
msp/2010_Annual_StatewideArrests_358704_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HDB-CWKA].  Population fig-
ures come from the 2010 Census.  QuickFacts: Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www. 
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/MI/POP010210 [https://perma.cc/Q7KR-UZWB]. 
 223 We calculate this number for the cohort of those receiving criminal-record expungements be-
tween December 2006 and December 2010, running for two years from each individual’s expunge-
ment date and excluding those individuals known to have out-of-state licenses; this is the most 
recent complete expungement-receiving cohort for which we have two years of subsequent criminal 
history data.  Total arrests per capita over two years are higher than the two-year arrest rates for 
the same population (like those we report in Table 4) because some people are arrested more than 
once.  See Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails Are Misused 
to Respond to Social Problems, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 2019), https://www.prisonpol-
icy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/33J2-CV53].  There are no public data on the 
number of unique individuals arrested in Michigan in any given period (for the closest we can find, 
see Wanda Bertram & Alexi Jones, How Many People in Your State Go to Local Jails Every Year?, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy. 
org/blog/2019/09/18/state-jail-bookings [https://perma.cc/2L9P-PTGM]), so the number of arrests is 
the best metric to use for this comparison.  We do not have a similarly authoritative source for the 
number of convictions statewide.  However, we can gain some insight into individuals who are 
arrested multiple times from the Prison Policy Initiative: “Using nationally representative data from 
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), we find that at least 4.9 million individuals 
were arrested and booked in 2017.  Of those 4.9 million individuals, 3.5 million were arrested only 
once in 2017; 930,000 were arrested twice; and 430,000 were arrested three or more times.”  Jones 
& Sawyer, supra. 
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characteristics that are generally associated with higher crime risk — 
for example, they are more likely to be male and poor than the general 
population is.  In fact, if we compare expungement recipients to subsets 
of the general population that look more like them in terms of observa-
ble characteristics such as age and gender, the comparison is even more 
favorable to expungement recipients. 224 
In Panel B of Table 4, we replicate the main results from Panel A, 
Row 1 (overall arrest and reconviction rates) for subsets of the expunge-
ment population of particular interest.  In Row 1, we examine individ-
uals who receive their expungements early, in their first year of eligibility 
(that is, by the end of the sixth year since sentencing or release).  The 
waiting period for expungements in Michigan is five years, but the ac-
tual median elapsed time before receipt is nearly ten years after sentenc-
ing or release.225  Because recidivism risk declines over time, this delay 
should be expected to reduce expungement recipients’ recidivism 
rates.226  But policymakers might understandably wonder what would 
happen if people did not wait those extra years — which would be the 
consequence of a policy that made expungements automatic after five 
years.227  Row 1’s estimate in Table 4.B is designed to inform the ques-
tion whether five years is enough of a waiting period — and what we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 224 These calculations are available upon request.  Age and gender are two of the characteristics that 
most strongly predict arrest rates, so it is helpful to begin by considering their role.  One might expect 
that expungement recipients’ low recidivism risk could be explained by the fact that, by the time they 
qualify for an expungement, they have already “aged out” of crime.  But while this may sometimes be 
true (and indeed there are few very young adults who obtain expungements), the overall age distribution 
of expungement recipients is similar to, and actually a bit younger than, the general adult population; 
a majority are still in their twenties and thirties, ages when arrest rates are still higher than average.  
See HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990–2010, 
at 3 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aus9010.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6BZ-VXJ2].  Mean-
while, a majority of expungement recipients are male, see supra tbl.2, and males have higher arrest 
rates, see SNYDER, supra, at 2.  If one reweights the general population arrest rates so as to mirror the 
expungement-recipient pool in terms of its age and sex distribution, the projected general-population 
rate becomes even higher: about 7.6 arrests per 100 people in each two-year period (compared, again, 
to 4.7 for expungement recipients).  General-population arrest data are not available broken down by 
many other characteristics, but we can be fairly certain that populations that are comparable to ex-
pungement recipients across other demographic and socioeconomic dimensions would have even higher 
arrest rates, since expungement recipients tend to be disadvantaged in various ways, as we explain in 
Part II.  See supra section II.B, pp. 2493–2501. 
 225 See supra tbl.2. 
 226 See SYNØVE NYGAARD ANDERSEN & TORBJØRN SKARDHAMAR, PICK A NUMBER: 
MAPPING RECIDIVISM MEASURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 15–17 (2014), 
https://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/discussion-papers/_attachment/166596 [https://perma.cc/3UEH-
TGKQ]; NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34287, OFFENDER REENTRY: 
CORRECTIONAL STATISTICS, REINTEGRATION INTO THE COMMUNITY, AND RECIDIVISM 7 
& fig.3 (2014); Kuziemko, supra note 221, at 379; Fredrik Sivertsson, Catching Up in Crime? Long-
Term Processes of Recidivism Across Gender, 2 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & LIFE-COURSE 
CRIMINOLOGY 371, 376 (2016). 
 227 See, e.g., Francisco, supra note 73; Kelan Lyons, Lamont to Introduce Clean Slate Legislation 
in Next Session, CT MIRROR (Jan. 8, 2020), https://ctmirror.org/2020/01/08/lamont-to-introduce-
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find in our data suggests that it is.  Recidivism rates in all columns are 
only very slightly higher than the main-sample numbers, indicating that 
this subgroup remains low risk relative to the general public. 
Meanwhile, Row 2 in Table 4.B shows rearrest rates for people who 
receive expungements in the eleventh or twelfth year after sentencing or 
release — a good proxy for the effect of providing for expungements 
after ten clean years, as Pennsylvania’s new law does automatically for 
minor offenses.228  These recidivism rates are even lower than average 
expungement-recipient rates (unsurprisingly, given the long clean rec-
ords of these individuals).  All in all, though, the differences among these 
various cohorts are quite small, suggesting that eligibility waiting-period 
differences might not matter very much in terms of fostering lower post-
expungement recidivism rates. 
In Rows 3 and 4 of Table 4.B, we show recidivism numbers for those 
whose expungement conviction was a felony and a misdemeanor, respec-
tively.  Recidivism rates are low for both groups, although slightly higher 
for the felony group.  In Rows 5 and 6 respectively, we compare the 
behavior of expungement recipients who did and did not serve any time 
behind bars, according to MSP records.  One might expect recidivism 
rates for the formerly incarcerated to be higher for two reasons: they 
have more serious prior convictions,229 and they may face additional 
socioeconomic disadvantages arising from their period of incarcera-
tion.230  These influences might be counterbalanced by the fact that  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
clean-slate-legislation-in-next-session [https://perma.cc/B75S-85JG]; cf. Margaret Love & David 
Schlussel, Model Law Proposes Automatic Expungement of Non-conviction Records, CRIME REP. 
(Dec. 18, 2019), https://thecrimereport.org/2019/12/18/model-law-proposes-automatic-
expungement-of-non-conviction-records [https://perma.cc/7L5G-FPRE]. 
 228 See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2 (2018); see also RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, 
PENNSYLVANIA RESTORATION OF RIGHTS & RECORD RELIEF, Part III (2020), https:// 
ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/pennsylvania-restoration-of-rights-pardon- 
expungement-sealing-2 [https://perma.cc/Q9CJ-BYV6]; supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
 229 See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (“[B]ecause incarceration is 
an ‘intrinsically different’ form of punishment, it is the most powerful indication of whether an 
offense is ‘serious.’” (quoting Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975))); NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 19 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) (“Prison terms usually are re-
served for those found guilty of more serious crimes, defined as felonies by state and federal legis-
latures.”).  But see S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 351 (2012) (“But not all fines are 
insubstantial, and not all offenses punishable by fine are petty.”); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
supra, at 86 (“Considerations of proportionality and parsimony have fallen into neglect in the United 
States.  Many laws enacted in the 1980s and 1990s required less serious crimes to be punished more 
severely than more serious ones.  Examples include mandatory minimum sentence laws requiring 
longer terms for people convicted of small sales of drugs than terms typically imposed for many 
violent offenses, and the sentencing of people to 25-year minimum terms for property misdemeanors 
under California’s three strikes law.”).  
 230 See John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2009) 
(“Even large fines are likely to have only minor effects on the well-being of those who receive them, 
because people adjust quite easily to their new financial circumstances. . . .  On the other hand, 
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during the five-year period in which we observe them, formerly incar-
cerated expungement recipients are further beyond their  
conviction/release dates (because the clock runs from the later of the two 
events) and are older on average.231  On balance, we find very slightly 
lower recidivism rates for those who have been incarcerated. 
Finally, in Rows 7 and 8 of Table 4.B, we present recidivism numbers 
for people who have had violent-offense convictions expunged.  In Row 
7, we demonstrate that the overall rearrest and reconviction numbers 
for this subsample are slightly higher than the average for the entire 
sample, although still quite low.  In Row 8, we report the rearrest and 
reconviction numbers for new violent crimes alone (as we did in Table 
4.A, Row 2).  This comparison addresses the specific fear that employers, 
landlords, and policymakers might have about people with a past vio-
lent offense: that they will commit another violent crime.232  Although 
the rates of violent reoffense that we calculate are very slightly higher 
in the subsample with violent crime convictions, they are still extremely 
low in absolute terms.233  Only 0.3% of those who have had a violent 
offense expunged are reconvicted of another violent offense within two 
years, and only 0.8% within five years. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
virtually any period of incarceration, no matter how brief, has consequences that negatively affect 
prisoners’ lives in ways that resist adaptation, even after they have been released.  Prisoners are 
often abandoned by their spouses and friends, face difficulty finding and keeping employment, and 
may suffer from incurable diseases contracted during their incarceration.”); see also Manudeep 
Bhuller et al., Incarceration, Recidivism, and Employment, 128 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1313 (2020) 
(noting that incarceration cripples a previously employed person’s post-release employment pro-
spects); Flake, supra note 86, at 55–62; David J. Harding et al., Imprisonment and Labor Market 
Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 124 AM. J. SOC. 49, 75–76 & tbl.2 (2018); Steven 
Raphael, The Effects of Conviction and Incarceration on Future Employment Outcomes, in 
LABELING THEORY: EMPIRICAL TESTS 237, 259 (David P. Farrington & Joseph Murray eds., 
2014); supra section I.A., pp. 2468–71.  
 231 Cf. J.J. Prescott et al., Understanding Violent-Crime Recidivism, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1643, 1688–97 (2020) (finding that age is negatively related to recidivism risk among prison releasees). 
 232 See, e.g., id. at 1643–45; Megan Denver, Justin T. Pickett & Shawn D. Bushway, The Language 
of Stigmatization and the Mark of Violence: Experimental Evidence on the Social Construction and 
Use of Criminal Record Stigma, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 664, 675–76 (2017) (reporting a “substantial” 
increase in the perceived risk of recidivism for those convicted of violent crimes as compared to 
those convicted of nonviolent crimes, id. at 676); see also supra p. 2513.  But see Michael M. O’Hear 
& Darren Wheelock, Violent Crime and Punitiveness: An Empirical Study of Public Opinion, 103 
MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 47–49) (on file with Marquette University Law 
School) (finding no evidence that public support for the punitive sentencing of individuals who 
commit violent crimes results from fear of violent-crime recidivism). 
 233 According to a national study of recidivism, 11% of prisoners released for a violent offense 
are arrested during their first year following release for having committed a new violent offense, 
compared to 9% of those released for a property offense and 7% of prisoners released for a drug 
offense.  ALPER ET AL., supra note 214, at 11.  
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B.  Interpretation and Implications 
Our recidivism analysis should, at the very least, dispel any notion 
that individuals who receive expungements under Michigan’s law pose 
any particular risk of reoffending.  And the same is likely to be true in 
other states considering similar record-clearing laws. Employers and 
landlords should rest assured that petition-based expungement laws 
with comparable requirements and waiting periods are unlikely to deny 
them access to information that they need to protect themselves or their 
employees, customers, or tenants. 
 But what are the broader implications of this analysis for expunge-
ment policy, both in Michigan and beyond?  In particular, do the data 
allow us to say anything about the effects of broadening the availability 
of expungement — either procedurally (for example, by rendering it au-
tomatic) or substantively (by loosening eligibility requirements)?  Ex-
pungement recipients are, again, an unrepresentative sample of individ-
uals with criminal records.  Primarily, they are self-selected — they had 
the motivation to apply for expungement, the belief that their case could 
be convincing to a judge, and the energy, money, and organizational 
skills to complete the application process.234  They are also filtered by 
judges’ discretion, and judges presumably look for candidates who seem 
to be at low risk of committing future crime.  So we cannot assume that 
subsequent crime rates for people who are not selected in the same way 
would be as low.  And if they were not as low, would the public-safety 
objection then become legitimate? 
To address these questions, we must consider two separate influences 
on post-expungement recidivism rates.  The first is baseline risk: the risk 
of recidivism, absent expungement, of those same individuals.235  The 
second is the causal effect of expungement on these individuals’ subse-
quent criminal behavior.236  Either or both could contribute to the low 
recidivism rates that we see in our expungement sample — that is, re-
cipients could have been low risk regardless and/or the expungement of 
their record could have lowered their risk.  Unfortunately, we do not 
have a good empirical technique for using our data to disentangle these 
two theories.  This is mainly because of the key legal requirement for 
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 234 See supra p. 2490 & tbl.1; section II.C, pp. 2501–10 (showing that the vast majority of indi-
viduals who are legally eligible for an expungement do not succeed in obtaining one and arguing 
that many potential recipients do not apply for record-clearing relief because of various institu-
tional, psychological, and practical barriers). 
 235 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM & JAMES NICHOLSON, THE CONCISE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS 39 (5th ed. 2014) (defining baseline risk); cf. Natalie J. Jones et 
al., Predicting Criminal Recidivism in Adult Male Offenders: Researcher Versus Parole Officer  
Assessment of Dynamic Risk, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 860, 861 (2010) (distinguishing baseline or 
counterfactual risk from dynamic risk that incorporates changes in an individual’s situation over 
time and is more tightly related to recidivism). 
 236 See, e.g., Adams et al., supra note 95, at 45 (arguing that expungement itself may cause a 
reduction in recidivism); Selbin et al., supra note 43, at 57 (same). 
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expungement: nonrecidivism.  Recidivism rates are by definition zero 
before people become eligible for expungement and before they receive 
one, which means that a study with a “pre-post” design cannot mean-
ingfully evaluate expungement’s effects on recidivism. 
Accordingly, to inform a discussion of what seems most likely to ex-
plain the low post-expungement recidivism risk we estimate, we turn 
for guidance to the criminological literature more broadly.  Scholarship 
in this area provides strong support for both explanations for our em-
pirical results.  Expungement recipients probably have low baseline re-
cidivism risk at the time they receive an expungement, and the receipt 
of an expungement probably lowers this risk further. 
As to baseline risk, first, a key finding of the relevant research is that 
most people who commit crimes do not continue to do so forever.  Within 
the large criminological literature on recidivism and patterns of de-
sistance from crime, a small but important subset of work focuses on 
the extent to which older criminal records remain usefully predictive of 
future offending.237  In particular, it asks: When people have remained 
crime-free for a given period of time, at what point do they become no 
riskier, or at least not notably riskier, than the general population or 
people without criminal records?  Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori  
Nakamura have labeled this concept “redemption” — suggesting that 
the passage of some number of recidivism-free years should be under-
stood to “redeem” the individual in the eyes of society.238  Estimated 
times to redemption appear to vary across samples, crime types, age 
cohorts, and methods, but they are usually in the range of four to ten 
years, at least when juxtaposing individuals with records to the same 
age cohort within the general population.239 
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 237 See, e.g., ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & KIMINORI NAKAMURA, EXTENSION OF CURRENT 
ESTIMATES OF REDEMPTION TIMES: ROBUSTNESS TESTING, OUT-OF-STATE ARRESTS, 
AND RACIAL DIFFERENCES 1–3 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240100.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BD4R-4GMV]; Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the  
Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 331–39 (2009); 
Shawn D. Bushway et al., The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and  
Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28–30 (2011); Megan C. 
Kurlychek et al., Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and Predictions of Future Criminal In-
volvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 64, 71–78 (2007); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters and 
Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 483, 492–98 (2006). 
 238 See BLUMSTEIN & NAKAMURA, supra note 237, at 8.  This religiously derived language has 
potential connotations (for example, the idea that those with records are “fallen”) that are probably 
not intended by any of the scholars using it and that we do not endorse; still, we use the term here 
in deference to the leading work on desistance from crime. 
 239 See generally Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 237.  If instead the contrast is drawn with 
only people who have no prior criminal record (instead of the general population, which includes 
people with records), then redemption studies tend to find that the recidivism risk of people with 
records never converges completely to the risk levels posed by individuals without records, see id. 
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One could easily interpret the low recidivism rates we find in section 
III.A — and the favorable comparisons to general-population arrest 
rates — as indications of redemption.  Expungement recipients have all 
gone at least five years without a subsequent conviction before receiving 
their expungement; the median period between conviction and expunge-
ment is nearly ten years.240  Moreover, by definition, expungement re-
cipients in our data were all individuals without any prior record when 
they were convicted of their expunged offense — and recidivism studies 
consistently find that the length of one’s existing criminal record is a 
strong predictor of subsequent recidivism.241  And, as we note above, 
the group that receives expungements is self-selected and selected by 
judges.  Taken together, then, there are many reasons to believe ex-
pungement recipients may be at a low baseline risk for recidivism.  
It is, however, also quite likely that receiving an expungement re-
duces a recipient’s recidivism risk below their previous baseline.  This 
possibility is supported by criminological research on the factors pre-
dicting recidivism.242  Recidivism-related benefits of expungements are 
likely to be mediated primarily by their effects on employment and wage 
levels — which we assess below in Part IV.  Unemployment is a moder-
ately strong predictor of recidivism.243  Likewise, higher weekly wages 
significantly reduce recidivism risk.244  A study of women with records 
indicates that “poverty status increases the odds of rearrest by a factor 
of 4.6” and is a better predictor of rearrest than a recidivism-risk index 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
at 340–44; however, the difference eventually comes sufficiently close to zero that a reasonable ob-
server would conclude that the old record provides no useful or actionable information, see id. at 
343 fig.4. 
 240 See supra tbl.2. 
 241 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL 
HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 10 (2004). 
 242 Indeed, although direct empirical evidence has long been lacking, this argument has often 
been part of the policy case made for expungement laws.  See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE ch. 19, introductory cmt., at 13, § 19-2.5, cmt., at 33 (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed. 2004);  
Deborah N. Archer & Kele S. Williams, Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring 
Socioeconomic Rights for Ex-offenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 527–30 (2006); 
Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A Suggested 
Conceptual Framework, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 599, 605 (1997); Jeremy Travis et al., Prisoner 
Reentry: Issues for Practice and Policy, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2002, at 12, 17–18. 
 243 See, e.g., CHI. MAYORAL POLICY CAUCUS, REBUILDING LIVES. RESTORING HOPE. 
STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES. 15 (2006); PAUL GENDREAU ET AL., CTR. FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE STUDIES, CASE NEEDS REVIEW: EMPLOYMENT DOMAIN 5–7, 12 (2000), 
https://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/research/092/r90_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/P89C-L8UM]; JOAN 
PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 40–41 (2003); TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 31, at 
31–33; Nicholas Freudenberg et al., Coming Home from Jail: The Social and Health Consequences 
of Community Reentry for Women, Male Adolescents, and Their Families and Communities, 95 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1725, 1729 (2005). 
 244 Samuel L. Myers, Jr., Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment Versus  
Punishment Effects, 98 Q.J. ECON. 157, 163 (1983). 
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commonly used in corrections.245  Homeless individuals with criminal 
records are especially likely to recidivate,246 while people who receive 
educational programming while incarcerated are less likely to recidivate 
upon release.247  To the extent that criminal records limit access to qual-
ity housing, student loans, satisfying employment, and decent wages, 
expungement should reduce recidivism by mitigating each of these soci-
oeconomic contributors to criminal behavior. 
Another possibility is that expungement reduces recidivism by alle-
viating the social exclusion that is often associated with criminal records.  
People with records face significant social stigma,248 which is exacer-
bated by employers’ growing reliance on increasingly available online 
criminal records databases.249  Sociologists and criminologists have long 
argued that social stigma and exclusion can contribute to criminal re-
cidivism.250  Although little empirical support has been found for the 
strongest claims of 1970s-era labeling theorists (for example, that label-
ing individuals renders criminal justice interventions actually counter-
productive on net),251 stigma and exclusion may still be an important 
part of the dynamic underlying recidivism.252 
All in all, it is highly plausible that expunging criminal records could 
benefit public safety, given what we know from a large body of research 
about recidivism patterns generally.  In contrast, no similarly plausible 
empirical support exists for the opposite claim, one that lies behind re-
sistance to expungement laws: that sealing records increases recidivism 
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 245 Kristy Holtfreter et al., Poverty, State Capital, and Recidivism Among Women Offenders, 3 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 185, 198 (2004). 
 246 See Stephen Metraux & Dennis P. Culhane, Homeless Shelter Use and Reincarceration  
Following Prison Release, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 139, 151–53 (2004). 
 247 See STEPHEN J. STEURER & LINDA G. SMITH, CORR. EDUC. ASS’N, EDUCATION 
REDUCES CRIME: THREE-STATE RECIDIVISM STUDY 20–21 (2003), https://files.eric.ed.gov/ 
fulltext/ED478452.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA7J-KHDF]; John Nuttall et al., The Effect of Earning a 
GED on Recidivism Rates, 54 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC. 90, 92–94 (2003); Kristen M. Zgoba et 
al., The Influence of GED Obtainment on Inmate Release Outcome, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 375, 
376–77 (2008). 
 248 See Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and Dis-
honesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 736–37 (1981). 
 249 See NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COAL., PORTAL TO COMPLIANCE: A QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF ONLINE PUBLIC RECORD REQUEST SERVICES IN MAJOR U.S. CITIES 2–3 
(2019), https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/files/pages/2019-09/NFOIC%20Portal%20to%20Compliance. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/PN2G-WC4G]; Kurlychek et al., Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and 
Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement, supra note 237, at 65, 68. 
 250 See, e.g., William D. Payne, Negative Labels: Passageways and Prisons, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 
33, 33–34 (1973); Charles R. Tittle, Deterrents or Labeling?, 53 SOC. FORCES 399, 399–400 (1975) 
(surveying the existing literature at the time on labeling “deviance” and whether labeling results in 
recidivism or deterrence). 
 251 See Tittle, supra note 250, at 402–04 (refuting the labeling argument).  
 252 See David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist 
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 305–07 (2000). 
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risk.  To our knowledge, those raising this objection have never pre-
sented evidence supporting it, and its rationale is not obvious. 
The intuition seems to be that those who know an individual’s crim-
inal background can take steps to protect themselves — for example, by 
choosing not to hire the person.  And as the empirical evidence we dis-
cuss in section I.A indicates, many U.S. employers do exactly that.  But 
while such a step might be in an individual employer’s or landlord’s 
self-interest, it is hard to see how it would be in society’s interest overall, 
given that lack of employment, unstable housing, and social stigma are 
all risk factors for recidivism.  Even if a person with a record is at an 
elevated risk of committing crime, the employer who declines to hire 
that person simply shifts risks to others, or even amplifies those risks.253  
No empirical research shows that the collective effect of decisions not to 
hire or rent to people with records makes society safer.  Notably, the 
purported public-safety case against expungement follows the same 
logic as the purported public-safety case in favor of sex offender regis-
tries with public notification requirements — yet empirical research has 
shown that these laws may actually increase recidivism.254 
With that in mind, let’s return to the question we raise at the begin-
ning of this section.  Suppose that a state were considering making ex-
pungement more broadly available to those with records: making it au-
tomatic for some subset of individuals with records, shortening the 
waiting period, or loosening eligibility requirements.  If these new clas-
ses of recipients have a higher baseline risk of recidivism than current 
recipients do, their post-expungement recidivism rates will also proba-
bly be higher — maybe substantially so.   
But from a policy perspective, this possibility is a red herring.  The 
higher recidivism risk would not be caused by the expungements or by 
the law change that allowed them; it is simply a baseline risk, which 
would exist with or without expungements.  A higher recidivism rate is 
not relevant to the cost-benefit analysis unless it is an effect of the law 
change or the resulting expungements.  But there is no credible evidence 
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 253 There is at least one plausible counterargument.  There may be situations in which someone 
with a history that includes a particular crime applies for a position that would put them in an 
especially favorable position to recommit the same or a similar offense.  Further, that criminal op-
portunity would not be available at another location or with another employer.  Many employers 
and landlords might prefer to use a public criminal record to reduce the likelihood that this person 
reoffends in that place or in that situation.  However, while theoretically possible, situations of this 
sort in which crime is not simply displaced seem likely to be very few, and, more importantly, the 
negative effect that employment and housing difficulties can have on general recidivism factors is 
likely to overshadow any benefit.  Cf. J.J. Prescott, Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-release Regulations 
and Sex Offender Recidivism, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1040, 1057 (2016) (identifying this dynamic in 
the context of sex offender post-release regulations). 
 254 J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect 
Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161, 181 (2011). 
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to support the idea that risk might grow because of the greater availa-
bility of expungement relief.  Meanwhile, existing research provides firm 
grounds to believe that, if anything, recidivism would fall.  Put another 
way, if expungement reduces recidivism, then granting it to a pool of 
new recipients with higher underlying recidivism risk simply offers a 
greater potential public-safety upside. 
IV.  EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES 
Although record clearing can simultaneously address a range of col-
lateral consequences of criminal convictions, probably the most im-
portant motivation for most expungement applicants255 — and the most 
important policy rationale for expungement laws — is to improve access 
to employment.  As we discuss in Part I, well-developed theoretical ac-
counts convincingly explain why criminal record expungement should 
have positive employment consequences for recipients, but the empirical 
evidence on the question remains extremely limited.256  This is a huge 
problem as advocates and policymakers negotiate the future of expunge-
ment policies.  In this Part, we hope to at least begin to resolve it.  Sec-
tion IV.A presents estimates and figures comparing pre- and post- 
expungement wage and employment trajectories for our large sample of 
recipients; these show large gains in both employment rates and wages 
following an individual’s receipt of an expungement.  Section IV.B ad-
dresses the question whether these gains can be interpreted as causal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 255 A sample of individuals who received record-clearing relief in California “expressed frustra-
tion with their inability to gain employment [with their criminal record], noting that the limited 
jobs open to them predominantly involved poor working conditions and low pay . . . .  They genu-
inely hoped record clearance would increase their employment potential and facilitate their success-
ful reintegration into society.”  Adams et al., supra note 95, at 30.  In another survey of people 
seeking expungement of criminal records in Chicago, participants reported suffering ongoing stigma 
from their record: “Even participants with extensive histories who had remained ‘clean’ for lengthy 
periods reported criminal record related stigma and material hardship.”  Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, 
supra note 32, at 398.  For example, “a 44-year-old man who had 12 arrests on his rap sheet [and] 
had been convicted of drug possession and unlawful use of a weapon 19 years earlier” said that “he 
could easily find several references who would vouch for his work ethic and skills, but even these 
personal testimonies did not compensate for his criminal record.”  Id.  
 256 See Megan Denver et al., A New Look at the Employment and Recidivism Relationship 
Through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174, 176–77 (2017); see also 
id. at 196; Pager, supra note 30, at 939–44; supra section I.C, pp. 2476–80.  A handful of studies 
have been conducted at the county level and have concluded that expungement leads to positive 
employment outcomes overall.  See Adams et al., supra note 95, at 45–47; Selbin et al., supra note 
43, at 57–58; see also MEYLI CHAPIN ET AL., A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL 
RECORD EXPUNGEMENT IN SANTA CLARA COUNTY 4 (2014), https://publicpolicy. 
stanford.edu/publications/cost-benefit-analysis-criminal-record-expungement-santa-clara-county 
[https://perma.cc/M2GZ-E5CB]; CLEAN SLATE PROGRAM, OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEF., CITY & 
CTY. OF S.F., 2007–2008 EVALUATION FINDINGS 6 (2009), http://sfpublicdefender.org/wp- 
content/uploads/sites/2/2009/05/clean-slate-evaluation-final-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6V2-9XWF].  
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effects of receiving an expungement, offering additional results to help 
us come to grips with this important question of interpretation. 
A.  Employment and Wage Trajectories for Expungement Recipients 
The outcome data we use in this work are quarterly Unemployment 
Insurance Agency (UIA) wage data collected for expungement recipi-
ents.  The data run from the third quarter of 1997 through the second 
quarter of 2013.  The sample inclusion criteria we use to conduct our 
analysis are as follows: (1) The individual received an expungement on 
a known date between January 1998 and May 2011.257  (2) The individ-
ual did not possess a non-Michigan driver’s license identified in our 
criminal history data.  (3) The individual matched to the UIA data in at 
least one quarter during the period from 1997 to 2013.258  And (4) The 
individual is of working age (eighteen to sixty-four) for the entire time 
over which we observe their wages for a particular regression.   
We examine both employment status and wages as outcomes.  We 
structure our dataset for the research in this Part as a panel — that is, 
we follow the same individuals before and after they receive their ex-
pungement, and each observation is a person-quarter.259  For each anal-
ysis, we use a balanced panel, meaning that for every individual in our 
analysis (regardless of the date of receipt), we include the same number 
of quarters before and after the expungement.260  Essentially, we use 
each individual as their own control; we compare an individual’s post-
expungement employment-related trajectories with that same individ-
ual’s pre-expungement trajectories.   
In Table 5, we report estimated average changes in employment 
trends before and after an individual receives an expungement.  The 
different columns of Table 5 present these estimated changes in trends 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 257 Within each column in Table 5, the sample is further constrained to ensure that outcome data 
exist for all person-quarters in the analysis.  For example, if we have only five quarters of pre-
expungement data for particular individuals, we include them in the sample for Column 2, which 
considers two quarters of data before and after expungement, but we exclude them from the sample 
for Column 3, which includes eight quarters of data on either side of the expungement. 
 258 For those individuals who do match, we interpret an absence of reported wage data for a 
particular quarter as implying the individual has no employment in that quarter.  By contrast, we 
take the total absence of someone from the wage data to imply a failure in the matching process 
(for example, a missing or incorrect Social Security number, or a non-Michigan resident). 
 259 For a brief summary of the advantages of using panel data, see CHENG HSIAO, ANALYSIS 
OF PANEL DATA 1–8 (2d ed. 2003). 
 260 See CHRISTOPHER F. BAUM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN ECONOMETRICS USING 
STATA 46–47 (2006); JEFFREY A. EDWARDS, BUILDING BETTER ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
USING CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 23 (2014); MARKUS MAYER, UNBALANCED PANEL 
DATA MODELS (2010), https://homepage.univie.ac.at/robert.kunst/pan2010_pres_mayer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K92A-FSXJ]. 
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over different time windows of various widths; we place the expunge-
ment at the center of each window.  We estimate the following equation 
using ordinary least squares: 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 + 𝛿𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡  
     + 𝜃𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜗𝑈𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝜖 . 
Our main outcome of interest, 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑, is an indicator for whether 
an individual has any positive wages reported to UIA by any employer 
in the quarter.261  𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 is a linear measure of time, increasing by one 
for each quarter; it is set to zero in the quarter before the individual 
receives their expungement.262  The coefficient we estimate on 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 
represents the underlying linear trend in employment in the quarters 
prior to the expungement — that is, it is the average change per quarter 
in the employment rate for the sample.  A negative coefficient on 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 would indicate that the group’s average employment rate was 
declining prior to expungement receipt, and a positive coefficient would 
indicate that it was increasing.   
 Our primary variable of interest, 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡, captures the 
change in the linear employment-rate trend after expungement receipt.  
A positive coefficient on 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 implies that the employment-
rate trend improves post-expungement, and a negative coefficient con-
versely means it gets worse.263  We estimate changes in the employment 
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 261 “Any positive wages” is a very minimal threshold for deeming an individual “employed,” as 
there is no minimum number of hours or total compensation requirement.  Furthermore, the wages 
could come only from one part of the quarter; the wage data are not further broken down tempo-
rally.  On the other hand, absence of employment/wages as measured in these data does not neces-
sarily mean that the individual is truly “unemployed” in the sense that economists use the term — 
that is, actively looking for a job, but so far unsuccessful.  Being unemployed in our data simply 
means that the individual does not have a wage- or salary-paying job.  Virtually all employers in 
Michigan are required to report wages, but the data do not include people who are self-employed, 
nor do they differentiate between unemployed people who are looking for work and people who are 
out of the workforce.  See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.13(2) (West 2020).  If our real outcome 
of interest is total lawful employment (including self-employment) among the working-age popula-
tion, then presence in the UIA data is a rough proxy for it.  UIA-reported wages may also understate 
total earnings.  That said, these issues affect the data throughout the study period, and we do not 
think they should substantially affect our estimation of trend changes from before an expungement 
to after its receipt.  If anything, classical measurement error like this tends generally to bias regres-
sion estimates toward zero — specifically, it may cause us to understate the true effect size of ex-
pungement.  See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION 
AND PANEL DATA 73–75 (1st ed. 2002); Andrew B. Abel, Classical Measurement Error with  
Several Regressors 16–17 (May 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://finance.wharton. 
upenn.edu/~abel/pdf_files_papers/attenuation%20bias%2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VL72-2LG8]. 
 262 Positive values of 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 represent the number of quarters since the individual received 
their expungement.  We count the quarters prior to the expungement, running from negative values 
up through quarter zero, which is the last quarter unaffected by the expungement. 
 263 The sum of the estimated coefficients of 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 and 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 represent the post-
expungement trend in the employment rate for this group; a positive sum means employment levels 
are increasing, and a negative sum means they are declining. 
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trend, rather than a simple one-time change in the employment level, on 
the assumption that the effects of an expungement may accumulate over 
time rather than being instantaneous.264  We estimate linear trends (as 
opposed to more complicated curves) for simplicity of interpretation.  
But estimating these trends over a variety of time windows can help us 
to detect nonlinear patterns in the actual trajectory.265 
 The remaining variables in our estimating equation are measures 
for economic conditions during the calendar quarter of each observa-
tion.  The time period of the analysis (1997–2013) includes considerable 
economic fluctuations, most importantly the 2008 financial crisis and 
subsequent deep recession; overall it was a period of economic decline 
and rising unemployment in Michigan.266  To account for these 
changes in the labor market, we include Michigan’s quarterly unem-
ployment rate and the total number of people employed in the state as 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.267  We control for these 
changing economic conditions because they could potentially affect the 
pre- and post-expungement periods differently.  In contrast, because of 
the balanced-panel structure, fixed attributes of given individuals or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 264 In addition, especially if there is an underlying trend over time before the expungement, esti-
mating changes in levels alone can be misleading.  For example, if there is a continuous upward 
trend throughout the sample period, the average level would be higher in the post-expungement 
period even if the growth has nothing to do with expungement receipt; at the same time, if there is 
a downward trend before the expungement that reverses after expungement receipt, the average 
employment levels might look the same before and after, even though there may have been a dra-
matic change in trajectory. 
 265 The results are substantively similar if we use logistic regression for the binary outcome var-
iables, as we did in the Table 3 uptake analysis.  Here, we prefer the linear probability model 
because our key variable of interest is an interaction term, and interactions are notoriously difficult 
to interpret in logistic regression.  See Edward C. Norton et al., Computing Interaction Effects and 
Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models, 4 STATA J. 154, 154–56 (2004).  Linear probability 
models also tend to perform well in the middle of the probability distribution, a condition that is 
satisfied here (but not in the Table 3 analysis).  See Paul von Hippel, Linear vs. Logistic Probability 
Models: Which Is Better, and When?, STATISTICAL HORIZONS (July 5, 2015), https:// 
statisticalhorizons.com/linear-vs-logistic [https://perma.cc/7XZB-EAA3]. 
 266 See Erin Duffin, Unemployment Rate in Michigan from 1992 to 2019, STATISTA (Mar. 5, 
2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/189438/unemployment-rate-in-michigan-since-1992 [https:// 
perma.cc/YA9U-4LWY]; Dustin Walsh, A Decade After Financial Crisis, Michigan Still Recovering, 
CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Sept. 16, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/economy/ 
decade-after-financial-crisis-michigan-still-recovering [https://perma.cc/7RA7-UNSF].  We observe 
each individual in the sample only for much shorter — and differing — parts of this period, so 
fluctuations will affect each of them differently, which should reduce the aggregate effect of this 
variation, if any, on our estimates. 
 267 See generally Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment: Archive, U.S. BUREAU 
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/opub/geographic-profile/archive.htm [https://perma.cc/ZAS2-
LE52] (reporting, among other things, annual state averages for total employment and the unem-
ployment rate among the civilian noninstitutional population). 
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their prior criminal records can be safely ignored, since they are 
equally present before and after the receipt of the expungement.268  
 In each version of the regression results in Table 5,269 we estimate a 
substantial and statistically significant (p < 0.001) upward turn in the 
employment-rate trajectory of expungement recipients after they receive 
their expungements.270  The coefficients, representing per-quarter gains, 
decline in magnitude as the window gets larger (although they remain 
significant), which intimates that the improvements are steepest in the 
first two quarters and slowly become more gradual; this can also be seen 
in the net gain and proportional net gain calculations we report in Table 
5.271  By the end of one year, after controlling for the pre-receipt trend 
and other potentially confounding labor-market variables, expungement 
recipients gain nearly eight percentage points in their employment rate; 
proportionally, they are 1.13 times as likely to be employed.  The net 
gain following expungement is about the same in the two-year observa-
tion period and slightly lower in the three-year period, suggesting not 
only that the employment improvements following an expungement 
come relatively quickly, but also that they are largely sustained in the 
following years. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we show the same type of analysis, but sub-
stitute a different, less minimalist definition of the employment outcome 
variable.  Instead of requiring only that any wages have been earned at 
any time in the quarter, Employed now requires individuals to have 
earned an average of at least $100 a week ($1300 total for the quarter) 
before they count as employed.  This is still a threshold that falls well 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 268 The standard errors that we estimate for these regressions are clustered at the person level; 
clustering in this way means that the reported precision of our estimates accounts for the fact that 
our quarterly observations for each person are not independent of one another. 
 269 The “window” range we indicate at the top of each column in Table 5 reflects the number of 
quarters before and after expungement receipt and thus the sample over which we estimate our 
regressions; for example, “+/- 4” means that we observe individuals for one year before (four quar-
ters) and one year after the expungement. 
 270 The p-value represents the probability that a randomly drawn sample of the size used by the 
researcher would produce the observed coefficient (or a more extreme one) if the true coefficient of 
the relationship in the underlying population were zero.  It is a way of expressing statistical impre-
cision due to sampling error.  See B.S. EVERITT & A. SKRONDAL, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY 
OF STATISTICS 307 (4th ed. 2010) (defining “null hypothesis”); Valen E. Johnson, Revised Standards 
for Statistical Evidence, 110 PNAS 19313, 19313 (2013).  A p-value of .05 or less is generally con-
sidered statistically significant, though even lower is better.  See Johnson, supra, at 19313, 19315. 
 271 Near the bottom of each Panel in Table 5, “net gain” and “proportional net gain” show the 
estimated percentage-point and proportional gains in employment experienced by the average ex-
pungement recipient by the window’s end, relative to what would have occurred had they stayed 
on their pre-expungement trajectory.  We calculate “net gain” by multiplying the estimated 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 coefficient by the number of quarters observed in the post-expungement period in 
the column.  We calculate “proportional net gain” by dividing the net gain by the average employ-
ment level in the quarter before expungement receipt (which is 61.7%). 
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short of representing full-time employment.272  Even so, by using this 
definition, we at least exclude truly trivial earnings that may be causing 
people who are for all practical purposes unemployed to be coded for 
our analysis as employed.  And, importantly, it may allow us to pick up 
on some differences that the main Employed coding misses.   
 And indeed, the results in Panel B show substantially larger trend 
changes than we display in Panel A.  The general pattern is the same — 
steeper trend changes in the narrower windows — but the magnitudes 
are larger.  By the end of one year, we now see a twelve-percentage-
point net gain in employment relative to the pre-expungement trajec-
tory.  This implies that expungement recipients are 1.23 times as likely 
to be making at least $100/week as they would have been (53% are em-
ployed at baseline using this measure of employment).  As before, the net 
gains are similar in the two-year window and slightly lower in the three-
year window, indicating that the employment gains largely endure but 
do not continue to increase after the first year. 
 In Panel C of Table 5, we estimate changes in the average wage tra-
jectory of individuals following expungement receipt.  We find a similar 
pattern, with a steep gain in the first year followed by a subsequent 
plateau in gains.  By the end of the first year, relative to the pre-receipt 
trend, recipients gain an average of $1111 in quarterly wages (that is, 
$4444 per year), which is a 23% improvement over the pre-expungement 
average; the net gain increases to $1234 in the two-year estimate, a 25% 
improvement.  The proportional increase in wages is much larger than 
the increase in the employment rate in Panel A, but very close to the 
gain we calculate using the alternative employment measure in Panel B.  
This pattern implies that the increase in average wages may substan-
tially be explained by unemployed people obtaining employment or by 
very minimally employed people securing more hours or higher-paying 
work following their expungement.  In Figures 3A, 3B, and 3C, we 
demonstrate visually the employment and wage patterns that underlie 
these regression estimates.273  These graphs show only raw averages by 
quarter before and after expungement receipt; they are not regression-  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 272 The minimum wage in Michigan was in the vicinity of $7 per hour throughout our sample 
period.  See Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-farm Employment Under State Law:  
Selected Years 1968 to 2019, U.S. DEP’T LAB.: WAGE & HOUR DIVISION (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/minimum-wage/history [https://perma.cc/MVJ7-ZELL].  
Therefore, this measure of employment represents about fourteen hours of work per week at min-
imum wage, or less at a higher wage; $100/week is less than one-fifth of the median wage among 
persons with any wage in our sample. 
 273 In these figures, we do not model changes in employment outcomes as linear trends during 
the pre-expungement and post-expungement periods.  We simply show the employment rate and 
average wage for each quarter beginning two years before and ending two years after the expunge-
ment (including quarter 0, the quarter immediately preceding the expungement quarter, which is 
marked with a vertical dotted line), and then we connect the dots.  The sample we use to create the 
graphs is the same that we use for Column 3 in Table 5, Panels A–C.  The graphs all have similar 
patterns — a clear V-shape immediately surrounding the expungement. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Window (Quarters) +/- 2 +/- 4 +/- 8 +/- 12
A. Employment Rate 
(= any wages)
Elapsed × Post 0.0260*** 0.0198*** 0.00945*** 0.00521***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.0006)
Elapsed -0.00710*** -0.00649*** -0.00346*** -0.00237***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Net Gain 0.052 0.079 0.076 0.063
Proportional Net Gain 8.4% 12.8% 12.3% 10.2%
Number of Observations 71,899 125,451 226,525 301,089
B. Employment Rate
 (> $100/week)
Elapsed × Post 0.0367*** 0.0308*** 0.0149*** 0.00838***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Elapsed -0.0144*** -0.0124*** -0.00562*** -0.00320***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Net Gain 0.073 0.123 0.119 0.101
Proportional Net Gain 13.8% 23.2% 22.4% 18.9%
Number of Observations 71,899 125,451 226,525 301,089
C. Quarterly Wages
 (U.S. dollars)
Elapsed × Post 314.5*** 277.8*** 154.2*** 92.22***
(36.77) (18.12) (10.38) (7.80)
Elapsed -160.5*** -113.5*** -43.57*** -14.95*
(22.26) (11.78) (7.32) (6.10)
Net Gain $628.98 $1,111.35 $1,233 .37 $1,106.69
Proportional Net Gain 12.8% 22.6% 25.1% 22.5%
Number of Observations 71,899 125,451 226,525 301,089
Controls
BLS Total Employment X X X X
BLS Unemployment Rate X X X X
TABLE 5. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS
AFTER EXPUNGEMENT 
(Full Employment-Outcomes Sample) 
Notes: Outcome data come from Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA). The “window” refers to
the length of the evaluation period and indicates the number of quarters before and after the expungement —
for example, “+/- 2” means a four-quarter (one year) evaluation period, with two quarters before and two
quarters after the expungement. The sample includes quarterly data from individuals who received a known-
date expungement between January 1998 and May 2011, did not have an out-of-state driver’s license, matched
to the UIA data in at least one quarter of the sample period, and were of working age (eighteen to sixty-four) for 
the entire observation period indicated in the column’s window. Standard errors clustered on the person are
reported in parentheses.  ⁺, *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively.
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adjusted to control for economic trends in Michigan.  And, notably, the 
downward overall pattern in each of the graphs reflects the declining 
state of Michigan’s economy over the course of our study period.  But 
what is important to understand for our purposes is not that underlying 
decline but the change in the direction of the graph in the period imme-
diately after the expungement — the sudden, V-shaped upturn. 
 The results that we show here are robust; that is, similar patterns 
consistently continue to appear even if we vary the details of the regres-
sion specification or the sample definition.274  For example, there are 
certain additional economic control variables that could potentially im-
prove our ability to account for the influence of economic fluctuations, 
but which we do not add to the main specification because we do not 
have the data for all years.  These include the average quarterly earnings 
for Michigan from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators series (available 
from 2001) and average quarterly wages and employment rates for ex-
pungement nonrecipients in our own data (available from 2004).  For 
the years that they are available, adding these variables into our analysis 
does not change the results.  In addition, one might worry that, nonetheless, 
 
FIGURE 3A.  EMPLOYMENT RATE (ANY WAGES)  
BEFORE AND AFTER EXPUNGEMENT                 
Notes: Quarter 1 (immediately after the dotted line) is the quarter of expunge-
ment receipt.  The sample consists of individuals who received a known-date 
expungement between January 1998 and May 2011, did not have an out-of-
state driver’s license, matched to our UIA data in at least one quarter during 
the period from 1997 to 2013, and were of working age (eighteen to sixty-four). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 274 Cf. RICARDO A. MARONNA ET AL., ROBUST STATISTICS: THEORY AND METHODS 
(WITH R) 1–2 (2d ed. 2019) (“Classical statistical inference quantities . . . can be adversely influ-
enced by the presence of even one outlier in the data.  In contrast, appropriately constructed robust 
versions of those inference quantities are little influenced by outliers.”). 
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FIGURE 3B.  EMPLOYMENT RATE (> $100/WEEK )  
BEFORE AND AFTER EXPUNGEMENT                   
FIGURE 3C.  AVERAGE QUARTERLY WAGES  
BEFORE AND AFTER EXPUNGEMENT                 
Notes: Quarter 1 (immediately after the dotted line) is the quarter of expunge-
ment receipt.  The sample consists of individuals who received a known-date 
expungement between January 1998 and May 2011, did not have an out-of-
state driver’s license, matched to our UIA data in at least one quarter during 
the period from 1997 to 2013, and were of working age (eighteen to sixty-four). 
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these controls might somehow not fully account for the major swings 
introduced by the financial crisis and recession.  But the same patterns 
in our data persist if we simply drop that entire time period, such that 
the windows for each analysis end before 2008 begins.  The same sub-
stantive story also surfaces if we leave in the sample all of the individu-
als who do not match to the wage data at all; for our main sample def-
inition, we assume their absence was likely just a failure of the 
matching process, but they could also be people who were not working 
for the entire period.  If we include them and count them as having 
zeroes for all of the outcome variables, the employment rate and average 
wages drop, and our point estimates decline proportionally, but the pro-
portional net gain estimates remain the same. 
We also conduct these analyses separately for different subpopula-
tions to see whether expungement affects different groups of recipients 
differently.  We find substantial, and largely similar, trend changes in 
every subgroup.  The most conspicuous pattern we discover is that wage 
and employment gains are much larger for women, at least in propor-
tional terms (women have lower baseline wages).  For example, in the 
one year after expungement, we estimate that men’s wages increase by 
17%, while women’s wages appear to increase by 30%.  We are unable 
to explain the difference, as there are many possible explanations; for 
example, perhaps women apply disproportionately to job types for 
which a criminal record is a particularly serious barrier.275  Studies of 
other kinds of job-access interventions, like job training, also generally 
find much larger effects for women, so the difference in our data may be 
a byproduct of a more general phenomenon.276  We also find larger ef-
fects for black expungement recipients than for white recipients, but 
this difference is not as large (one-year wage gains of 25% versus 18%).  
Among both men and women, people who expunge a felony see only 
slightly larger gains than those who expunge a misdemeanor (one-year 
wage gains of 33% versus 29% among women, and 18% versus 16% for 
men).  This difference seems surprisingly small, given that felonies carry 
more collateral consequences and presumably more labor-market 
stigma.277  However, relatively few misdemeanors are expunged in the 
first place, so they may represent a highly selected subset — for example, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 275 A 2019 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey reports that women dominate fields like social work 
(81.9% women), teaching young children (98.7% women), and home health care (88.3% women) — 
they are more likely to work with sensitive information and vulnerable populations.  Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www. 
bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.htm [https://perma.cc/ENU7-EML5] (last updated Jan. 22, 2020).  More em-
ployers in these fields probably conduct background checks — in fact, background checks are re-
quired by law for any childcare provider.  Background Checks: What You Need to Know, 
CHILDCARE.GOV, https://www.childcare.gov/index.php/consumer-education/background-checks-
what-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/GZ59-BVNR]. 
 276 See infra note 341 and accompanying text. 
 277 See Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of 
Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 647 (2014). 
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perhaps the misdemeanors people choose to expunge tend to be partic-
ularly stigmatizing for them.  In any case, the estimates for all crime 
categories and for all categories of individuals are large and significant. 
B.  Interpretation: Expungement Effect, Motivation,  
or Mean Regression? 
Our analysis demonstrates that expungement is associated with large 
improvements in the employment rate and wages on average — and, in 
particular, a reversal of the pre-expungement downward trend that we 
observe for recipients as a group.  Can we conclude from this evidence 
that expungements cause these improvements?  The answer is not obvi-
ous.  A causal interpretation of the trend-change estimates above de-
pends on the assumption that, in the absence of these individuals receiv-
ing expungements, their collective pre-expungement employment and 
wage trajectories would have continued on the same path.  But is that 
true?  Absent expungement, is there some other force that might reverse 
the downward slide at about the same time as receipt and give rise to 
the same V-shaped pattern we observe?  The control variables in the 
regression already account for the role of changing labor-market trends, 
which would otherwise be one plausible explanation.  But there is still 
the possibility of omitted variable bias — there could be something else 
going on that we cannot measure or observe that accounts for these pat-
terns, other than the receipt of an expungement.278 
The most likely candidate is motivation.  As we detail in Part II, it 
takes a lot of effort, as well as a financial investment, to obtain an ex-
pungement.279  Moreover, most expungement recipients choose not to go 
through this effort as soon as they become eligible — three-quarters wait 
more than a year, and 44% wait more than five years.280  So, what mo-
tivates people who have waited several years to decide that now is the 
time to apply?  From an inference perspective, it would be ideal if their 
decision were random, but it probably is not.  For many, it may be that 
they are trying to get a job — perhaps because they have been laid off, 
or because they are seeking out better pay.281  This latter theory finds 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 278 Omitted variable bias (OVB) (or selection bias, in this case) is almost always a challenge in 
observational studies that seek to identify treatment effects.  See Helene Starks et al., The Challenge 
of Selection Bias and Confounding in Palliative Care Research, 12 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 181, 181 
(2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2982715/pdf/jpm.2009.9672.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YJH8-EKUZ].  However, in at least some employment-related contexts, OVB may not ulti-
mately result in significant bias.  See generally Marco Caliendo et al., Unobservable, but  
Unimportant?  The Relevance of Usually Unobserved Variables for the Evaluation of Labor Market  
Policies, 46 LAB. ECON. 14 (2017). 
 279 See supra section II.A, pp. 2488–93; supra section II.C, pp. 2501–10. 
 280 See supra fig.1 and accompanying text. 
 281 Cf. Adams et al., supra note 95, at 30 (noting that prior to record clearance, “[q]uintessential 
good jobs — those in specialized fields such as health care; jobs that provided good benefits such 
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some support in our findings in Column 5 of Table 3: People are more 
likely to receive an expungement within a year of a job loss or substan-
tial decline in wages.  And a person who is motivated to improve their 
employment situation to the point that they are willing to go through 
the burdensome expungement process is probably taking other steps to 
better their prospects, too — like applying for jobs, obviously.  So, if we 
see a turnaround in their employment trajectory just after the receipt of 
their expungement, could the change actually be due to these other steps, 
with the expungement merely incidental? 
A related causal-inference concern is the possibility that our empiri-
cal findings are simply the product of statistical regression toward the 
mean.282  Consider a classic example often used to explain the concept: 
both very tall parents and very short parents tend, on average, to have 
children who are a little closer to the population’s average height than 
they are.283  Although height is substantially hereditary, people do not 
turn out exactly like their parents; there is randomness involved in gene 
mixing and in the operation of other influences on height.  Parents who 
are extremely tall or short are likely that way partly because of random 
noise, and their children are unlikely to get the same roll of the dice.284  
Similar patterns are found in other real-world phenomena involving 
random fluctuations — extreme outcomes tend to be followed by less 
extreme ones285 for the straightforward reason that most outcomes are, 
by definition, not extreme.286 
A similar phenomenon could explain some of our results.  Suppose 
there is a certain amount of random variation in individual wages and 
employment status (or as good as random for our purposes — uncorre-
lated with the other variables of interest in our analysis).  Suppose fur-
ther that people tend to apply for expungement when they have recently 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
as health insurance, retirement plans, etc.; and jobs with the local, state, or federal government — 
were particularly difficult to secure”); Ispa-Landa & Loeffler, supra note 32, at 389 (“Historically, 
[criminal justice system (CJS)–marked individuals] could find employment in the manufacturing 
sector and other portions of the economy that had less direct contact with members of the general 
public.  However, with deindustrialization, retail and other service sector jobs have largely replaced 
manufacturing jobs.  These pay lower initial wages and offer fewer opportunities for wage progres-
sion.  Furthermore, because retail and service sector jobs involve extensive contact with the public, 
employers may be especially reluctant to hire CJS-marked individuals.” (citations omitted)). 
 282 For an explanation and examples of the statistical phenomenon, see generally Adrian G.  
Barnett et al., Regression to the Mean: What It Is and How to Deal with It, 34 INT’L J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 215 (2005). 
 283 Charlotte M. Wright & Tim D. Cheetham, The Strengths and Limitations of Parental Heights 
as a Predictor of Attained Height, 81 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 257, 257 (1999) (“How-
ever, where parents were unusually tall or short, their children were relatively less tall or short, 
respectively . . . .”). 
 284 See J. Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman, Statistics Notes: Regression Towards the Mean, 
308 BRIT. MED. J. 1499, 1499 (1994) (“This is a statistical, not a genetic phenomenon.”).  
 285 See Barnett et al., supra note 282, at 217. 
 286 See John R. Nesselroade et al., Regression Toward the Mean and the Study of Change, 88 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 622, 624–25 (1980). 
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experienced an employment setback, so they are more likely to seek re-
lief when they are on the downside of one of these random fluctuations.  
Then, even leaving to one side any broader job-search motivation that 
may be correlated with an individual interest in expungement, one 
might expect that downward trend to reverse itself at around the time 
an individual receives an expungement.  Our analysis assumes that an 
existing downward trend in employment outcomes observed across a 
sample should be expected to continue without some clear reason for it 
to change — like receiving an expungement.  Such an expectation is 
sensible when the underlying trend is driven by durable, real-world fac-
tors.  But if the trend is not substantive but rather the product of ran-
dom noise, then such an expectation can confound causal inference and 
lead one astray, especially when a trough in employment circum-
stances activates an understandable tendency among those eligible to 
apply for an expungement, inducing a spurious correlation. 
Unfortunately, there is no entirely clean way to unravel these causal 
conundrums in our data.  In truth, it is likely that all of these factors 
contribute to the large apparent employment effects we find — that is, 
expungements do bring about employment gains, but the gains caused 
by expungement receipt are not quite as large as those we estimate 
above.  Indeed, the effects of motivation spillovers and record clearing 
might be expected to be mutually reinforcing: perhaps the motivation 
drives the job search, but the expungement makes the search more likely 
to be successful (and that prospect in turn may increase motivation), 
suggesting an even more reticulated causal story. 
Fortunately, our data do provide a couple of reasons to believe that 
causal effects of expungements probably explain at least a large part of 
the trend changes we observe.  The first reason concerns the exact tim-
ing of the upturn.  The motivation and mean-regression theories both 
hinge on the idea that people apply for expungements at particular times: 
when they are motivated to seek work and/or when they have recently 
experienced the loss of a job or wages.  But there is a significant period 
of time between application and receipt, and our analysis focuses on the 
date of receipt of the expungement.  It takes at least a few months to 
receive an expungement,287 and this time lag implies that, in our quar-
terly wage data, any motivation or mean-regression effects should begin 
to be visible even two quarters before and definitely one quarter before 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 287 Lamentably, we do not know the date of the application for expungement in the great ma-
jority of observations in our data, and the time lag between application and receipt reportedly 
varies by a fair amount, depending on geography and so forth.  But our conversations with ex-
pungement lawyers in Michigan and with representatives of the Michigan State Police suggest 
that it is very hard to complete the process in less than two months, and that (while some jurisdic-
tions have recently achieved efficiency improvements) three to six months was a more common lag 
during the years covered by our study.  See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
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expungement receipt.  We might expect to detect motivation effects even 
earlier because the impetus to seek a job might often be around for a 
while before any expungement application. 
 But what we see in the data does not seem to match this alternative 
story — or at least, it matches it at best only weakly.  In Figures 3A, 3B, 
and 3C, the first quarter in which there is a change in trajectory — an 
upswing from the prior quarter — is quarter 1, the quarter in which the 
individual actually receives the expungement.288  In that quarter, we 
spot a very slight improvement from the previous quarter — which does 
represent a substantial change, stopping the previous downward trajec-
tory — and a much steeper upward pivot between quarters 1 and 2 for 
the first employment curve (Figure 3A), and between quarters 2 and 3 
for Figures 3B and 3C.  This type of pattern is very much what we 
would expect to observe if expungement receipt (and not other factors 
correlated with an expungement application) drives the change in tra-
jectory.289  If the shift in the trend were instead triggered by something 
happening a quarter or two earlier (e.g., the motivation accompanying 
the choice to apply for an expungement), we would likely see a similar 
pattern, only shifted a quarter or two to the left.  But we see no trend 
change until quarter 1 in any of these graphs.290  It is possible that what 
occurs between quarter 0 and quarter 1 includes some component of the 
mean-reversion or motivation effect — we cannot rule this out.  But the 
pattern is more consistent with changes being driven at least quite sub-
stantially by expungement receipt.  
 Second, we provide a further test of this causal theory in Table 6 by 
analyzing a specific subset of our sample: those who receive expunge-
ments within one year of becoming eligible to apply.  As we explain 
above, we consider these cases (accounting for 25% of all expungements, 
and 19% of the wage-linked sample) to be primarily “pent-up demand” 
cases — people just waiting to become eligible.291  These individuals are 
obviously motivated to obtain an expungement, but there is no reason 
to believe that this motivation would have materialized just at the time 
of their application or, alternatively, as a consequence of some recent 
  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 288 See supra section IV.A, pp. 2524–33.  
 289 We only discern about half of the trend change in the partial post-expungement quarter 
(quarter 1); the trend change appears in the figures in full bloom beginning only in the first quarters 
that fall fully in the post-expungement period. 
 290 Indeed, in the wage graph (Figure 3C), the fall between quarters –1 and 0 is particularly 
steep. 
 291 See supra notes 160–161 and accompanying text. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Window (Quarters) +/- 2 +/- 4 +/- 8 +/- 12
A. Employment Rate 
(= any wages)
Elapsed × Post 0.0231*** 0.0173*** 0.00884*** 0.00521***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0016)
Elapsed -0.00151 -0.00529* -0.00217+ -0.00213*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Net Gain 0.046 0.069 0.071 0.063
Proportional Net Gain 7.6% 11.4% 11.6% 10.3%
Number of Observations 13,386 23,184 42,075 55,293
B. Employment Rate
 (> $100/week)
Elapsed × Post 0.0230** 0.0215*** 0.0125*** 0.00742***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Elapsed -0.00364 -0.00605** -0.00217 -0.00132
(0.004) (0.002) (0.0013) (0.0011)
Net Gain 0.046 0.086 0.100 0.089
Proportional Net Gain 8.8% 16.5% 19.2% 17.1%
Number of Observations 13,386 23,184 42,075 55,293
C. Quarterly Wages
 (U.S. dollars)
Elapsed × Post 227.8** 211.1*** 128.6*** 59.70***
(70.00) (39.96) (23.11) (17.24)
Elapsed -17.76 -25.56 9.292 31.45*
(41.44) (24.46) (15.95) (13.08)
Net Gain $455.68 $844.25 $1,028 .88 $716.45
Proportional Net Gain 10.6% 19.6% 23.9% 16.6%
Number of Observations 13,386 23,184 42,075 55,293
Controls
BLS Total Employment X X X X
BLS Unemployment Rate X X X X
TABLE 6. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE TRENDS
AFTER EXPUNGEMENT
(Expungement in First-Eligible-Year Subsample) 
Notes: Outcome data come from Michigan’s Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA). The “window” refers to
the length of the evaluation period and indicates the number of quarters before and after the expungement —
for example, “+/- 2” means a four-quarter (one year) evaluation period, with two quarters before and two
quarters after the expungement. The sample period runs from the third quarter of 1997 through the second
quarter of 2013. The sample includes quarterly data from individuals who received a known-date
expungement between January 1998 and May 2011, did not have an out-of-state driver’s license, matched to the 
UIA data in at least one quarter of the sample period, were of working age (eighteen to sixty-four) for the entire
observation period indicated in the column, and received an expungement within their first year of eligibility.
Standard errors clustered on the person are reported in parentheses. ⁺, *, **, and *** represent significance at the
10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, respectively.
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employment setback.292  Motivation that is longer term rather than spe-
cific to the particular time around the expungement is unlikely to con-
found our results because it would not explain a turnaround in the trend 
at the time of expungement receipt.  Likewise, we worry less about re-
gression to the mean when we study this sample because there is less 
reason to believe that an individual’s choice to apply at the culmination 
of the waiting period is motivated by finding themselves at the bottom 
end of a random fluctuation in their employment outcomes; rather, they 
are simply applying the first chance they get. 
 The regressions in Table 6, Panels A–C, directly parallel those in 
Table 5, Panels A–C; we carry out the same analyses on the smaller 
“pent-up” sample.  Table 6 demonstrates very strong gains in employ-
ment and wages after receiving an expungement — changes that remain 
statistically significant (p < 0.001 for almost all estimates) despite the 
loss of power accompanying the sample’s smaller size.293  Early ex-
pungement recipients become, by two years after expungement receipt, 
1.12 times as likely to be employed at all using our “any wages” measure 
(a seven percentage point gain) and 1.2 times as likely to be employed 
for at least $100 per month (ten percentage points), and they earn 1.24 
times their prior wages on average. 
The most important difference between these results and our Table 5 
findings concerns the pre-expungement underlying trend, which is nega-
tive in all Table 5 specifications.  By contrast, the early-expungement 
group exhibits no significant prior trend for most windows and outcome 
variables, consistent with our theory of pent-up demand.294  In other 
words, the arrival of the five-year threshold for these individuals is ef-
fectively random; it does not coincide with any particular pattern in pre-
expungement employment outcomes.  Thus, mean regression cannot ex-
plain the subsequent trend changes because there is no prior downturn 
from which to regress.  It is also hard to explain by a job search — there 
is no prior setback to explain its arrival, and moreover, the timing of the 
expungement for early recipients seems to be driven mechanically by the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 292 Cf. Peter M. Gollwitzer, Mindset Theory of Action Phases, reprinted in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
THEORIES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 526, 527 (Paul A.M. Van Lange et al. eds., 2012) (explaining 
that under the Rubicon model for analyzing motivation, a person’s course of action may be sepa-
rated into phases that include a predecision phase — where a person begins setting goals — and a 
preaction phase — where a person begins goal-directed behaviors). 
 293 The timing of the largest gains is slightly later (the curves are slightly less steep in the six-
month window), but by the end of two years, the net gain in proportional terms is essentially 
identical to what we observe for the broader group in Table 5. 
 294 Table 6 offers evidence in support of our causal account of expungement receipt: the flat prior 
trend, which is followed by a steeply positive post-expungement trend, is inconsistent with early-
expungement recipients applying for expungement in the wake of an employment downturn.  Ad-
mittedly, a few of our specifications hint at a small negative pretrend in employment outcomes, 
but others actually produce positive coefficients on 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑, our trend variable. 
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eligibility clock.295  Perhaps the absence of mean regression and motiva-
tion effects slightly dampens the immediate effects we estimate in the 
shortest time window, but by two years the gains are just as large.  This 
result provides quite good reason to believe that the employment and wage 
gains are substantially caused by expungement. 
In Figure 4, we present a variant of the wage graph from Figure 3C; 
this version, perhaps, provides more compelling visual evidence of the 
causal explanation of our results.  This analysis is limited to the early-
expungement sample, and it is also residualized — that is, we use re-
gression analysis to remove the underlying downward trends attributa-
ble to secular changes in the economy.  This graph shows little evidence 
of any downward trajectory for individual wages before expungement.  
Rather, it presents a noisy but essentially flat pattern, which abruptly 
turns upward after expungement receipt.296 
 The results from the early-expungement sample are encouraging in 
another sense as well: they suggest that similar employment benefits 
might accrue in states that make expungements automatic after a fixed 
period of time post-conviction.297  One might otherwise worry that the 
employment gains depend on the fact that expungement recipients like 
those in our data are a self-selected group who choose to apply just 
when they are hunting for a job.  Even if the expungement does help 
(that is, it has a causal effect) in obtaining employment or better wages, 
one would not necessarily expect a similar effect to emerge if a recipient 
is not job hunting in the first place.298   
 But in the early-expungement sample, the timing of the expunge-
ment is less likely to be determined by an individual’s search for better 
employment circumstances; rather, for most of this group, expungement 
timing is dictated by the arbitrary five-year waiting period.  And that 
perhaps explains why the gains for this group are slightly slower to ar-
rive — but still, they arrive fully within two years of the expungement.  
If expungement kicked in automatically after five years (or some other 
time threshold), presumably most recipients would not happen to be 
looking for a job (or a better-paying job or one with more hours) at that  
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 295 See supra notes 115–124 and accompanying text (describing in detail the eligibility require-
ments — and in particular the five-year waiting period — for expungement in Michigan). 
 296 For space reasons, we show only the wage graph here and not the other outcome variables.  
The graphs of the employment measures, when we construct them using the early expungement 
sample and residualized, do show a slight decline in the quarters before expungement receipt, but 
it is much smaller than what we observe for the full sample. 
 297 For a list of states that have led this policy shift, see supra section I.B, pp. 2472–76. 
 298 In other words, we worry that receipt of an expungement might have heterogeneous effects 
on employment outcomes, depending on whether someone is hunting for a new job, which might 
be unobservable.  Cf. Patrick Arni & Amelie Schiprowski, Job Search Requirements, Effort  
Provision and Labor Market Outcomes, 169 J. PUB. ECON. 65, 75–76 (2019); James J. Heckman & 
Edward Vytlacil, Policy-Relevant Treatment Effects, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 107, 107 (2001). 
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FIGURE 4.  AVERAGE RESIDUALIZED QUARTERLY WAGES 
BEFORE AND AFTER EXPUNGEMENT (Expungement in First-Eligible-Year Subsample)   
                 
Notes: Quarter 1 (immediately after the dotted line) is the quarter of expunge-
ment receipt.  The sample consists of individuals who received a known-date 
expungement between January 1998 and May 2011, did not have an out-of-
state driver’s license, matched to our UIA data in at least one quarter during 
the period from 1997 to 2013, and were of working age (eighteen to sixty-four). 
 
very time or within moments of learning about their expungement.  But 
almost everyone looks to improve their employment situation eventu-
ally — and probably more frequently among people with records, who 
tend to be in lower-paying jobs with higher turnover.299 
In sum, the causal interpretation of our results is on all fours with 
many patterns in our data that are otherwise difficult to explain — and 
with what we should expect based on extensive research showing that 
criminal records pose substantial hurdles to employment success.300  Our  
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 299 See Adams et al., supra note 95, at 30 (“Respondents, at times, expressed frustration with their 
inability to gain employment, noting that the limited jobs open to them predominantly involved 
poor working conditions and low pay . . . .”). 
 300 See Franklin & Johnsen, supra note 248, at 736–37; supra section I.A, pp. 2468–71. 
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findings are consistent with the intuition that expungement of those rec-
ords should help to reduce those hurdles.  
 Notably, our analysis is based entirely on expungements received in 
the age of the internet.301  Thus, our results suggest that it is possible 
for record clearing to generate substantial benefits for individuals with 
records notwithstanding the search tools currently available to employ-
ers.  And this, perhaps, should not be surprising.  Many arrests and 
convictions are not especially newsworthy and do not create a long trail 
of adverse Google hits.302  Employers, after all, overwhelmingly pay to 
carry out background checks using criminal records databases; they do 
so presumably because they believe that the database they patronize will 
provide them with much more comprehensive and reliable information 
than they could otherwise obtain for free.303  
 And Michigan’s experience demonstrates that expungement can, in 
fact, succeed in excising convictions from these databases.304  This, too, 
is probably to be expected under the circumstances.  Companies that 
manage these databases obtain their records from the state and update 
them frequently;305 their legal obligation not to share expunged records 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 301 Dates range from 1998 to 2011, with a median of 2006.  Internet usage was less ubiquitous 
early in this period, but the gains from expungements are similar (if anything, larger) if one looks 
only at dates after the median of this span of years, which was well into the period when internet-
based background research had become pervasive. 
 302 See Sara Tiegreen & Elana Newman, Violence: Comparing Reporting and Reality, DART 
CTR. FOR JOURNALISM & TRAUMA (Feb. 18, 2009), https://dartcenter.org/content/violence- 
comparing-reporting-and-reality [https://perma.cc/FX48-4Y56] (noting that “[r]eports of crime 
don’t match actual rates of crime” and that less serious crimes receive much less attention from the 
media).  But see Lageson, supra note 96 (“Even if a record is officially wiped clean, it’s legal for 
criminal justice agencies and other websites to keep criminal records online.  Arrest records, mug 
shots, and court records are classified as in the public record in most states.”). 
 303 One 2010 survey found that 92% of employers perform criminal background checks on some 
potential hires and that 73% perform criminal background checks on all potential hires.  Two years 
later, this number declined to 86% of employers conducting criminal background checks for some 
potential hires and 69% of employers for all potential hires.  SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., 
supra note 42. 
 304 Michigan criminal records are readily available for direct search by employers and other 
members of the public via state databases from which expunged records are purged.  See Criminal 
History Records, MICH. ST. POLICE, https://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,4643,7-123-1878_ 
8311---,00.html [https://perma.cc/4QQB-SML8] (explaining the different kinds of searches available 
and noting the unavailability of suppressed criminal records); MICH. ST. RECS, https:// 
michigan.staterecords.org [https://perma.cc/R573-2XR3] (providing a searchable database). 
 305 See MARINA DUANE ET AL., URBAN INST., CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS: IMPACT 
ON EMPLOYMENT AND RECIDIVISM 7–8 (2017), https://www.urban.org/research/ 
publication/criminal-background-checks-impact-employment-and-recidivism/view/full_report 
[https://perma.cc/6GWF-SESW]. 
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is clear;306 and thus failing to observe this requirement potentially ex-
poses them to criminal prosecution.307  In all of our conversations with 
expungement advocates in Michigan, none mentioned any concerns 
about the practical effectiveness of expungements at limiting employer 
access to records, even though similar concerns have been raised often 
in the course of debates about expungement reform elsewhere.308 
To be sure, our data do not establish that expungement works per-
fectly in all cases to hide records from the public eye; it is likely that 
some individuals really cannot escape the digital trail of their prior con-
victions, and mistakes could well persist for some individuals who have 
had their records cleared in some criminal history databases.309  More-
over, a clean record obviously does not automatically translate into a 
new or better job; the search for employment involves many other fac-
tors, and not every expungement recipient will end up experiencing em-
ployment benefits (although some will presumably experience benefits 
in other areas of life as well).  The employment and wage gains that we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 306 Third-party vendors are less important given the availability of public records, but in any 
event, they too are constrained by law not to share expunged records — indeed, doing so is a mis-
demeanor.  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.623(5) (2020). 
 307 See id. 
 308 Many data collection agencies that offer background checks to companies and employers 
qualify as consumer reporting agencies (CRAs) that are regulated by the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA).  See LOVE ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 5:14–5:15, 5:19; Roberts, supra note 97, at 345.  How-
ever, “not all CRAs use reliable sources for their reports, and they certainly do not always update 
expunged records from their databases through removal.  Thus the potential for, and indeed inci-
dents of, error can be high.”  Id.; see also REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO 
ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 14 (2014), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PXV4-ANWP] (“Common errors include reporting mismatches of cases belonging 
to someone else, reporting expunged cases, and failure to report outcomes of old arrests.”).  Jenny 
Roberts mentions that some states do have their own credit reporting acts, and these are a way of 
“limiting access to and use of sealed and expunged records.”  Roberts, supra note 97, at 345.  Mug-
shot websites do not qualify as CRAs and are therefore unregulated by the FCRA.  See id.  Eldar 
Haber argues that digital access to records poses a constant threat to record clearing, Haber, supra 
note 97, at 356, and expungements “must be revisited and revised to address the challenges of digital 
technology to rehabilitation,” id. at 384.  “‘Mugshot’ websites post photos from the day’s arrests, 
often free of charge except to those who must pay to get expunged charges taken off the site.  Web-
sites like ‘Instant Checkmate’ encourage a quick check of criminal records and social media before 
a date.”  Roberts, supra note 97, at 329 (footnotes omitted).  Roberts argues that sealing and ex-
pungement laws can be made more effective by “ensuring the accuracy of records, restricting ways 
in which decision makers with access can use records, and effective regulation of background 
screening companies and private companies that sell mugshots and other arrest and conviction 
information.”  Id. at 344.  Clay Calvert and Jerry Bruno argue that journalists are positioned to 
balance the competing interests of expungement laws and the First Amendment guarantee of a free 
press: “[I]f a newspaper publishes a story regarding the arrest of an individual, then it takes on an 
ethical obligation to subsequently report on the expunction of that same individual’s record should 
such a resolution occur.”  Calvert & Bruno, supra note 97, at 143–44.  
 309 See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
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find are averages for expungement recipients as a group, and to the ex-
tent that they can be interpreted as causal effects, they represent achiev-
able gains even if expungement does not work flawlessly. 
V.  OTHER OBJECTIONS TO EXPUNGEMENT LAWS 
This Article does not seek to address comprehensively all policy con-
cerns surrounding reform of expungement laws.  Some arguments raised 
by both proponents and opponents do not depend on empirical claims 
and are not subject to evaluation by data-driven studies like ours.  For 
example, expungement advocates often argue that people who have com-
pleted their sentences following a conviction deserve a second chance and 
should not be punished and stigmatized forever.310  The case for a “clean 
slate” is sometimes framed in terms of forgiveness and redemption, lan-
guage that, as we note above, alludes to various religious traditions.311  
The affirmative case for expungement reform can also be framed in terms 
of equality, as seeking to help people with records escape the permanent 
form of second-class citizenship that effectively results from the collateral 
consequences of convictions.312  At the same time, some expungement 
opponents contend that sealing records (and allowing people who have 
been convicted of crimes to explicitly state the opposite) is dishonest and 
at odds with freedom of information, government transparency, and the 
public’s right to know.313   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 310 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: 
AMERICA’S FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 12–13, 15–18 (2014), 
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/4a1f16cd-ec82-44f1-a093-798ee1cd7ba3/collateral-damage-
america-s-failure-to-forgive-or-forget-in-the-war-on-crime-a-roadmap-to-restore-rights-and- 
status-after-arrest-or-conviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL3N-LHU4] [hereinafter COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE]; VALLAS & DIETRICH, supra note 308, at 34, 37, 49. 
 311 See, e.g., VALLAS & DIETRICH, supra note 308, at 34 (“Enabling Americans with criminal rec-
ords to obtain a clean slate upon rehabilitation would permit them to redeem themselves and move on 
with their lives after they pay their debt to society.”); supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 312 E.g., COLLATERAL DAMAGE, supra note 310, at 9 (“[C]ollateral consequences, whether based 
on specific legal provisions or the general discrimination they encourage, have produced untold collat-
eral damage in the war on crime.  Collateral consequences affect jobs and licenses, housing, public 
benefits, voting rights, judicial rights, parental rights, the right to bear arms, immigration status, and 
even volunteer opportunities.  Each individual consequence may have seemed prudent and logical 
when enacted, but their overall effect is to consign millions to second-class status.”); Beth Feldstein, The 
Steep Price of a Clean Slate, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L. (June 20, 2019), https://equaljusticeunder-
law.org/thejusticereport/the-steep-price-of-a-clean-slate [https://perma.cc/9JFM-D68Y] (“[O]ur laws 
perpetuate a cycle of poverty where financially-struggling people with criminal records are stuck as 
second-class citizens.”); Eric Westervelt & Barbara Brosher, Scrubbing the Past to Give Those with a 
Criminal Record a Second Chance, NPR (Feb. 19, 2019, 4:58 AM), https://www. 
npr.org/2019/02/19/692322738/scrubbing-the-past-to-give-those-with-a-criminal-record-a-second-
chance [https://perma.cc/68EJ-56WH] (“With background checks ubiquitous for jobs, schools, mort-
gage applications and more, even one conviction — and sometimes even just one arrest — can dog 
people for years, critics say, relegating them to permanent second-class status.”). 
 313 See Funk, supra note 94, at 302–04 (arguing that aggressive expungement policies hamper police 
investigations and present a risk of liability or theft to employers); see also JACOBS, supra note 7, at 302 
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These arguments essentially involve questions of principle, values, 
and preferences, not data or empirics, and fully engaging them is beyond 
our Article’s scope.  Instead, in this Part, we briefly address two other 
possible objections to expungement laws that do connect more directly to 
the substance of our evidence and argument: the crime and labor-market 
consequences of expungement laws. 
A.  General Deterrence 
When evaluating the effects of expungement on crime, one might ob-
ject that our focus on subsequent recidivism rates of expungement recip-
ients is incomplete.  Record-clearing policies can influence crime rates 
through other channels — in particular general deterrence, especially of 
those who do not presently have records.  Perhaps some people are de-
terred from committing crimes by the knowledge of the many ways in 
which having a criminal record might harm them, such as embarrassing 
them in their communities or interfering with their future employment 
and housing prospects.314  The concern, therefore, is that expanding ex-
pungement opportunities (especially through a much broader and/or au-
tomatic expungement policy) may conflict with general deterrence — 
that is, deterrent effects on the population as a whole — and do so in a 
way that produces a net increase in crime. 
Such a consequence is theoretically possible, but once we inspect the 
argument’s basic premises, we are skeptical of it.  Our study does not 
evaluate general deterrence effects, nor has any study of expungement 
laws.315  But other existing research provides many reasons to expect 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
(“First Amendment purists and open government advocates . . . argue that when it comes to combatting 
crime, criminal justice agencies and courts do a better and fairer job of preventing and solving crime 
when they have more information at their disposal.”); Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: 
Reinventing Access to Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 36 (2016). 
 314 See Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 
519, 532–36 (1996) (arguing conviction stigma may contribute to deterrence).  But see Murat C. 
Mungan, Stigma Dilution and Over-criminalization, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 88 (2016) (“Crim-
inalizing an act that provides weak signals about a person’s productivity and character can dilute 
the stigma attached to having a criminal record.”).  Indeed, this possibility has been raised in the 
context of sex offender community notification laws, and there is at least some evidence that concern 
over being publicly labelled as a “sex offender” might reduce the number of first-time offenses, 
although the evidence, even in this context, is mixed.  See Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 254, at 
181 (finding some evidence that community notification may reduce the frequency of first-time sex 
offenses but also that it may exacerbate recidivism among those subject to it). 
 315 Recently, there has been some experimental research on record expungement, however.  See 
Romain Espinosa et al., The General Versus Specific Deterrence Effects of Expungements:  
Experimental Evidence 1–3 (George Mason Univ., Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19-10, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379701 [https://perma.cc/LGF7-9C6J] (reporting results from a lab ex-
periment on expungement and its influence on criminal behavior and suggesting that the effect of 
expungements on general deterrence varies based on cost but that “[t]here is no effect of expunge-
ments on specific deterrence,” id. at 1). 
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such effects to be minimal (at least when the record-clearing laws in ques-
tion are similar to those most states have in place or are presently consid-
ering).  If anything, they are very likely to be outweighed by salutary spe-
cific deterrence effects on those who already have records. 
First, general deterrence effects are relevant only if potential offend-
ers are not only aware of the collateral consequences of criminal convic-
tions,316 but also cognizant of the availability of expungement.  But even 
people who already have criminal records and are legally eligible for ex-
pungement under existing record-clearing laws rarely know about or un-
derstand the opportunity.  We doubt that — even if broader laws were 
enacted — general public knowledge of it would be particularly wide-
spread, especially prior to a criminal conviction.317  Similarly, studies of 
the effects of other legal shocks on general criminal deterrence emphasize 
that deterrence depends on perceived consequences, not actual ones,318 
and they stress that most people do not have a very good understanding 
of the law that governs them, a phenomenon that tends to undermine 
deterrence effects.319  Even in a world without record clearing, individu-
als considering committing crimes may be overoptimistic when thinking 
about potential labor-market and other collateral consequences.  They 
may be unaware of many of those consequences and also dismiss the like-
lihood of getting caught. 
Second, the existence of waiting periods ought to almost completely 
eliminate general deterrence concerns.  This is especially so for fairly long 
waiting periods, like Michigan’s current five years, and even more so for 
the up-to-ten years the new Pennsylvania and Utah automatic expunge-
ment laws require.320  It might be less true where waiting periods are 
shorter, such as under California’s new law, but even in that case, the law 
requires an individual to at least complete their sentence, delaying the 
availability of expungement.321   
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 316 See Rasmusen, supra note 314, at 520; see also Murat C. Mungan, Gateway Crimes, 68 ALA. 
L. REV. 671, 681 (2017) (“Both stigma and formal sanctions have the desirable effect of increasing 
the expected cost” — that is, a cost assumed to be accurately predicted in advance — “to committing 
crime and thereby reducing people’s incentives to commit crimes.”). 
 317 See supra section II.C, pp. 2501–10. 
 318 See Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 
23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (1998) (“The perceptual deterrence literature was spawned by the recogni-
tion that deterrence is ultimately a perceptual phenomenon.  While great effort has been committed 
to analyzing the links between sanction risk perceptions and behavior, comparatively little attention 
has been given to examining the origins of risk perceptions and their connection to actual sanction 
policy.”); see also Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, 
55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 10–12 (2017). 
 319 See Robert Apel, Sanctions, Perceptions, and Crime: Implications for Criminal Deterrence, 29 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 67, 78–79 (2013); Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 318, at 10–11. 
 320 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(5) (2020); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2(a) (2019); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-40-105(3)(c)(i) (West 2020). 
 321 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425(a)(2)(E) (West 2020). 
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Intuitively, we have a hard time imagining the potential offenders 
who would (absent expungement) avoid committing a crime out of fear 
of social stigma, job loss, or other collateral consequences, but who would 
decide to commit the crime after all if they became aware that five or ten 
years later they might, if they keep their record clean and are otherwise 
eligible, be relieved of some of those consequences.322  This possibility 
seems especially unlikely under a petition-based regime involving uncer-
tain judicial discretion.  What is far more likely to be salient to these po-
tential offenders is the immediate consequence of losing the job they have 
now, or embarrassing themselves or their families now (in addition to the 
sentencing consequences).  The possibility of expungement many years 
down the road is comparatively remote and indefinite, and even at best 
it does not undo many of those consequences; it simply stops them from 
continuing to accrue over time. 
Support for this intuition derives from the substantial literature ad-
dressing the effects of differences or changes in expected sentences on 
crime rates.323  In general, this research finds that criminal behavior is 
not particularly sensitive to changes in the expected sentence, especially 
not to additional years of incarceration beyond the first few.324  Research 
instead indicates that deterrence is best achieved through certainty and 
celerity of punishment — for example, by visibly increasing policing.325  
Partly, this failure of deterrence is a function of people not understanding 
the relevant laws, but it is also because most people have high, even hy-
perbolic, “discount rates” — we simply do not care nearly as much about 
things that will happen to us years from now as we do about things that 
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 322 In support of our conjecture, research indicates that individuals living in states that decrimi-
nalize marijuana often remain — at least for a time — not fully aware of the change in the law.  
Rather, they continue to believe that they could be jailed for marijuana possession.  Robert  
MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing 
the Perceptual Component of Deterrence Theory, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 347, 366–67 (2009). 
 323 See Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 318, at 5–6, 24–28 (providing an excellent recent review 
of the literature); J.J. Prescott, Criminal Sanctions and Deterrence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 498, 508–09 (Alain Marciano & Giovanni Battista Ramello eds., 2019). 
 324 See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Long-Term Sentences: Time to Reconsider the Scale of Punishment, 87 
UMKC L. REV. 113, 123 (2018); Michael Tonry, An Honest Politician’s Guide to Deterrence:  
Certainty, Severity, Celerity, and Parsimony, in 23 DETERRENCE, CHOICE, AND CRIME 365, 365 
(Daniel S. Nagin et al. eds, 2018); Giovanni Mastrobuoni & David Rivers, Criminal Discount  
Factors and Deterrence 1 (Inst. of Labor Econ., Discussion Paper No. 9769, 2016), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730969 [https://perma.cc/ZN8M-FHWZ] (“Our esti-
mates imply that the majority of deterrence is derived from the first few years in prison.”).  But see, 
e.g., Francesco Drago, Roberto Galbiati & Pietro Vertova, The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, 117 J. POL. ECON. 257, 259–60, 267–73 (2009). 
 325 See Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 318, at 5 (“[T]here is considerable evidence that crime is 
responsive to police . . . .”). 
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will happen today.326  This basic feature of human psychology, which 
may be even more present in lawbreakers,327 has been documented in 
wide-ranging contexts.328  And its pervasiveness strongly implies that the 
possibility of an expungement years later is unlikely to sway a person’s 
decision to commit a crime today.329  Furthermore, even beyond the ef-
fects of the waiting period’s implicit delay, scholarship on general deter-
rence suggests that people are simply less responsive to the consequences 
of being caught for a crime in the first place than one might expect based 
on traditional economic theory.330 
Third, if one broadens the analysis to encompass general deterrence 
effects, it also makes sense to take into account yet another channel by 
which expungement might influence crime: the specific deterrence of po-
tential expungement recipients.  That is, one must consider how the pos-
sibility of expungement affects the incentives of the many people who 
already have criminal records, not just those who are contemplating the 
commission of first offenses.331  After all, most crime is committed by re-
peat offenders.  And these effects, intuitively, cut in the opposite direction 
— and not just after expungement, which is the subject of our recidivism 
discussion in Part III.  Just about every state that makes expungement 
available conditions it on some period of good behavior — which creates 
incentives for good behavior before the waiting period expires.332  To be 
sure, such effects have not been studied either, and they too depend on 
potential offenders knowing about the expungement law and caring 
about the consequences of a clean record.  But even though knowledge 
of expungement laws is limited even among this subpopulation, people 
who are already convicted and potentially expungement-eligible are, in-
tuitively, at least somewhat more likely than members of the general pub-
lic to be aware of such policies and to consider their benefits germane to 
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 326 See Chae Mamayek et al., Temporal Discounting, Present Orientation, and Criminal  
Deterrence, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF OFFENDER DECISION MAKING 209, 214–15 
(Wim Bernasco et al. eds., 2017). 
 327 See David Åkerlund et al., Time Discounting and Criminal Behavior, 113 PNAS 6160, 6160 (2016). 
 328 Murat Yilmaz, An Extended Survey of Time-Inconsistency and Its Applications, 32 
BOGAZIÇI J. REV. SOC., ECON. & ADMIN. STUD. 55, 56–58 (2018). 
 329 J.J. Prescott and Jonah Rockoff, supra note 254, do find some evidence that the possibility of 
becoming a publicly registered sex offender many years in the future can deter first-time sex of-
fenses, see id. at 181.  However, inclusion on a sex offender registry is an unusually well-known and 
widely feared collateral consequence; Prescott, supra note 253, observes that other collateral conse-
quences (and even sentencing consequences such as those we discuss here) are likely less salient to 
potential offenders, see id. at 1040. 
 330 See Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 318, at 37–40. 
 331 See Michael Mueller-Smith & Kevin T. Schnepel, Diversion in the Criminal Justice System:  
Regression Discontinuity Evidence on Court Deferrals 3–6 (Aug. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wp-content/uploads/sites/283/2017/08/Diversion_in_the_Criminal_ 
Justice_System.pdf [https://perma.cc/F98G-SGCH]. 
 332 It might be possible to strengthen incentives for ongoing good behavior by providing that a 
subsequent conviction following an expungement could lead to the unsealing of a previously sealed 
conviction.  See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF 
MASS INCARCERATION 156–57 (2007). 
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their decision making.  After all, these people are living at that moment 
with the often-significant collateral consequences of their records; if they 
are struggling to find a job or housing, the possibility that another clean 
year or two could entitle them to an expungement might be much more 
salient to them than expungement opportunities are to the general public. 
Finally, it bears noting that the theoretical possibility that general de-
terrence of criminal behavior might decrease in a world with expunge-
ment is an argument that, at its logical extreme, can be deployed against 
any reform meant to reduce the harshness of the criminal justice system’s 
consequences.  But it cannot be the case that anything that makes the 
lives of people with records worse is better; this notion is at odds with all 
reentry efforts and all policy-based limits on punitiveness.  At some point, 
the costs of such an approach to individuals and communities outweigh 
the benefits.  In this case, the purported general deterrence concern is 
purely theoretical, tentative at best, and fragile on its own terms.  Absent 
strong evidence supporting its practical importance in the expungement 
context, policymakers ought to give the general deterrence argument 
very little weight. 
B.  Statistical Discrimination or Stereotyping 
A different objection relates to the potential unintended labor- 
market consequences of expungement laws.  The precise worry is that if 
employers really do not want to hire people with criminal records, wall-
ing off information about applicants’ records will simply cause them to 
pursue that objective in other, potentially more pernicious ways.  Specif-
ically, employers might instead rely more heavily on perceived proxies for 
criminal records, such as race — which could amplify racial disparities 
in employment.333  This phenomenon is referred to as statistical discrim-
ination, or — if employers’ assumptions about who has criminal records 
are inaccurate or exaggerated — stereotyping.334 
The strongest empirical support for this concern comes from recent 
research by one of us on the effects of Ban-the-Box laws.  In a large, ran-
domized field experiment that varied the race of fictitious job applicants, 
Agan and Starr find that after Ban-the-Box went into effect in two  
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 333 See Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of “Ban the Box”: 
Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes when Criminal Histories Are Hidden, 38 J. 
LAB. ECON. 321, 324–26 (2020). 
 334 See generally Kevin Lang & Jee-Yeon K. Lehmann, Racial Discrimination in the Labor  
Market: Theory and Empirics, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 959, 985–98 (2012).  Landlords and other 
decision makers could in theory have similar responses, although we focus our discussion here on 
employment.  See, e.g., David Bjerk, Racial Profiling, Statistical Discrimination, and the Effect of 
a Colorblind Policy on the Crime Rate, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 521, 522 (2007).  
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jurisdictions, white applicants’ advantage in receiving callbacks from af-
fected employers skyrocketed by more than a factor of six.335  These find-
ings suggest that large numbers of employers appear simply to assume 
that most or at least many black applicants have criminal records.  Un-
derstandably, we are often asked whether we ought to expect expunge-
ment laws to have a similar effect. 
This question is legitimate and worthy of study in the future; we are 
aware of no empirical evidence on this concern yet.  But we believe that 
at least under the vast majority of current and proposed expungement 
policies, there is little reason to fear a substantial increase in racial dis-
crimination.  An important difference between expungement and Ban-
the-Box restrictions is that Ban-the-Box explicitly takes away all crimi-
nal record information on all applicants, at least during the early stages 
of the hiring process, when significant screening occurs.336  Employers 
reviewing applications are left completely in the dark as to who has a 
criminal record — even as to very serious, very long, and very recent 
criminal records.  Expungement policies, in contrast, are much more tar-
geted in their approach; most conviction records will never be expunged, 
and recent (and thus much more informative) records categorically can-
not be expunged under the law in most states.  Moreover, in a jurisdiction 
with an expungement law, employers can collect information on criminal 
records, and anybody with a non-expunged record can be required to 
provide that information. 
So employers under an expungement policy still have access to a lot 
of information about criminal history; this should reduce their incentive 
to rely on factors like race as a proxy for it.  In Michigan, for instance, if 
an employer sees that an applicant reports having no record, it is vanish-
ingly unlikely at present that the applicant actually has an expunged rec-
ord; there are ten million people in Michigan, and only around thirty 
thousand expungement recipients.  Even if expungement were made au-
tomatic, expanding the size of the latter group substantially, it would still 
be fairly unlikely for any particular applicant to have received an ex-
pungement.337  Moreover, even if the applicant does have an expunged 
record, at worst, it would be an old and likely less serious one, followed 
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 335 See Agan & Starr, Ban the Box, supra note 39, at 191. 
 336 See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 333, at 323–24 (“Even though ex-offenders could be weeded 
out after the interview process, interviewing candidates is costly.  Employers would rather not spend 
time interviewing candidates who they are sure to reject when their criminal history is revealed.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 337 See Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 353, 355–62 (2014) (surveying state and federal expungement policies and noting 
how few crimes are eligible for expungement). 
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by years of nonrecidivism, given the waiting period and eligibility re-
quirements.338  This possibility provides little incentive for employers to 
engage in statistical discrimination.   
What’s more, all of this assumes employers know expungement laws 
exist at all.  Ban-the-Box laws have been very salient to employers, who 
were forced to change their applications and were mandated to refrain 
from asking about something that had always been a traditional part of 
their process.339  Expungement law is not salient in the same way.  Em-
ployers need do nothing, and they can continue to ask the questions (and 
run the background checks) that they always have.  And, if most people 
with expungeable records are unaware of record-clearing opportunities, 
it seems very likely that many employers will be in the dark about them 
as well. 
All of that said, there can be no doubt that the landscape of expunge-
ment reform is changing, and the more sweeping expungement policies 
become, the more reason there will be to worry about the possibility of 
statistical discrimination by decision makers.  If an expungement policy 
is so broad that it leaves employers effectively without much useful crim-
inal record information at all, they might indeed react much as employers 
do to Ban-the-Box policies.  Among current expungement laws, Califor-
nia’s may come closest to raising this concern, since it appears to apply 
to a broad swath of criminal offenses, albeit relatively minor ones, and 
has (for some crimes) no post-sentence waiting period.340  Therefore, the 
effect of this and similarly expansive laws on racial discrimination is 
worth assessing via future research. 
CONCLUSION 
As states throughout the country continue to debate the adoption and 
expansion of expungement laws, it is important for their decisionmaking 
to be guided not by hype or supposition, but by empirical evidence.  Prior 
to the work we present in this Article, policymakers have had very little 
at their disposal.  Fortunately, Michigan’s experience with expungement 
provides a great opportunity to evaluate how these laws work in practice 
and what their consequences are likely to be.  The challenges faced by 
people with records in Michigan are fundamentally similar to those faced 
by their counterparts in other states, and many features of Michigan’s 
law — for example, its coverage of felonies and violent crimes and its 
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 338 See Pager, supra note 30, at 963 (noting that employers may sometimes only ask about incar-
ceration within the past year); Kathy Gurchiek, Research: Employers Willing to Overlook a Criminal 
Record to Hire the Right Person, SHRM (May 17, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/behavioral-competencies/global-and-cultural-effectiveness/pages/research-employers-willing-
to-overlook-criminal-record-to-hire-right-person.aspx [https://perma.cc/U3Z3-7B92] (reporting survey 
data showing that employers are less worried about — and therefore relatively more likely to hire — 
individuals with the kinds of records that expungement laws typically address). 
 339 See Hanks, supra note 83. 
 340 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.425(a)(2)(E)(i) (West 2020). 
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middle-of-the-road waiting period — make the state’s experience with 
expungement particularly relevant to assessing the likely effects of re-
forms nationwide.  We hope the findings we document in this study, the 
first of its kind, will provide helpful guidance for those crucial policy  
decisions. 
Taken together, our findings strongly support increasing the availa-
bility of expungement — and particularly efforts to make expungements 
automatic, or at least procedurally easy to obtain.  Those whose records 
are expunged experience large gains in employment rates and wages — 
and while some of these gains may have their source in other factors such 
as underlying motivation, expungements very likely cause a substantial 
portion of these improvements.  The expungement effects we uncover 
imply that record clearing compares favorably as a strategy to other pol-
icy interventions that seek to improve employment outcomes.  Take, for 
example, job training — a common public investment.  A meta-analysis 
of thirty-one studies covering fifteen different publicly funded job-train-
ing programs finds average unweighted gains in annual wages of $832 
for women and $471 for men.341  Like expungement recipients in  
Michigan, participants in these programs were self-selected; they pur-
sued the programs because they thought they would benefit from them.  
And they did benefit — but not nearly as much as expungement recipi-
ents do (annualized, the wage gains for our sample come to $4594 for 
women and $4295 for men).342  Meanwhile, the average cost of these job-
training programs to the government was $6600 per person.343  Expunge-
ment, in contrast, has comparatively minimal costs (running a back-
ground check, holding a court hearing, processing the paperwork),344 and 
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 341 David H. Greenberg et al., A Meta-Analysis of Government-Sponsored Training Programs, 57 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 31, 42 (2003) (reporting weighted means across studies). 
 342 The job-training study reports results in 1999 dollars, id. at 33, whereas our figures are nom-
inal gains over one-year periods falling between 1997 to 2011, with a median year of 2005.  Adjust-
ing the job-training averages to 2005 dollars comes to $1611 for women and $373 for men. 
 343 Id. at 50. 
 344 For example, the cost of ink fingerprinting, one of the procedure’s requirements, is $15 at the 
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OAKLAND PRESS (Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.theoaklandpress.com/news/nation-world-news/state-
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2dec246d40c5.html [https://perma.cc/8TY3-FVJ4]. 
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these could very likely be reduced much further if the process were sim-
plified or automated.  As an employment intervention, therefore, ex-
pungement appears superior to job training in terms of both its effective-
ness and its price tag. 
The arguments of expungement opponents do not typically focus on 
program expenditures, of course, but rather on public safety.345  Fortu-
nately, our findings on the crime front are equally encouraging.  Subse-
quent offending rates after expungement are extremely low.  Ninety-nine 
percent of those who receive expungements in Michigan are not con-
victed of a felony anytime in the next five years; 99.4% are not convicted 
of any violent crime; and 95.8% are not convicted of any crime at all, 
even a petty misdemeanor.  In fact, expungement recipients appear to be 
lower risk than the general public.  To be sure, recidivism rates would 
not be as low if states made expungement available immediately follow-
ing the completion of a sentence, removed judicial discretion, or extended 
it to a generally riskier pool, such as people with more extensive criminal 
records.  But even in those scenarios, there is still no evidence to suggest 
that access to expungement would increase the recidivism risk of those 
groups; if anything, due to the benefits we find in terms of employment 
outcomes (and possible benefits in other areas), one should probably ex-
pect their recidivism rates to decline. 
The discouraging element of our findings is that, despite the apparent 
benefits of expungement, very few people — even among those who are 
eligible — actually obtain them.  Our best estimate is that 6.5% of people 
who meet the legal requirements for expungement in Michigan obtain 
one within five years — a small fraction of what is already a small frac-
tion of all those living with records, given the tight eligibility require-
ments.  This low uptake rate is troubling, but not shocking, given the 
procedural hurdles and expenses involved, the lack of legal counsel, the 
dearth of public information, and the fact that most people with records 
have limited resources for overcoming these challenges.  Unfortunately, 
all but a handful of states with expungement laws require individuals to 
apply for relief and give judges the discretion to deny them, so the situa-
tion is unlikely to be better in other states.346 
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 345 “The most potent argument for broad access to criminal history data is to preserve public 
safety.  The right to a safe and peaceful environment is a core value for a civilized society, and 
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(“Simply put, the public safety is better served when people with criminal convictions are able to 
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 346 See CCRC State Survey, supra note 11.  For examples of the pitfalls in the application process, 
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of Denied Expungement-Seekers, 40 DEVIANT BEHAV. 1428, 1435 (2019).  
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The policy upshot of our research is clear: the process of obtaining 
expungement should be made as simple as possible, or ideally automatic 
once an individual’s record meets the legal requirements.  The path-
breaking Pennsylvania automatic-sealing law, while still at the forefront 
of developing legislation, has illustrated a way forward; indeed,  
California’s, Utah’s, and New Jersey’s newly adopted automatic ex-
pungement policies are further dramatic advances.347  With luck, the 
next wave of Clean Slate legislation will continue to move in this direc-
tion.348  
Pennsylvania’s law is a watershed in terms of expungement proce-
dure, but it is unfortunately quite limited in its substantive scope (that is, 
in terms of its eligibility rules): automatic expungement applies only to 
people with minor, nonviolent misdemeanors after ten crime-free 
years.349  Other earlier adopters are less limited on a few dimensions, but 
not on many and not by much.  Presumably, Pennsylvania clean-slate 
advocates concluded that the bill’s substantive constraints were politi-
cally necessary to secure automatic process.350  Likely, this limitation was 
meant to defuse the concern that people with more substantial or more 
recent convictions posed a greater public-safety risk.  But our findings 
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 347 See Sharon Dietrich & Rebecca Vallas, The Left, the Right, and the Football Players: How 
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states have “siloed” systems that do not transmit records from one court to another.  Id.  Record-
keeping systems (and the infrastructure they require) are an additional hurdle that states without 
centralized systems should consider in crafting their reforms. 
 349 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2 (2018). 
 350 For example, those with past felony convictions, multiple first-degree misdemeanor convictions, 
and four or more second-degree misdemeanors are not eligible for automatic sealing.  Mark Scolforo, 
Wolf Signs Bill Sealing Some Criminal Records After Decade, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 28, 2018), 
https://apnews.com/9fb7a96015944642bdf796c30cee35a5/Wolf-signs-bill-sealing-some-criminal- 
records-after-decade [https://perma.cc/Z2QF-8EBJ].  See also Dietrich & Vallas, supra note 347, for a 
description of the political compromises the bill made: “The bill . . . expanded sealing eligibility to reach 
first-degree misdemeanors.  Although a modest expansion, this was the most that appeared politically 
feasible, given that misdemeanor sealing had just been introduced by Act 5 earlier in 2016.”  Id.  District 
attorney support was vital to the passing of the law, leading to more exclusions in the bill: “Critical 
stakeholders we needed on board — or at least to remain neutral — were the district attorneys, from 
whom opposition on a record-clearing bill in Pennsylvania was likely enough to kill it.  One major area 
of focus for them and others was which criminal records would be eligible for sealing both through 
Clean Slate and through expanded eligibility for filing by petition, and the list of exclusions became 
longer as we brought them and other key parties on board.”  Id. 
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indicate that these concerns are unfounded; people who receive expunge-
ments after just five years pose a very low recidivism risk, even though 
Michigan does not exclude people with felonies or violent offenses.351  
The somewhat broader approaches now being pursued in states like  
California — and perhaps soon in Michigan as well — are more ambi-
tious, and studying their effects will help us to learn more about what 
happens when expungement is granted broadly and automatically, and 
not to a narrow, self-selected sample. 
For now, however, it is likely that most states will continue to require 
an application-based, discretionary procedure for at least some subsets of 
expungement applicants.  Where this is so, policymakers should consider 
how to at least render that process as easy and accommodating as possi-
ble.  Courts, public defenders’ offices, or prosecutors’ offices could auto-
matically notify individuals, after the requisite waiting period, that they 
may be eligible for expungement, and provide them with links to online 
tools for determining eligibility.  Court hearings should not be necessary, 
especially when prosecutors and victims do not oppose expungements.  
Online applications should be permitted.  Serving the application on mul-
tiple entities (the court, the prosecution, the police) should not be re-
quired, given that the information could be passed along automatically 
via computerized processes.  Fingerprinting may be essential for back-
ground checks (although this too perhaps could be done via touchscreen), 
but there is no reason an applicant should have to make a fingerprinting 
visit to a police station and multiple courthouse visits, not to mention a 
possible visit to a notary.  For example, the court clerk’s office should be 
set up to provide whatever records are necessary, provide the form or a 
computer terminal, take the fingerprints, and collect the forms all at once.  
Fees should be eliminated; they are minor in their impact on the public 
fisc (especially given the cost-effectiveness of expungements at improving 
employment outcomes), but they remain substantial barriers for many 
people with records. 
Long after they have served their sentences, tens of millions of  
Americans and their families face the serious challenges of life with a 
criminal conviction record, and this number increases daily.  Collectively, 
these challenges contribute to many significant public policy concerns, 
making it harder for these families to avoid poverty and contributing to 
racial disparities in employment and other domains.  Our empirical re-
sults suggest that expungement is a powerful policy lever for redressing 
these negative consequences, without risk (and possibly with benefits) to 
public safety.  But expungement will only realize its full potential and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 351 See supra Part III, pp. 2510–23 (describing the low recidivism rates for expungement recipi-
ents despite Michigan allowing expungements for those with violent felony convictions); see also 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621(3) (2020) (allowing expungements for those with one felony convic-
tion, with the exceptions of sex offenses that are subject to registration requirements and offenses 
carrying potential life-imprisonment terms). 
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make a serious dent in these large-scale social problems if we make it avail-
able much more broadly and much more easily.  Legislatures throughout 
the country have been taking up the issue, which provides reason for opti-
mism.  They should now consider the empirical evidence, which makes a 
clear case for action. 
 
 
 
 
